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ABSTRACT. 
One hundred and nine generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) patients, referred 
by their General Practitioners to a clinical psychology primary care 
service, were assigned to either Cognitive, Behavioural, Cognitive- 
behavioural, Placebo or Waiting List conditions. 'Stress Control' 
large group therapy combined didactic therapy with a workshop model 
and emphasised the aim of turning patients into their own 'therapists' 
in order to enable them to deal with present and future problems. 
Patients were thus encouraged to view Stress Control as an "evening 
class" rather than "group therapy". Measures of treatment process and 
outcome were obtained mainly from self-report instruments. Follow-up 
data were collected at six months post-treatment. 
At post-therapy, all active therapy conditions and, against expectation, 
the Placebo condition had shown significant time within treatment group 
change. The active therapy conditions, and to a lesser extent, the 
Placebo condition, were significantly different to the Waiting List 
condition, which, overall showed no evidence of improvement. At 
follow-up the active therapy condition generally enhanced therapy gains 
while the Placebo condition maintained therapy gains. 
Process measures did not, with*the exception of self-statement change, 
differentiate between the groups. Noted variable response in the main 
analyses was somewhat explained by various sub-group analyses. There 
appeared to be little benefit in dividing patients into those who 
experienced panic and those who did not. There was some evidence that 
'matching' patients to therapy, i. e. cognitive responders to cognitive 
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therapy was of value at post-therapy although differences generally 
disappeared at follow-up. Synchronous change was associated with 
enhanced performance. Finally, attempts to predict response to 
Stress Control by a comparison of responders and non-responders were 
attempted and the results assessed in terms of clinical as opposed to 
statistical significance. 
The results of the present study are discussed with reference to other 
treatment outcome studies and an attempt to produce a model to account 
for the similar effects found across treatment conditions. The 
implications of these findings and some suggestions for future 
research for GAD and other diagnostic categories are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) appears to be the most frequently 
occurring anxiety disorder in the community and GAD patients may 
comprise one-fifth of all referrals to primary care clinical psychology 
services (Espie & White, 1986). In a period of increasing dissatisfaction 
with the use of benzodiazepines as a treatment approach for this group, 
it is argued that clinical psychology services in primary care are well 
placed to provide effective treatment for this population. The 
literature on GAD reflects the difficulties imposed by the substantial 
alterations in the classification of GAD as study populaticns fitting 
DSM-III criteria-may not be the same as those fitting DSM-III-R criteria. 
Perhaps related to the diagnostic difficulties associated with this 
population, GAD, in contrast to other anxiety conditions, e. g. Panic 
Disorder, has not been studied in depth (Hoehn-Saric, 1985). 
Recent treatment outcome studies, based on research demonstrating an 
association between anxiety and a variety of cognitions (e. g. Hibbert, 
1984), suggest that cognitive-behavioural approaches may be beneficial in 
dealing with patients described as "difficult customers" (Woodward & 
Jones, 1980). Although reasonably successful, little work has so far 
focused on the process of change. In addition, no placebo condition 
has so far been included in an outcome study. . 
The present study was conducted to provide systematic and controlled 
evaluation, using G. P. referred patients, of a large-group therapy 
approach designed not only as a short-term, cost effective approach to 
primary care treatment but also to investigate the process of change during 
treatment and to investigate the relative contribution of specific 
and non-specific treatment components. 
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PART 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERALISED ANXIETY DISORDER 
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While behavioural treatments have been shown to be successful for 
problems with an identifiable external focus, e. g. agoraphobia 
(Mathews et al, 1981) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Foa et al, 
1984), these treatments have been shown to be limited in the 
treatment of disorders characterised by a lack of external anxiety 
cues such as GAD. However, there has recently been a promising 
surge of interest which has focused on the internal fear cues 
associated with GAD and Panic Disorder (PD). In part this has 
been facilitated by changes in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), particularly by the delineation 
of GAD and PD in DSM-III (1980) and, more recently, in the 
revised version of this manual, DSM-III-R (1987). 
This chapter will concentrate on Generalised Anxiety Disorder 
and divides into 6 sections: 
1). GAD IN DSM. 
2). PREVALENCE AND ONSET. 
3). PREDISPOSITION. 
4). COGNITIVE FACTORS IN GAD. 
5). PROBLEMS OF DIAGNOSIS. 
6). CONCLUSION. 
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1). GAD IN DSM 
Although the DSM of the American Psychiatric Association has 
undergone revisions over the decades, DSM-III represented the most 
radical departure from its predecessors. In particular, the removal 
of the rather vague category of 'Anxiety Neurosis' allowed, for 
the first time, the distinction to be made between GAD and PD. 
Influenced by the work of Klein (1962,1964,1981), this distinction 
is now widely accepted although many authors raise the issue of 
whether there are true differences between these categories or 
whether they simply represent different points on a dimension of 
severity of anxiety (Lowe et al, 1984; Mathews, 1985). The 
division has probably been welcomed more in the United States than 
in Britain where Tyrer (1984) noted that, following the removal 
of the original criteria for classifying anxiety neurosis, DSM-III 
had turned GAD into "an ativistic ghost of its predecessor that 
can hardly stand alone as a diagnostic entity" (page 79). 
In fact, the DSM-III definition of GAD produced so much confusion 
that few researchers or clinicians could agree on individuals who 
would meet the definition. This was influenced by the fact that, 
within DSM-III, GAD is considered a residual category only to be 
diagnosed if the specific symptoms of Phobic Disorder, Panic Disorder 
or Obsessive Compulsive Disorder are not present. This convention 
is absent in DSM-III-R which accords GAD equivalent status to the 
other anxiety disorders. 
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Almost all hierarchical exclusionary rules are eliminated thus. 
allowing the establishment of patterns of comorbidity, i. e. 
a patient can be assigned several diagnoses of which one will 
normally be assigned a primary status. The criteria are more 
restrictive. In order to distinguish GAD from transient stress 
reactions, the minimum duration of symptoms has been extended 
from one month to six months and diagnosis requires the presence 
of at least six of the listed eighteen symptoms. Also of great 
importance, the diagnosis of GAD, unlike its predecessor, now 
allows for the presence of panic attacks. Thus DSM-III-R 
defines GAD as: 
A. Unrealistic or excessive anxiety and worry 
(apprehensive expectation) about two or more 
life circumstances, e. g. worry about possible 
misfortune to one's child (who is in no danger) 
and worry about finances (for no good reason), 
for a period of six months or longer, during 
which the person has been bothered more days 
than not by these concerns. In children and 
adolescents, this may take the form of anxiety 
and worry about academic, athletic, and social 
performance. 
B. If another AXIS I disorder is present, the 
focus of the anxiety and worry in A is unrelated 
to it, e. g., the anxiety or worry is not about 
having a panic attack (as in Panic Disorder), 
being embarrassed in public (as in Social Phobia), 
being contaminated (as in Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder), or gaining weight (as in Anorexia 
Nervosa). 
C. The disturbance does not occur only during the 
cause of a Mood Disorder or a psychotic disorder. 
D. At least six of the following 18 symptoms are 
often present when anxious (do not include 
symptoms present only during panic attacks): 
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Motor Tension 
(1) trumblirg, twitching or feeling shaky 
(2) muscle tension, aches, or soreness 
(3) restlessness 
(4) easy fatigxibility 
Autonomic hyperactivity 
(5) shortness of breath or sxotherirg sensation 
(6) palpitations or accelerated heart rate 
(tachycardia) 
(7) sweating, or cold clammy hands 
(8) dry mouth 
(9) dim or lj&htheadedness 
(ID) narzsea, diarrhoea, or other abdominal distress 
(11) flushes (tot flashes) or chills 
(12) frequent urination 
(13) trouble swallowirg or "limp in throat" 
Vigilance and sca nixg 
(14) feeling 1myed up or on ectp 
(15) erated startle response 
(16) difficulty concentrating or 'bind ipirg 
blank" became of anxiety 
(17) trouble falling or staying asleep 
(18) irritability. 
E. It cannot be established that an organic factor 
initiated and maintained the disturbance, e. g. 
hyperthyroidism, caffeine intoxication. 
The cardinal feature of GAD is apprehensive expectation 
(Barlow, 1988b) while the most common spheres of worry have 
been shown to be family, money and work (Sanderson and Barlow, 
1986). 
2). PREVALENCE AND ONSET 
Prevalence of GAD has been difficult to establish due to poorly 
defined diagnostic criteria and to alterations in these criteria 
e. g. DSM-III specifically excludes panic in GAD whereas 
DSM-III-R allows for the presence of panic as long as the 
frequency and severity of panic attacks do not reach the criteria 
for Panic Disorder. In addition, as there is no clear dividing 
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line between 'normal' and 'clinical'anxiety, the accurate 
determination of onset is beset with difficulties. 
i. Studies prior to specific diagnostic criteria 
Marks and Lader (1973) found a good deal of agreement among five 
populations conducted in the U. S. A., Great Britain and Sweden 
between 1943 and 1966. They reported a prevalence rate of 
between 2 and 4.7 per 100. Anxiety states were more prevalent 
in women especially between the ages of 16 and 40. 
Barlow et al (1984) cite a Gallup Organisation Survey in the 
U. S. A. which found marked anxiety in 30 to 40% of the general 
population with greater prevalence in females. Lader (1975) 
notes similar levels in a British study. Marsland et al (1976) 
found that anxiety was the fifth most common diagnosis in 
medical practices in Virginia. Dunn (1983) states that 
'anxiety neurosis' was the most common psychological disorder 
diagnosed by G. P. s in Britain. Weissman (1985) reviewed an 
additional nine community studies of anxiety states. Due to 
variations in diagnostic methodology and time periods studied, 
little can be said definitively. However, the studies, in 
general, are in agreement with those reviewed by Marks and Lader 
(1973). 
ii. Studies using specific diagnostic criteria 
Data are available from epidemiologic surveys, all in the U. S. A. 
and which utilize structured diagnostic interviews and specified 
criteria.. 
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a). New Haven Survey 
Using the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia- 
Lifetime Version (SADS-L), Weissman et al (1978) found a 
prevalence rate for GAD of 2.5 per 100 in Connecticut. They 
found a substantial overlap within the anxiety disorder group - 
over 80% of all individuals diagnosed as GAD had had at least 
one other anxiety disorder in their lifetime. The study also 
found that 7% of the GAD group had major depression at some time 
in their life. GAD was slightly more common in middle and 
younger aged women, non-whites, singles and those in lower 
socio-economic classes. 
b). National Survey of Psychotherapeutic Drug Use 
From a symptom check list administered by survey interviewers in 
a large scale survey, Uhlenhuth et al (1983) report a prevalence 
rate for GAD of 6.4 per 100 (prevalence of one year) making it 
the most commonly identified DSM-III disorder. Women were more 
likely to be diagnosed as suffering from GAD. 
Weissman (1985) notes the. marked discrepancy between the rates 
(2.5 - 6.4). She suggests it may be accounted for by the fact 
that the former is a current rate while the latter is a one year 
rate. Sample sizes also differed - the Uhlenhuth study 
interviewed, in all categories, 3161 individuals while Weissman 
interviewed, in all categories, only 511 individuals. 
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c). Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study Survey 
ECA respresents the most sophisticated epidemiological study. 
However, only preliminary data are available for GAD. Barlow 
(1988b) quotes a personal communication from L. N. Robins who 
places the prevalence of GAD at approximately 4%. GAD thus 
appears to be the most frequently occurring anxiety disorder, 
occurring 3-5 times more frequently than P. D. 
The onset of symptoms is generally between the ages of 16 and 
26 (median 21) (Hoehn-Saric and McLeod, 1988) - Barlow et al (1986) 
note that in his sample of 12 GAD patients, over half reported 
being anxious for more than half of their lives. Akiskal (1985), 
on the basis of this commonly found lengthy duration of symptoms, 
proposed that GAD patients actually suffer from an anxious 
personality. 
3. PREDISPOSITION 
The notion that anxiety disorders are familial is not new. 
Cohen et al (1951) described 19 reports published between 1869 
and 1948 in which a familial predisposition to anxiety was described. 
More recently, Carey and Gottesman (1981) and Carey (1985) reviewed 
studies of first degree relatives of "anxiety neurosis" probands. 
Rates range from 14.9 to 15.6 per 100. All of these studies are, 
however, open to major methodological weaknesses (Barlow, 1988b). 
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Two studies have specifically looked at the families of GAD 
probands. Cloninger et al (1981) noted a GAD rate of 3.1 per 
100 among first degree relatives. A similar frequency of GAD 
(3.5 per 100) was found among first degree relatives of the 
control group. Davidson et al (1985) identify similar rates - 
3.8 per 100 among parents of GAD probands and 3.2 per 100 among 
siblings. Torgensen (1988), on the basis of these findings, 
thus suggests that the specific familial transmission of GAD 
is negligible although a nonspecific familial transmission may 
exist as Davidson et al (1985) note that only one of thirteen 
(7%) of the patients with GAD lacked a first degree relative with 
a psychiatric disorder. 
Family studies are, however, open to the obvious criticism that 
not only do they share common genes but also common environments. 
Torgensen (1983), using DSM-III criteria, studied twelve 
monozygotic (MZ) and 20 'dizygotic (DZ) adult, same sex twins of 
whom one had been diagnosed as having GAD. In stark contrast 
to PD, no specific genetic transmission was apparent. However, 
in acordance with the Davidson et al (1985) finding, 25% of the 
MZ and DZ co-twins had another psychiatric disorder. 
Barlow (1988b) questions whether the difference between GAD 
and PD on genetic predisposition is so clear cut. He suggests 
that the results may be artifactual due to the use of DSM-III 
criteria which may have led to only milder non-panicking patients 
being assigned a GAD diagnosis and thus any differences may reflect 
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differences in severity rather than differences due to diagnosis. 
Indeed a re-analysis of Torgensen's data finds only a genetic 
contribution amongst those probands who were receiving in-patient 
treatment but not out-patient treatment. In addition, since 
almost all PD patients also present with marked generalised anxiety 
(Barlow et al, 1986), establishing different heritability rates 
for PD and GAD would require at least matching the two groups 
on severity. 
There is interesting evidence supporting the view that GAD is a 
consequence of environmental events. Thomas and Chess (1977, 
1984) followed children from the age of three months to their late 
teens. They noted that various personality traits including 
anxiety were present already in infants. High levels of anxiety 
in the mothers (Windhauser, 1977) and interpersonal relationship 
problems in later life (Ilfield, 1979) have been found to be related 
to the emergence and maintenance-of anxiety. Torgensen (1986) 
noted that 31% of twins with GAD had lost their mother, father 
or both parents in childhood compared with 10% of PD twins. 
While further studies are clearly called for, particularly using 
DSM-III-R criteria, current research suggests that while GAD 
patients may havea non-specific genetic 'vulnerability' e. g. 
Eysenck's (1967) work on the autonomic nervous system, increased 
attention is now being paid to the cognitive factors involved in 
GAD. 
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4). COGNITIVE FACTORS IN GAD 
With increased emphasis being placed on the role of information 
processing in anxiety disorders (e. g. see Brewin, 1988), several 
studies have now highlighted that the widely accepted concept of 
GAD as comprising diffuse fears which are, by definition, unknown, 
is tautologous. The focus of fear in GAD is, however, on 
internally - rather than externally - elicited stimuli. 
Beck et al (1974) studying 32 'anxiety neurosis' patients, - 
identified cognitions revolving around the themes of: 
1). Physical injury, illness or death 
2). Mental illness 
3). Psycho-social impairment or loss of control 
4). Failure or inability to cope 
5). Rejection, depreciation and domination. 
70% of patients had fears in at least three of these areas. 
Patients without panic attacks tended to focus on psycho-social 
rather than physical fears. 
While this study can be criticised on methodological grounds, 
Hibbert (1984), studying 25 patients diagnosed as suffering from 
generalised anxiety or panic disorder according to RDC criteria 
(Spitzer et al, 1978), noted similar results with cognitions 
centreing on the theme of personal danger. Generally anxious 
patients had a central fear of an inability to cope with people 
whereas PD patients had fears of physical danger. Similar results 
have also been reported by Rapee (1985). Again comparing GAD 
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and PD patients (DSM-III criteria) he noticed that PD patients 
realised the symptoms were the result of reacting in an anxious 
fashion and therefore harmless. - Butler and Mathews (1983) 
asked subjects to estimate the subjective probability of a 
range of hypothetical dangers. Results showed that anxiety 
state patients over-estimated the probability of future (hypothetical) 
events related to themselves but not to other people. In addition, 
Beck et al (1974) and Hibbert (1984) provide some evidence that 
the danger related thoughts precede the anxious mood and thus 
support the cognitive view that cognitions are central in the 
mediation of anxiety. 
The above evidence thus suggests that GAD patients have systematic 
biases in the way they process incoming information and, hence, 
the informational value of new experiences depends on how they 
are processed by the individual (Brewin, 1980). This helps 
explain why anxiety is not diminished by experience, i. e. why 
anxiety does not respond to new information disconfirming the 
expectation of threat as previously noted. 
In a series of well designed studies, Mathews and his colleagues 
(Mathews and McLeod, 1985,1986; McLeod et al, 1986) have shown 
that GAD patients process threat cues differently to normals. 
Mathews and McLeod (1985) reported that, on a colour naming task, 
GAD subjects performance was disrupted in the presence of threat 
words. Similar results were reported by McLeod et al (1986). 
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Mathews and McLeod (1986) present evidence that GAD patients 
process unattended and subsequently unrecognised threat-related 
words differently to normal controls -a finding which has clear 
implications for cognitive therapy. However, Mogg et al (1987) 
compared GAD patients and normal controls in recall of positive 
and negative; threatening and non-threatening; self and other 
reference words. They could not demonstrate a self-referrent 
bias favouring negative or threatening words amongst anxious 
patients. Indeed, these patients had a relatively poorer memory 
for threatening material as compared to the control group. The 
authors note that phis data cannot be accounted for by the cognitive 
schema model. 
While many of the preceding studies provide some evidence for 
cognitive mediation in anxiety, the proposal that danger related 
cognitions are a reflection of change in the activation of anxiety 
rather than a prime determinant cannot yet be ruled out. As 
Beck and Emery (1985) note 
"We believe that the primary pathology or dysfunction 
during....... an anxiety disorder is in the cognitive 
aparatus. However, that is quite different from the 
notion that cognition causes these syndromes -a notion 
that is just as illogical as an assertion that hallucinations 
cause schizophrenia". (page 85). 
5). PROBLEMS OF DIAGNOSIS 
i. DSM 
Although DSM-III and DSM-III-R now clearly define anxiety sub- 
categories and allow researchers a common language for communication, 
they have been criticised on the grounds of being overly descriptive, 
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neo-Kraepelian and too medically orientated. They have been 
referred to as an extension of a medical approach to behavioural 
disturbances (McReynolds, 1979; Gormezy, 1978; Zubin, 1977). 
Barlow et al (1986) noted that GAD, defined by DSM-III as a 
residual category, could be identified in all anxiety disorders. 
DSM-III-R now gives GAD equivalent status to other disorders. 
However, using a well tested diagnostic assessment instrument 
(Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule - ADIS - Di Nardo et al, 
1983), Barlow et al (1985) demonstrated a Kappa coefficient of 
. 571 for GAD, well below the reliability level of other anxiety 
disorders with overt behavioural features, for example, . 854 for 
agoraphobia with panic, . 905 for social phobia. This suggests 
that a degree of confusion still exists as to what is or is not 
GAD. Changes in the criteria imposed for diagnosing GAD within 
DSM-III-R both reflect and enhance this confusion. It is notable 
that DSM-III and DSM-III-R have made more changes in the criteria 
for the anxiety neurosis/GAD/PD states than for other disorders. 
Indeed Barlow (1988b) suggests that DSM-IV, due to be published 
in 1992, will again involve further modification of diagnostic 
criteria for these disorders. 
Hoehn-Saric and McLeod (1983) and Hoehn-Saric and Masek (1981) 
suggest that patients included in the category of GAD are not a 
homogeneous group. In their studies patients with comparable 
ratings in anxiety scales, differed significantly in physiological 
response patterns. Some patients responded to psychological 
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stress with an elevation of heart rate, skin conductance and 
muscle tension while other patients with similar anxiety ratings 
only increased levels of muscle tension while autonomic responses 
were comparable with those of a normal control group. Hoehn-Saric 
(1983) concluded that GAD represented a heterogeneous group of 
disorders that differ from PD in having less severe symptoms. 
While the stricter criteria imposed by DSM-III-R and knowledge 
gained from 3 Systems Theory dilutes these criticism,, the DSM 
convention artificially promotes clearer divisions between the 
disorders than exists in reality, e. g. at what point does a 
GAD patient who panics become a PD patient with generalised 
anxiety? 
ii Normal versus Abnormal Anxiety 
GAD is closer to normal anxiety than other anxiety disorders. 
Establishing a dividing line between normal and abnormal anxiety 
is riddled with problems . Barlow et al (1987) noted that the 
most frequent reason given by two independent raters for dis- 
agreement was an inability to determine whether GAD was severe 
enough to be classified as a disorder. DSM-III criteria for GAD 
required only a one month duration of symptoms -a time period 
which also allowed transient stress reactions to be included as 
GAD. DSM-III-R increased the duration of symptoms to a minimum 
of six months. Breslau and Davis (1985), examining the utility 
of extending the duration criteria from one month to six months 
found prevalence rates were reduced from, perhaps an excessively 
high estimate of 11.5% (1 month) to 2.4% (6 months). Subjects 
reaching the 6 month criteria also reported a greater number of 
symptoms as well as more severe symptoms. Thus increasing the 
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duration criteria helps differentiate between clinical and 
transient anxiety, however the manifestation of GAD seems to 
differ from normal anxiety only in degree, not in quality. 
As with blood sugar levels in diabetes and blood pressure in 
hypertension, the dividing line between pathological and normal 
is arbitrary. In practice, it is exceedingly difficult, if not 
impossible to decide on the dividing line between clinical and 
sub-clinical anxiety. 
Barlow et al (1986), in a co-morbidity study noted that 83% 
of patients given a primary diagnosis of GAD also warranted an 
additional diagnosis (GAD, defined as a residual diagnosis by 
DSM-III, is almost always an associated feature of other anxiety 
disorders (see Barlow, 1985) ). 
In addition to difficulties in establishing the dividing line 
between normal and pathological anxiety, there are also 
difficulties in differential diagnoses between GAD, depression 
and PD. 
iii. Relationship to Depression 
Roth et al (1982) point out that 
the depression and anxiety syndromes are-distinct 
but related phenomena separated by a limited area of 
diagnostic uncertainty. The clean sharp line of 
distinction applied by DSM-III does not apply". (page 140) 
Hamilton (1980) noted cognitive symptoms of anxiety in 96% of his 
depressed group and somatic symptoms in 86% of this group. On 
cross-sectional studies, both anxiety and depressed groups score 
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significantly higher on depression scales (Barrett, 1981; 
Lipman, 1982; Heohn-Saric 1983). In addition, depression 
patients rate themselves as more severely impaired in all but 
the somatisation scores of the Hopkins Symptoms Check List 
(Raskin et al, 1982). Patients diagnosed as reactively depressed 
tend to have the same personality characteristics as those 
suffering from GAD (Zerssen, 1980). 
However, on longitudinal examination, depression in anxiety 
patients is a transitory reaction to the anxiety as are the 
feelings of inadequacy and failure. In contrast, in depressed 
patients, depression dominates the picture and severe tension 
occurs intermittently (Roth et al, 1972). During the course of 
an anxiety disorder, the anxiety state is more responsive to 
environmental events than in depression. Hamilton (1988) suggests 
this is one factor in explaining the differential effect (in 
favour of anxiety) of the placebo response. 
Beck (1976) states that each disorder can be characterised by a 
cognitive content specific to that disorder. In depression, 
the automatic thoughts, interpretations and imagery relate to the 
feelings of self-deprecation and negative attitude towards the 
past and future. Anxiety disorders, on the other hand, are 
characterised by the theme of danger with GAD patients misreading 
their experiences as constituting either a physical or psycho- 
social threat and over-estimating both the probability and intensity 
of anticipated harm in future situations. Beck et al (1987), 
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in a test of this "cognitive content-specificity hypothesis" show 
clear evidence discriminating depressed and anxious patients on 
the basis of the nature of the automatic thoughts. 
iv. Relationship to Panic Disorder (PD) 
Differential diagnosis of GAD and PD seems problematic. While 
PD has traditionally been viewed as somatically-based compared 
to GAD which has been viewed as cognitively-based (Friedman and 
Jaffe, 1983), Barlow et al (1984) could find no significant differences 
between PD and GAD patients (DSM-III criteria) on cognitive questionnaires. 
Hoehn-Saric and McLeod (1985) replicated this finding. Anderson 
et al (1984) could not differentiate PD from GAD patients on the 
STAI or EPI. In general, Hoehn-Saric (1981) found few differences 
between the two groups on a battery of psychological tests. 
On somatic measures, Anderson et al (1984) reported that PD patients 
showed a greater number of autonomic symptoms than GAD patients 
as measured by questionnaires. Similar results were obtained 
by Rapee (1985b) and Hoehn-Saric (1981). Barlow et al (1986), 
however, failed to find any difference on severity of somatic symptoms 
between the two groups. Barlow et al (1984) noted that PD, patients 
had lower levels of EMG activity during pre-treatment physiological 
assessment than GAD patients. However, the differences were 
statistically significant on only two of the possible twelve measures 
of EMG arousal and were absent on all of the heart rate measures 
(Marshall and Segal, 1988). 
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PD and GAD can be differentiated on their ideational components. 
Rapee (1985b) noted that GAD patients seem to realise that fears 
centreing around psycho-social concerns are the result of reacting 
in an anxious fashion and are harmless. PD patients, on the other 
hand, tend to attribute their symptoms to mental or physical illness. 
Hibbert (1984), demonstrating similar findings, noted that non-panickers 
had less threatening fears. Beck and Emery (1985) have elaborated 
on the specific cognitive processes in PD patients with the pattern 
of catastrophic thoughts concerning present danger, e. g. dying, 
losing control, becoming mentally ill, etc. Thus the ideational 
components suggest that GAD and PD do differ although whether this 
difference is fundamental or epiphenomenal, i. e. simply reflecting 
definining characteristcs .. f.. all. 
i., ng into each category cannot at 
this stage be determined. 
PD and GAD patients have been shown to differ on symptoms associated 
with hyperventilation (Hoehn-Saric, 1982; Rapee, 1985a). Rapee (1986) 
noted baseline differences with PD patients showing a greater tendency 
to overbreathe. The same study showed PD patients recording higher 
resting heart rate than the GAD group (92.4 compared to 76.4 bpm). 
This finding replicates Barlow et al (1984). 
PD patients differ from those with GAD with respect to cardio-pulmonary 
hyper-excitability. Ratings of muscular and gastro-intestinal 
symptoms do not differ between the two groups (Hoehn-Saric, 1982). 
Mitral valve prolapse appears to occur more frequently in PD than 
GAD patients (Dagger et al, 1986) although more recent evidence 
calls this into question (Barlow and Cerny, 1988). 
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Dealy et al (1981) and Raskin et al (1982) noted that PD patients 
report depressive episodes twice as frequently as GAD patients. 
Raskin et al (1982) compared GAD and PD patients in terms of 
developmental and psychiatric history. The two groups were similar 
in terms of having experienced childhood loss, separation disorder 
in childhood and separation as a precipitant of anxiety in adult 
life. PD patients, however, reported disturbed childhood environments 
more frequently. Hoehn-Saric (1982) failed to find differences 
between PD and GAD patients in terms of childhood history, social 
characteristics or personality features other than the finding 
that GAD patients showed greater levels of introversion as measured 
by the EPI. 
Crowe et al (1983) studied families of PD patients. The morbidity 
risk amongst first degree relatives of patients was 24.7% compared 
with 2.3% amongst relatives of controls. The risk of GAD amongst 
the first degree relatives was only 4.8% compared to 3.6% amongst 
relatives of controls. The authors took this finding as evidence 
that GAD and PD are separate disorders, however due to the use 
of DSM-III criteria, GAD was not diagnosed if panic was present 
thus it is possible that individuals who would reach GAD criteria 
in DSM-III-R were instead given a diagnosis of PD. Thus the finding 
may be an artifact of the diagnostic convention now discarded. 
Rapee (1985b) reported that GAD patients had an earlier age of 
onset than PD patients (25.7 years compared to 32.3); GAD patients 
were more likely to have a gradual onset of symptoms; were less 
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likely to explicitly remember the first instance of anxiety and 
to show more social dysfunction as measured by the Fear Questionnaire 
(Marks and Mathews, 1979). Barlow et al (1986) reported that, 
on average, GAD patients had been anxious for 56% of their life 
span whereas PD patients reported anxiety for only 16% of their 
life span. 
Twin studies appear to strongly indicate hereditary factors in 
PD but not GAD. Torgensen (1983) observed PD in four of the thirteen 
MZ co-twins of index twins with PD (or agoraphobia with panic attacks) 
compared to none of the 16 DZ co-twins. The concordance rates 
were not influenced by whether the twins had been together a lot 
as children, whether they had strongly identified with each other 
or treated as "identical" by parents. None of the 12 MZ or 20 DZ 
co-twins in the GAD study had been diagnosed as having GAD although 
five (2 NZ, 3 DZ) twins did have other anxiety disorders. This 
was taken as evidence of a differential hereditary input in these 
disorders (see also Leckman et al, 1983). Reference has been 
made in a previous section to Barlow's criticisms of this research. 
While GAD patients can panic - both predictably and unpredictably 
(Barlow, 1988) and while the vast majority of PD patients have 
a background of GAD symptoms (Barlow et al, 1986), Klein (1981) 
and Sheehan et al (1980) argue that panic attacks often occur 
spontaneously in the absence of an underlying anxiety disorder. 
B ärlow(1988b) estimates that 25 - 35% of the general population 
may occasionally experience panic in any give year. Beitman (1987) 
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reported that 40% of a group of cardiology patients with non-anginal 
chest pain evidenced clear panic attacks. 
Pharmacological evidence exists for GAD and PD being treated as 
separate disorders. The work of Donald Klein and his colleagues 
has produced many reports suggesting differential response to 
pharmacological treatment of PD versus GAD (e. g. Klein, 1981; 
Zitrin, 1981; Zitrin et al, 1983). Indeed, Klein's work was a 
major influence in the initial separation of GAD and PD in DSM-III. 
Liebowitz and Klein (1982) reported that panic attacks can be 
successfully treated by tricyclic anti-depressants but not, with 
the possible exception of alprazolam, by benzodiazepines (see Vol. 45 
of the Archives of General Psychiatry for the effectiveness and 
problems associated with Alprazolam). Anticipatory anxiety, however, 
generally responds to benzodiazepines but not tricyclics. There 
is also evidence that MAOI's are also effective in treating panic 
attacks (Sheehan*et al, 1980,1981). 
Marks (1983) criticises these studies, citing evidence suggesting 
that improvement of panic symptoms occurs simultaneously with improve- 
ment in depression and other mood disturbance. Tyrer (1984) believes 
that these arguments show the unsatisfactory nature of DSM-III 
criteria for GAD and PD which are based largely on evidence of 
treatment response studies by Klein. , Tyrer points to alternative 
aetiological hypotheses evolved from behaviour therapy (Matuzas 
and Glass, 1983). Barlow and Maser (1984) suggested that panic 
may simply lie at the upper end of the anxiety continuum. 
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Cloninger et al (1981) reported that all of the PD patients in 
their study suffered from symptoms of GAD from two to twelve years 
prior to their first panic attack. Hoehn-Saric. and McLeod (1985) 
report that many patients seen in their anxiety disorder clinic 
eventually developed panic attacks after experiencing GAD symptoms 
for years. 
However, if PD were simply GAD in its most extreme form, then we 
should not expect to see patients with severe and chronic anxiety 
symptoms who have never experienced panic attacks. Clinical evidence 
is clearly to the contrary. In addition, Anderson, et al (1984) 
have noted a lack of difference on measures of "general" anxiety 
such as the STAI. If PD was a more intense version of GAD, we 
should expect those patients to score higher than GAD patients. 
They do not. Indeed, Rapee (1985b) noted that PD patients scored 
lower than GAD patients on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. The 
results thus suggest that PD may be a sub-group of GAD, i. e. some 
but not all patients suffering from GAD will experience panic attacks. 
********************** 
It is clear that the separation between GAD and PD is not as clear- 
cut as suggested by categorical classification. In any case, 
separating GAD and PD, although of theoretical interest, may be 
of little clinical utility. Barlow et al (1984) treated PD and 
GAD patients using an extensive array of psychological therapies. 
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While reporting significant treatment success for both, they could 
find no significant differences between the groups in the range 
of measures. Due to the variety of treatments utilized in the 
study, however, it may have been that the PD patients responded 
to certain aspects of the treatment and GAD patients to others. 
6). CONCLUSION 
In contrast to PD which has been the target of intense investigation 
over the last few years, GAD has not been studied in depth 
(Hoehn-Saric, 1985) even although it is probably the most frequently 
occurring anxiety disorder in the community (Hoehn-Saric and McLeod, 
1988). In the light of this lack of knowledge about GAD, it is 
clear that it is likely to be the focus of a good deal of cognitive 
and behavioural-orientated research and that this research will 
concentrate on the intriguing theoretical and practical problems 
alluded to in this chapter. This study is part of this process. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ENER At. ISED ANXIETY DISORDER- TREATMENTS 
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GENERALISED ANXIETY DISORDER : TREATMENTS. 
In contrast to anxiety disorders with a specific external focus 
(e. g. phobias), treatments for diffiuse anxiety states (GAD and PD) have, 
until recently, been largely untested. In an otherwise comprehensive 
review of the effects of psychological treatment, Rachman and Wilson (1980) 
point to the-paucity of studies with GAD patients while Barlow and Wolfe 
(1981) called for outcome research to be carried out on the effects of 
various psycho-social treatments in comparison to pharmacological treat- 
ments and no-treatment controls. Tyrer (1984) noted that "Behaviour 
therapy has nothing for anxiety compared to the treatment available for 
phobias" (page 81). This pessimistic view was supported by the outcome 
study carried out by Woodward and Jones (1980). Using both cognitive 
and behavioural procedures with generalised anxiety patients, they 
concluded that this population comprises "difficult customers" and 
suggest a multi-dimensional approach to treatment would be more appropriate 
than treatments comprising one element only. Designing appropriate 
treatments is hampered by the fact that although non-phobic anxiety states 
have been estimated at approximately 15% of all out-patient problems 
(Lader, 1975; Reed, 1973), the nature of these problems is still poorly 
understood (Barlow et al 1984). 
The aim of this chapter is to look at the main treatment approaches 
to GAD. It divides into seven sections: 
1. EARLY BEHAVIOUR THERAPY. 
2. RELAXATION TECHNIQUES. 
3. ANXIETY MANAGEMENT TRAINING. 
4. COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACHES. 
5. GROUP THERAPY. 
6. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES. 
7. CONCLUSIONS. 
1. EARLY BEHAVIOUR THERAPY 
GAD has, to a large extent, been conveniently ignored by behaviour 
therapists, possibly due to difficulties in incorporating it into 
conditioning models of anxiety disorders. This difficulty arises from 
the diffuse nature of the condition with its high level of autonomic 
arousal and cognitions existing generally in the absence of avoidance of 
specific situations. Thus, while exposure based therapy has been well 
developed and proven for phobias (Barlow and Beck, 1984), it is of 
limited use in GAD where avoidance is unlikely to be a focal feature. 
As Barlow et al (1984) point out, treatments from GAD have emerged from 
a quite different tradition than those for clinical phobias. 
Cautela (1966) noted that early behavioural attempts have been of 
limited success with pervasive (free-floating) anxiety. Wolpe (1958) 
modified the La Verne technique (1953) of giving patients single 
inhalations of 70% carbon dioxide and 30% oxygen. Lang (1964) states 
"I think... that the desensitisation of very generalised anxiety 
response is difficult because it is hard to isolate the conditioned 
stimuli for anxiety" (page 51) while Lazarus (1963) notes that these 
patients had the most unfavourable prognosis. Costello (1964), however, 
reported a successful single case study using LSD. 
Although Clark (1963) cautioned against the use of systematic 
desensitisation in the treatments of free-floating anxiety, Cautela 
(1966) described the use of a systematic desensitisation approach 
using a combination of : 
1. Reassurance. 
2. Relaxation combined with implicit verbal behaviour. 
3. Modification of Wolpe's desensitisation technique. 
4. Assertive training. 
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Missing pages are unavailable 
The rationale for this approach was: 
1. To reciprocally inhibit anxiety and thereby reduce the need for 
avoidance and increase a feeling of wellbeing. 
2. Give the patient the definite feeling that he can control his own 
behaviour. 
The first two techniques were designed to achieve the first aim, 
the latter to achieve the second. Using these techniques, Cautela 
presents anecdotal evidence of successful outcome in three cases. 
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2. RELAXATION TECHNIQUES. 
Relaxation, including meditation, represents probably the oldest and 
most popular treatment for anxiety. Although the idea that relaxation 
is an appropriate treatment for anxiety seems self-evident, there is no 
clear theoretical rationale for its use. (Mathews, 1985). 
a). Transcendental Meditation (TM) 
TM was introduced to the West in 1959 by Maharishi Mahesh Yoga. It 
involves sitting quietly twice daily and passively attending to a 
special thought or "mantra". (Smith, 1976). 
In his 1975 review of the TM literature, Smith concluded that research 
"does show the regular practice of meditation to be associated with 
decrement in psycho-pathology, particularly anxiety, over a period of 
time ranging usually from four to ten weeks". (page 562). 
Studies suggest that TM lowers physiological arousal and increases 
alpha density (Wallace and Benson, 1972; Wallace et al, 1971), 
stablises autonomic functioning and increases skin conductance 
habituation (Orme-Johnson, 1973) and it decreases blood lactate 
concentrate (Wallace et al, 1971). All these changes are in opposition 
to the changes found in anxiety (Raskin et al, 1980). Studies on 
self-referred volunteeers suggest TM is effective in reducing anxiety 
(Orme-Johnson, 1974; Farwell, 1974; Hjelle, 1974). 
Schwartz et al (1978) describe TM as a cognitively orientated technique 
because, they presume reciting the mantra involves some of the same brain 
pathways as verbally mediated cognitions. They noted that regular 
meditators (cognitive intervention) report fewer cognitive but more 
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somatic symptoms of anxiety than people who regularly take exercise 
(somatic intervention). 
However, these studies have associated methodological weaknesses 
and do not take into account Smith's cautionary point that 
"The critical therapeutic variables underlying meditation 
could be something other than the meditation exercise. Two 
main possibilities not controlled for..... are: 
1. Expectational relief. 
2. The regular practice of sitting quietly. " 
(page 562) 
In order to isolate the effects of TM exercise from expectational 
relief and sitting quietly, Smith (1976) compared, in two experiments, 
TM with two placebo conditions. Findings indicate that: 
1. TM has no more effect than producing relief in volunteer 
anxious college students than an exercise designed to be 
the near antithesis of meditation - "Cortically Mediated 
Stabilisation". 
2. TM was no more effective than a controlled treatment - 
"Periodic Somatic Inactivity" - involving a daily exercise 
of sitting with eyes closed but not meditating. 
All conditions had a high rate of attrition (30 - 59%). 
Raskin et al (1980) compared TM, Progressive Muscular Relaxation (PMR) 
and Electromyographic Biofeedback (EMG-FB) with well motivated anxious 
volunteers. 40% of subjects reported a clinically significant decrease 
in anxiety. Results indicated that there was no great difference 
32 
between the three therapies and due to the fact that subjects were a 
self-selecting group highly motivated to obtain symptomatic relief 
without the use of medication, the authors conclude that: 
1. The 40% improvement rate may be an overly generous estimate 
of the effectiveness of these therapies. 
2. TM, PMR and EMG-FB have a limited place in the treatment of 
chronic anxiety when used as a sole intervention. 
b). Progressive muscular Relaxation 
Lehrer et al (1983), as part of a series of papers on progressive 
Relaxation, noted that there are generally few differences to be found 
between PMR and meditation even on physiological responses. In a 
study of anxious volunteers either recruited through newspaper adverts 
or referred by physicians, Lehrer adapted a procedure developed by 
Jacobson (1964). Subjects were not taught to use relaxation imagery 
or cognitions and suggestions to relax were minimised. PMR was found 
to be somewhat more effective than meditation although both techniques 
were found to be useful in decreasing stress. Of interest is the fact 
that PMR was administered by a therapist rather than via audio tape 
which appears to be less effective than "live" relaxation training 
(Lehrer, 1982; Brauer et al, 1979). 
Canter et al (1975) compared PMR to EMG-FB in a study of in- and 
out-patients diagnosed as 'anxiety neurotic' of whom 50% had associated 
acute panic. They found that both treatments were effective in reducing 
frontalis tension levels. Global ratings suggest that these improvements 
were not clinically significant. The study can be criticised on the 
grounds that it appears to have involved taped verbal suggestions rather 
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than individualised progressive relaxation and this may have decreased 
treatment effects on the PMR group and that it involved variable number 
of treatment sessions. 
Leboeuf and Lodge (1980) studying patients diagnosed as 'chronically 
anxious' used either PMR or EMG-FB. Although significant differences 
were found pre and post therapy, the authors felt that the results were 
disappointing as global ratings showed little change in 22 of the 26 
subjects. They further suggest that as physiological variables over 
sessions did not seem to be related to clinical improvement, any 
improvements in anxiety questionnaires may have been a function of non- 
specific effects. As there was no placebo control, the study was 
unable to clarify this issue. 
Hutchings (1980), in a study using generally anxious college students, 
found that audio-taped relaxation exercises which omitted the application 
of voluntary self-control of anxiety resulted in little improvement and 
was significantly worse than Anxiety Management Training (AMT) and 
Applied Relaxation (AR) on several measures although these differences 
generally disappeared at follow-up. Applied Relaxation led to greater 
decreases in anxiety than passive relaxation. This form of relaxation 
is taught with a self-control rrationale" which suggests the ability to 
learn voluntary control over anxiety and, further, to apply this skill 
when in an anxiety provoking situation (Denny, 1980); Goldfried, 1971). 
AR is virtually identical to cue-controlled relaxation (CCR), - the 
main differences being that while the former stresses in-vivo application, 
the latter incorporates training in PMR with repeated association of 
relaxation and a self-produced cue word such as 'calm' or 'control'. 
(Russell and Sipich, 1974). (See Barrios and Shigetomi, 1975 for a 
review of coping skills training). 
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c). Biofeedback 
Rice and Blanchard (1980), in a review of the biofeedback literature, 
conclude that evidence exists only for electromyographic feedback 
(EMG-FB) as an effective treatment of anxiety. If muscular relaxation 
is important in decreasing anxiety, then clearly EMG-FB should be an 
appropriate method to utilise. This idea is based on the principle of 
information feedback which suggests that behaviour is altered by the 
individual receiving continuous information about the consequences of 
actions and by acting appropriately in the face of these consequences. 
There is evidence that EMG-FB directed upon the frontalis muscle assists 
in the generalisation of the relaxation response to other muscle groups 
(Budzynski and Stoyva, 1974). 
Townsend et al (1975) compared EMG-FB relaxation and group psychotherapy 
with patients objectively assessed as suffering from an anxiety condition. 
Results indicated that the EMG-FB therapy was at least as effective as 
the group therapy although two week follow-up results on only certain 
patients are anecdotal in nature. 
Canter et al (1975), treating chronically anxious patients, found 
improvements with both EMG-FB and audio taped PMR. By the end of 
therapy, EMG-FB was superior in reducing frontalis muscular tension and 
this improvement was noted in patients in therapists global ratings. 
There was slight evidence favouring better outcome with those patients 
experiencing panic episodes. 
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Leboeuf and Lodge, (1980) criticised the above study on methodological 
grounds and, using patients similarly diagnosed, found no difference 
between frontalis EMG-FB treatment and PMR even although EMG-FB was 
more effective in reducing frontalis activity. However, at three month 
follow-up only two of the eleven in the EMG group reported even 'moderate' 
improvement. 
Lavalle et al (1977) in a study with 'chronically anxious patients', 
compared EMG-FB, diazepam and a control group in which the individual 
was asked to sit alone and devise his own relaxation strategy. At the 
end of treatment, the EMG-FB group showed most improvement but by six 
month follow-up, the control group showed greatest improvement. 
Raskin et al (1980), following on from some limited success with the use 
of EMG with treatment-resistant chronic anxiety patients (Raskin et al, 
1973) used anxious volunteers recruited via advertisements. Comparing 
EMG-FB, PMR and TM they could find no difference between therapies. They 
also suggested that the improvement rate was probably overly generous due 
to the selection procedure. 
d). Relaxation-Induced Anxiety (RIA) 
While the above studies have shown some effectiveness as a treatment of 
anxiety (see also Beaman et al 1978; Zuroff and Schwartz, 1978; 
Borkovec and Sides, 1979) evidence exists that these procedures can lead 
to an exacerbation of, or initiation of anxiety in some individuals 
(see Heide and Borkovec, 1984, for a review of RIA). 
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The above authors note that GAD patients in particular are prone to 
RIA. Reports of RIA have been furnished from studies involving PMR 
(Borkovec and Grayson, 1980); group therapy (Borkovec and Hemmings, 
1978); EMG-FB (Raskin et al, 1973) and meditation (Hassett, 1978). 
Heide and Borkovec (1983) treated 14 chronically anxious subjects with 
one session of either PMR or mantra meditation. 31% of the PMR group 
reported increased tension during the relaxation compared to 54% of the 
meditation group. However, only 2 subjects showed an increase in 
measures. Heide and Borkovec (1984) suggest five related but 
distinguishable mechanisms: 
1. Subjects may become frightened of sensations, physiological - 
behavioural reactions and cognitive-affective events that are released 
automatically through relaxation. 
2. Subjects may fear losing control or may attempt to achieve 
relaxation through active, effortful strategies. 
3. Subjects may fear the experience of their anxiety to which their 
attention is drawn during relaxation. 
4. Subjects may fear attending to their internal experience in 
general as a result of dissatisfaction with self. 
5. Subjects may engage in worriescýe cognitive activity about 
matters unrelated to relaxation. (page 2). 
There is some empirical support for the first two mechanisms 
(Cohen et al, 1985; Hauri et al, 1985). 
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A more extreme counterpart to RIA is described by Cohen et al (1985) 
and Adler et al (1987), namely the phenomenon of Relaxation-Induced 
Panic (RIP). The phenomenon of RIP differs from RIA in terms of the 
suddenness and severity with which the anxiety occurs (see the special 
issue of Integrative Psychiatry - Volume 5,1987 for a comprehensive 
review of RIP). 
While not an 'epidemic', the practical and theoretical implications 
of RIA are of significant importance to the future treatment of anxiety 
conditions and, in particular, GAD. Adler et al (1987) suggest that 
rather than avoiding the phenomena of RIA and RIP, it may be possible 
to use these responses therapeutically, e. g. from a behavioural 
perspective, repeated exposure to feared somatic and loss of control 
cues should result in anxiety extinction. In addition, heightened 
anxiety in response to relaxation suggests that fears regarding somatic 
and loss of control cues should be addressed early in therapy to increase 
the longer term benefits from relaxation. 
e). Conclusions. 
The general finding in clinical studies is that no one relaxation 
technique offers greater benefits than any other (Tarler-Benlolo, 1978; 
Mathews, 1985). These techniques are more effective than no treatment 
conditions although many of the studies suffer from serious methodological 
flaws and rely too heavily on self-report measures (Delmonte, 1985). 
Effectivness may also be impaired because patients do not practice 
persistently (Hoelsher et al, 1984). However, in many of the reports, 
active treatment offers no greater benefit than credible placebo treatment 
(e. g. Boswell and Murray, 1979; Goldman et al, 1979). 
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Central to Biofeedback and PMR is the premise that muscular relaxation 
facilitates subjective relaxation and therefore emphasis is placed on 
the achievement of this in, for example, Jacobsen's (1970) PMR and 
Schultz and Luthe's (1959) autogenic training. However, the literature 
now clearly rejects this. Various studies have failed to find a 
relationship between an increased ability to achieve muscular relaxation 
and clinical improvement, e. g. Raskin et al (1980) note that - 
"Those individuals who had the most substantial reduction in 
anxiety were no different from those who had the least clinical 
improvement with respect to their EMG scores or changes in those 
scores-subjects' EMG scores rose significant from the treatment 
period to the post treatment period while their anxiety level 
remained constant" (page 96). 
The above authors argue that on the basis of their findings, the ability 
to relax is not directly related to the reduction of anxiety symptoms and 
cite as evidence the fact that physiological changes over sessions were 
not related to clinical improvement. Johnston (1986) argues that the 
therapeutic effects of relaxation may, in part, be mediated by cognitive 
and behavioural changes which occur as a result of the subjective effect 
of regular practice. Plotkin and Rice (1981) suggest that the perception 
of control of physiological process may be as important as actual 
physiological change, i. e the experience of success with feedback may 
contribute to the therapeutic outcome even if the actual physiological 
change is negligible or irrelevant to the outcome. 
Lehrer et al (1983) discuss two possible mechanisms to explain the 
relaxation effects: 
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A. The unitary model of arousal/relaxation (Benson et al 1974): 
This suggests that all relaxation techniques provide a common 
integrated 'relaxation response'. 
B. Multi-process model (Davidson and Schwartz, 1976): 
Within this model the authors suggest that techniques focusing on 
somatic aspects of stress (e. g. EMG-FB) would produce a pattern of 
physiological change different from that produced by a cognitively 
focused technique (e. g. meditation). 
Evidence for these two models are inconsistent and studies often suffer 
from methodological limitations (e. g. see Cauthen and Prymak, 1977). 
Warrenburg et al (1980) produce support for a revision of the multi-process 
model wherein specific effects are superimposed upon a general relaxation 
produced by relaxation techniques (Schwartz et al, 1970). As Lehrer 
et al (1983) point out, this is consistent with findings that show PMR 
and meditation both produce reductions in various measures of arousal 
(see Lehrer, 1982; Woolfolk, 1975) and see Poppen (1988) for a 
detailed assessment of these issues. 
A previous chapter noted the difficulties in obtaining a reliable 
physiological assessment. These problems are of relevance in bio- 
feedback studies. It is unreasonable to expect that teaching a 
person control over a single physiological response will result in total 
physical and psychological relaxation. Lebeouf and Lodge (1980) showed 
that while their EMG-FB group evidenced the greatest reduction in 
frontal EMG activity, there was no difference between the EMG group and 
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a PMR group in heart rate. These authors note "It seems unlikely 
that the technique could ever be the panacea for chronic anxiety 
since there is an increasing awareness that anxiety neurosis consists 
of many dimensions of behaviour other than physiological ones" 
(page 284). 
Raskin et al (1980) conclude that relaxation treatments were insufficient 
in the treatment of chronically anxious subjects. 
ý*ý***************** 
It is clear that in the treatment of complex clinical problems such as 
GAD, reliance on single techniques is of limited use. However, 
recently, there have been signs that more complex multi-dimensional 
treatment packages may well be of greater benefit. 
41 
3. ANXIETY MANAGEMENT TRAINING (AMT) 
AMT is the most successful modification of desensitistion (Suinn and 
Richardson, 1971; Suinn, 1976). It can be a useful technique in 
cases where exposure is difficult (Deffenbacher and Suinn (1987). 
Anxiety is viewed as a drive state and, by teaching patients to become 
aware of internal cues of anxiety and to attend to them, the individual 
can control anxiety symptoms without having to tackle the root causes. 
Patients are initially trained in relaxation and structured rehearsal 
of relaxation skills is carried out during consultation (Denney, 1980). 
Structured rehearsal achieves two objectives: 
1. Discrimination of tension cues. 
2. Practice and use of relaxation to decrease anxiety. 
Patients are then asked to induce anxiety, generally by mental imagery. 
Following the use of a standard word (e. g. "relax") or stimulus (e. g. 
deep breath) the patient controls the anxiety by the use of imagery and/or 
relaxation . The cue can then be used in-vivo. The rationale offered 
is that the anxiety symptoms will cue the relaxation responses and thus 
prevent further cueing of anxiety. AMT has been shown to be useful in 
studies of generalised anxiety amongst college students (Edie, 1972; 
Schumacher, 1976). 
Hutchings et al (1980) cited earlier, in a well controlled study of 70 
college volunteers who reached the criteria of scoring in the upper 15% 
of the distribution of the EPI (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1960) and a 
modified version of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (Bendig, 1956), 
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randomly assigned subjects to AMT, Applied Relaxation, Relaxation only, 
Placebo and untreated control. Results suggested that relaxation alone 
had little impact on general anxiety while AMT and AR were both moderately 
effective in reducing self-report measures of generalised anxiety. The 
authors concluded that the addition of a structured rehearsal component 
to applied relaxation led to AMT being the most effective procedure for 
treating generalised anxiety. They hypothesised that the rehearsal 
helped subjects pinpoint somatic anxiety at an earlier stage thus finding 
it easier to reduce. By the use of rehearsal during the consultation, 
subjects were better prepared to use the skills in-vivo and more confident 
about their ability to cope. 
While studies using college volunteers may, at times, be of use in the 
development of therapies, care has to be taken about generalising from 
this population to a clinical population. Bernstein and Paul (1971) 
assert that analogue and clinical subjects are sufficiently dissimilar 
as to obstruct the generalisation of findings from one population to 
another (evidence for this assertion has been found by Sallis et al, 1980). 
Sipprelle (1967) offered a variant of AMT which he called "induced anxiety". 
A modification of this technique was devised by Hamilton and Bernstein 
(1977). They present a single case study involving a generally anxious 
male. Following relaxation, the patient was asked to turn his attention 
inward. Suggestions to "feel a small feeling start to grow" were given 
and indications of muscular tension, increased swallowing and breathing 
changes were verbally reinforced. At a predetermined SUD level the 
patient was instructed to relax. This procedure was repeated five times 
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during each of the three treatment sessions. Improvement was noted 
and the authors suggest that avoiding visualisation of anxiety-provoking 
situations circumvents problems with poor imagery and also facilitates 
a development of generalised coping responses. 
Jannoun has produced two reports on clinical populations using AMT 
(Jannoun et al, 1981,1982). The first paper reported on a primary 
care treatment of 15 patients complaining of anxiety problems. A self- 
help treatment was abbreviated for use in general practice and involved 
four components: 
1. Self-monitoring -a daily diary recording occurrence of symptoms, 
severity and provoking events. 
2. Instructional booklets. 
3. Taped PMR. 
4. Cognitive control - in which patients were taught to provoke images 
and to engage in positive self-talk. 
By the end of treatment, an independent assessor rated 80% of patients 
as 'improved' or 'almost free of presenting symptoms' - the remaining 
20% showed no improvement. 60% of patients maintained their progress 
at three month follow-up. 
While accepting that this pilot study can be severely criticised on 
methodological grounds (see Wilkinson, 1985), Jannoun reports success 
in achieving the two main objectives, i. e. that AMT could be adapted for 
use in general practice and that it could be an effective treatment for 
generalised anxiety. 
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Jannoun et al (1982) followed up this report with a controlled study 
of 'anxiety state' patients. Independent and self-assessment showed 
significant improvement in the AMT group and this improvement was 
maintained at three month follow-up. Use of anxiolytic drugs showed 
a 60% decrease by end of treatment and this was again maintained at 
follow-up. Although again pointing to design limitations, Jannoun 
noted that comparisons between AMT and no treatment condition showed 
that the changes during treatment were mainly due to the effects of the 
treatment rather than other factors, e. g. self-monitoring. 
Ramm et al (1981), in a small scale study of non-phobic anxiety patients 
of whom only one had not experienced panic, randomly assigned 12 patients 
to AMT with either positive or negative self-instruction. Therapies 
differed at the rehearsal stage when patients were asked to imagine them- 
sevles in an anxiety provoking situation and, as the therapist guided 
them through the situation, they were prompted with self-instruction 
statements from a standardised cue card. The 'positive group' used 
positive self-statements which included examples such as "I can cope 
with these feelings"; "Even if I make a fool of myself, it is not the 
end of the world", while the negative group used negative self-statements 
which included "I am really going crazy"; "I can't cope with this 
situation. ". 
Surprisingly, there was little difference between the two groups and 
overall improvements were not impressive. At one month follow-up the 
only significant difference between the two groups related to background 
anxiety -a difference in favour of the positive condition. At three 
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month follow-up, this group showed less pathology as measured by the 
global rating of the Fear Questionnaire. 
The use of standardised statements were found by some individuals as 
unrealistic or irrelevant but the paradoxical effects of the negative 
self-statement group is difficult to explain. Mathews (1985) suggests 
the result could involve a placebo effect or that exposure to the 
negative statements disrupted original mal-adaptive thinking patterns. 
He cites as evidence for this view the similar benefits obtained by 
combining paradoxical intention and exposure in the treatment of 
agoraphobia (Mavissakalian et al 1983). 
Blowers et al (1987) randomly allocated 66 GAD patients to AMT, non- 
directive counselling or to a waiting list control. Individual treatments 
consisted of 8 sessions lasting approximately 45 minutes each. All 
therapists were trained nurses who were also qualified behaviour therapists. 
Results to six month follow-up show few significant differences between 
the two active therapies although AMT was consistently superior to the 
waiting list control. The authors raise the question of how much of the 
effects attributed to specific components in AMT are a function of non- 
specific factors present in many different psychological treatments. 
Interestingly, therapists in this study commented that, despite the 
presentation of very different rationales and procedures, patients in 
both treatments often reported similar cognitive changes possibly 
signifying the adoption of common cognitive strategies. These interesting 
speculations deserve future attention. It should be noted that there 
was a total of 29 (of 66) drop-outs within the first half of treatment 
perhaps reflecting the use of nurse therapists who may not have been 
adequately trained in cognitive techniques. 
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Another recent paper has compared the AMT with other established 
treatment approaches (Lindsay et al, 1987). This study will be 
discussed in detail in the following section. 
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4. COGNITIVE/BEHAVIOURAL APPROACHES. 
These therapies are derived from the studies which have demonstrated 
an association between anxiety and a variety of cognitions (Beck 
et al, 1974; Mathews and Shaw, 1977; Hibbert, 1984; Rappee, 1985). 
Assuming that the relationship is causal and that the direction of 
causality is from cognition to affect, techniques have been developed 
to identify, challenge and modify the cognitions and beliefs associated 
with anxiety. These techniques can be subsumed under the title of 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapies. 
Thought-stopping, although theoretically naive, was successfully 
reported for the treatment of "phobias of internal stimuli" in an 
uncontrolled study by Kumar and Wilkinson (1971). Mathews and Shaw 
(1977) compared thought-stopping to a 'thought satiation' technique 
wherein patients were asked to allow the anxious thoughts to remain. 
In a treatment study with generally anxious patients, they unexpectedly 
found no difference between the treatments, both showing clinically 
significant improvement. Anecdotal evidence from patients suggest 
that improvement in both groups was achieved by engaging in an 
alternative activity, patients being distracted from the anxiety 
provoking thoughts while, at the same time, realising that these 
thoughts could be changed. 
Hollon (1981) produced an anecdotal report on two patients suffering 
from 'drug-induced' situational anxiety states. Using a variety of 
cognitive and behavioural treatments, Hollon reports clinically 
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significant improvements. Clark (1986) reports successful treatment 
of six patients using Beck's cognitive therapy. 
Last (1983) presented a single case study of GAD. Two cognitive 
strategies - coping self-statements (Meichenbaum, 1977) and paradoxical 
intention (Frankl, 1960; Ascher, '1980) - were alternated randomly 
across sessions. Marked improvement was achieved and maintained at 
one year follow-up. The author was unable to point to a differential 
effectiveness of the two strategies. Interestingly, the greatest 
reduction in anxiety ratings occurred during baseline when a 
conditioning model was used to explain the aetiology and a cognitive 
model to explain maintenance. This suggests the clinical usefulness 
of information, expectation and perhaps other non-specific effects. 
Ost (1985) also presented a single case of GAD. Stress-inoculation 
training (Meichenbaum, 1977) was utilised in combination with 
progressive relaxation. Significant improvement in a variety of 
measures was noted and this improvement was maintained at one year 
follow-up. 
The preceding studies are all methodologically weak and therefore 
caution should be applied in interpreting the results. Barlow 
et al (1984) compared GAD and PD patients in an extremely comprehensive 
treatment package. Treatment consisted of PMR and Frontalis EMG-FB 
combined with cognitive behavioural therapy and cue controlled relaxation. 
Therapy was spread over 18 sessions in a fourteen week period. Results 
indicate significant improvement for both conditions on all measures 
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(physiological, diary and questionnaire). Further improvement was 
noted in some patients at the two follow-up points of three months and 
one year. GAD and PD patients responded equally well to treatment 
leading Barlow to question whether true differences exist between 
these categories. Due to the various techniques utilised in this 
package, the mechanisms behind the improvements are not clear as 
different patients may have responded to different therapeutic aspects 
of the package. Four recent British studies and two U. S. studies 
showed promising results in the treatment of this recalcitrant population. 
a). British studies. 
Durham and Turvey (1987) randomly assigned GAD out-patients to either 
cognitive or behavioural therapy. The two conditions followed a 
research protocol based on Beck and Emery's (1979) treatment manual. 
Patients received a maximum of 16 hours individual therapy. The 
behaviour therapy condition included strategies such as PMR distraction 
and graded exposure. Cognitive therapy was concerned with the 
elicitation and modification of automatic thoughts and dysfunctional 
assumptions using socratic questions and hypotheses testing. 
By the end of treatment, both groups had shown improvement with no 
difference between the groups - 50-60% of patients in both conditions 
were rated as markedly or completely improved, 20-25% rated as 
moderately improved and 15-25% unchanged. This improvement is 
particularly significant for the behavioural group given the view that 
behaviour therapy has little to offer in the treatment of a condition 
characterised by a lack of avoidance of any external situations. It 
could be suggested that exposure treatments may be of value to patients 
who experience panic and who, conceivably, show some degree of phobic 
avoidance. 
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At six month follow-up, however, differences became more apparent 
with the cognitive group maintaining or enhancing their progress while 
the behavioural group reverted towards pre-treatment scores with 45% 
of this group reporting no change or only slight improvement. 
While the authors regard their results as promising, they note that 
virtually no patients were symptom-free at follow-up and that one 
third of patients had shown no degree of improvement. In order to 
explain the superiority of cognitive therapy at follow-up, they 
suggest the cognitive therapy offers patients a frame-work for 
perceiving and coping with problems that inevitably build up in life 
and that techniques learned during therapy could be generalised to deal 
with a wide range of difficulties. 
This study can be criticised on the following grounds: 
1. Patients were not diagnosed according to an established 
classification system, e. g. DSMIII. 
2. Cognitive and behavioural treatments may not have been as distinct 
as the authors suggest. They point out that the behaviour therapy 
condition included the use of positive self-statements and general 
problem-solving strategies while the cognitive condition included 
behavioural techniques 'when appropriate'. No information is 
given on how frequently these techniques were utilised. 
3. The disappointing follow-up scores for the behavioural group 
may have been influenced by the less cohesive nature of that therapy - 
unlike the cognitive condition, a number of diverse techniques seem 
to have been used in a 'rag-bag' fashion which may have led patients to 
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view therapy as less intelligible and coherent than cognitive 
patients. (No expectation measures were taken before or during the 
study). It could also be argued that the use of graded exposure is 
not appropriate in GAD as the assumption is made that no significant 
phobic avoidance is present. 
ii) Lindsay et al (1987) compared cognitive behavioural therapy, 
AMT, lorazepam and a waiting list control. Patients were described 
as chronically anxious although no attempt was made to separate GAD 
from PD patients or classify them according to DSMIII. In addition 
those patients showing high levels of depression were deliberately 
excluded from the study.. Patients were seen for eight sessions over 
a four week period. The cognitive behavioural therapy was a composite 
of techniques suggested by Beck and Meichenbaum. AMT was based on 
the work of Suinn and Richardson (1971). The lorazepam group was 
prescribed the drug, 1 mg, t. i. d. for ten days and 1 mg b. d. for a 
further ten days. Interestingly, the lorazepam group showed the 
fastest and most significant improvement. However, as the trial 
progresssed, this group reported increases in daily anxiety ratings, 
until, by the end of therapy, they were only slightly less anxious 
than the waiting list controls. However, due to concerns about the 
possibility of drug dependency, the dose used was reduced in the fourth 
and final week of treatment thus patients were essentially drug-free 
by post-treatment assessment thus invalidating any meaningful 
comparison between psychological and pharmacological treatment. 
In addition, patients were not matched in terms of the amount of 
therapist contact. 
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The CBT and AMT groups showed significant and consistent improvement 
as therapy progressed. Although the CBT group showed lower scores 
than the. AMT group, differences were not significant. There was a 
correlation between statistical and clinical significant change in 
both groups with a clear trend towards CBT patients ratings demonstrating 
significant clinical change with about 50% of patients remaining in 
the functional range at three month follow-up. 
iii) Butler et al (1987), using a modified version of AMT - 'Anxiety 
Management' (AM) with 45 patients diagnosed as GAD (RDC definition). 
The treatment package included a booklet, taped progressive relaxation, 
distraction techniques, a form of self-instructional training, graded 
exposure and activity scheduling. Patients were allowed to stop 
treatment after a minimum of four sessions if they were no longer 
experiencing distress. Average length of treatment was 8.7 sessions. 
Patients were randomly allocated either to AM treatment or to a waiting 
list control. At three months, the AM group showed superior 
performance to the control group on a variety of measures. At six 
month follow-up improvement on all measures was either maintained or 
increased further. Informal follow-up at one year was collated from 
G. P. records. Two thirds of the patients had had no further 
consultations with their G. P. s although nine had required additional 
treatment for anxiety including the use of medication. 
Due to the complex array of techniques used in this study, it cannot 
be determined why it works or what procedure contributed most to 
53 
treatment' success. In addition, patients complaining of continuous 
symptoms for 2 years or more were excluded from this study. Thus 
these results may not apply to more chronic anxiety sufferers who may 
be more representative of GAD patients referred to out-patient clinics. 
However, the results are promising and the study requires replication 
and its various components analysed in more detail. 
iv). Power et al (1989) report on a well controlled primary care 
study of generalised anxiety (RDC). Patients were randomly assigned 
to a cognitive-behavioural condition (n = 10), diazepam condition 
(n = 10) or placebo medication condition (n = 11). Treatments were 
balanced for degree of psychologist/ patient contact. Although no 
significant differences existed between the groups, only the cognitive- 
behavioural group evidenced a significant improvement effect over time 
although a trend towards improvement was achieved by the other 2 groups. 
Of interest is the large variation (as evidenced by the S. D. s) in 
response all three treatments. 
b). U. S. Studies. 
i) Rapee and Barlow (1988) presented preliminary results of a 
large controlled study in Albany. They compared four treatment 
conditions : relaxation, cognitive restructuring, combined condition 
and waiting list control. All subjects received 15 weekly sessions. 
Data are available for 46 subjects for pre - post data and 13 subjects 
at follow-up. 
Results suggest that relaxation treatment and cognitive restructuring 
are relatively effective. Interestingly, the combined treatment 
condition did not appear to produce as much improvement as either 
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the relaxation or cognitive restructuring treatments alone. It 
should be noted, however, that six subjects (of thirteen) dropped 
out of the relaxation condition. Due to the small number reported 
on at this interim stage, little can be concluded until completion of 
this study. 
ii). Borkovec and Mathews (1988), following a successful study using 
volunteer subjects reaching criteria for GAD (DSM-III), (Borkovec et al, 
1987), extended the investigation in three ways. Firstly, older 
and more severely anxious subjects (GAD and PD) were employed. 
Secondly, in addition to cognitive therapy and non-directive therapy, 
the study employed a coping desensitisation condition and finally, 
more experienced therapists were used. Random assignment resulted 
in six GAD subjects (DSM-III criteria) in each of the three therapy 
conditions. All subjects received twelve individual sessions, twice 
weekly and two booster sessions a week apart after the post-therapy 
assessments. Sessions varied from 60 to 105 minutes. 
Results failed to support differential effectiveness among the three 
therapy conditions. Each condition produced significant improvement 
on a wide range of outcome measures, maintaining this improvement at 
one year follow-up. The authors suggest that the observed changes may 
have been due to elements common across the three therapy conditions. 
Relaxation training was involved in all conditions, however non- 
specific factors such as expectation may also have been of significance. 
They also suggest that processes such as alternative conceptualisations 
of one's anxiety or the self-discovery of coping methods may also be 
operative. This suggestion echoes that made by Blowers et al (1987). 
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5. COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL GROUP THERAPY. 
Specific advantages of group work include more economical use of the 
therapist's time but, more importantly, allows for potentially 
beneficial factors such as vicarious learning, group pressure 
motivating the patient to attend new behaviours, group approval 
reinforcing these behaviours and generally letting the individual know 
that he does not have a unique problem (Upper and Ross, 1977; 
Johnson, 1975). 
On the basis of investigations into the transactional patterns of 
groups carried out by workers from different persuasions (e. g. 
Flowers, 1979; Yalom, 1970), various factors believed to promote 
clinically relevant change have been abstracted. Yalom (1970), 
enumerates 10 such 'curative factors' - cohesion, altruism, 
universality, imparting of information, corrective recapitulation of 
family relationships, imitation, interpersonal learning, installation 
of hope, social skills acquisition and catharsis. Very similar factor 
clusters are offered by other investigators (Corsini and Rosenberg, 
1955; Leiberman, 1975). 
Woodward and Jones (1980) carried out group therapy on generally 
anxious patients. Patients were randomly assigned to one of four 
groups. 
1. Modified systematic desensitisation. 
2. Cognitive restructuring. 
3. Cognitive behavioural modification (combination of one and two). 
4. No treatment control. 
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There were only six to seven patients in each group and therapy 
consisted of eight weekly sessions although treatments were incompletely 
specified. Results show that the combined treatment group improved 
significantly more than the other two active groups in terms of 
Fear Survey Schedule although this may not be a valid measure of 
improvement in GAD patients. In terms of subjective diary ratings, 
the combined treatment and modified systematic desensitisation groups 
were significantly better than the cognitive restructuring group. 
This improvement was maintained at the short follow-up time of one 
month. The poor result with cognitive restructuring was similar to 
that obtained by Emmelkamp et al (1978) with agoraphobics and the 
authors hypothesised that this is not an effective treatment for GAD 
patients because it relies on 'insight' (Thorpe and Amati, 1976) and 
thus may be too difficult for some clinical patients. They suggest 
intelligent students used to thinking rationally may benefit more 
from this aproach. The study can be criticised on a number of grounds. 
Diagnosis was subjective, choice of outcome measures poor and the 
numbers in each group were small. Treatments were incompletely 
specified and the four week follow-up inadequate. In addition, the 
extent of clinical change is not clear (Barlow et al, 1984). 
Skinner (1984), in an uncontrolled pilot study, reports on a six 
session anxiety management group of primary care patients presenting 
with 'anxiety related symptoms'. A maximum of six patients were 
seen in each group. The course combined education about anxiety, PMR, 
cognitive restructuring/positive thinking and cue control of relaxation. 
At one year follow-up, 22 of the 35 patients reported that their 
target anxiety symptoms were eliminated. Another 12 reported improvement 
and two thirds had stopped psychotropic medication. 
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Shapiro et al (1982) compared cognitive behaviour group therapy with 
individual therapy and also traditional process-orientated interpersonal 
group therapy. Patients were diagnosed as 'adjustment disorder with 
depressed or anxious mood'. The cognitive behavioural group in 
individual therapy composed of relaxation training, a combined cognitive 
approach combining the work of Ellis and Beck and assertion training. 
Treatments consisted of ten weekly sessions. Results indicate that 
all three experimental groups significantly improved in all dependent 
measures from pre to post treatment. No differential treatment effects 
were found. As with many of the other group therapies, this is an 
extremely methodologically weak study. Patients had not been diagnosed 
according to any classification system, measures used are poor, no 
follow-ups included and little description of therapy or experience in 
using cognitive techniques given. 
Jupp and Dudley (1984), in a descriptive paper of group anxiety 
management, present information on three groups run on an informal 
learning basis with a large didactic component. The content of the 
group therapy involved information, positive thinking, target setting, 
exposure and relaxation. Six weekly group sessions involving a maximum 
of seven generally anxious patients were undertaken. Questionnaire 
and therapist ratings showed significant improvement. 
Eayres et al (1984) report on pilot studies designed to test a 
'coping skills package' for generally anxious problems (although 
patients within the group also appeared to have included agoraphobics, 
socially anxious patients and those suffering from tension headaches). 
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Coping skills group included instruction in PMR, AMT, positive 
self-talk, targeting and self-monitoring. The relaxation group 
involved listening to a PMR tape followed by a general discussion. 
Results indicate that all but three subjects reported at least some 
progress. There was no significant difference between the two 
conditions except on the STAI: A-Trait (Spielberger, 1970) which 
favoured the coping skills group. The authors suggest that the 
coping skills package may have been too difficult for some patients to 
understand within the six session course. It may be that this 
package lacked consistency which would have aided patients' comprehension 
and appreciation of the methods being used. 
Trepka et al (1986) compared individual therapy with two types of 
group treatment - an anxiety support group which involved 12 unstructured 
sessions during which the 7 patients were given the opportunity to 
discuss problems and an anxiety management group which contained 5 
patients. This involved 11 sessions during which relaxation, self- 
hypnosis and graded exposure were taught. Neither group approach had 
a clinically significant effect on anxiety symptoms as reduction at 
the end of therapy disappeared by one year follow-up. Individual 
therapy was somewhat more successful. 
Powell (1987) reports on 47 patients treated in six anxiety management 
groups of whom only one third were defined as 'generally anxious'. 
Coping skills such as deep and cued relaxation, respiratory control, 
rational self-talk, and distraction were utilised. Drop-out rate 
over the six sessions was 19%. Results suggested decrease in symptom 
severity, an increase in confidence in coping and a decrease in the 
negative effect of anxiety in daily life. Although anxiety levels 
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fell significantly Powell notes that they remained moderately high. 
Asked to rate what they had found useful about the course, patients 
suggested that "information about anxiety and stress" and the 
experience of "being in a group and meeting people with similar problems" 
were rated more highly than any of the coping skills. This corresponds 
to Jupp and-Dudley's (1984) finding of the importance of the informational 
aspects of therapy and perhaps helps explain why most change was noted 
during the informational sessions of the individual cognitive therapy 
reported by Last et al (1983). Powell cites Eayres et al (1984) who 
noted that group members frequently suggested that the most helpful 
aspect of treatment was 'the opportunity to share problems with others 
in the same boat'. (page 126). 
This finding taken from the above studies, most of which are extremely 
limited due to methodological weaknesses, suggest that simply being 
in a group may, in itself, be an integral part of therapy. Powell, 
indeed, suggests that psychologists should place less emphasis on 
our role as individual therapists and move towards the position of 
educators, utilising the benefits of groups. 
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6. OVERVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OUTCOME LITERATURE - 
SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES. 
The previous sections have reviewed a range of interventions which 
appear to vary considerably in their impact on GAD (or related diagnoses). 
There appears to be little evidence suggesting the superiority of any 
one relaxation technique over any other and, further, that reliance on 
a single technique in the treatment of a complex multi-faceted problem 
such as GAD is of limited use. Several treatment packages derived 
from Anxiety Management Training and Cognitive-Behavioural therapies 
seem to offer clinically effective techniques. 
From a methodological point of view, treatment studies have varied 
from the grossly inadequate to the imaginative and well-controlled. 
This is inevitable in a review of any clinical condition. More recent 
studies have identified and remedied a number of weaknesses in methodology 
which were previously evident. Nevertheless, there remain some serious 
shortcomings, and it is partly through a concern to address these that 
the present study has been undertaken. In the interests of parsimony, 
therefore, it may be of value to review these studies on the basis of 
their major methodological deficiences. These are as follows: 
i Subject selection. 
ii Changes in diagnostic convention. 
iii Measures of change. 
iv Confounding of treatment variables. 
v Adequacy of controls. 
vi Analysis of treatment outcome data. 
ýýýýýýýýýýýýýýý* U* ***** 
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i). Subject Selection. 
Many of the studies previously noted have used non-clinical populations 
and, in particular, students and are, therefore, subject to the criticisms 
commonly levelled against analogue research. An analogue approach 
does, of course, have its place. Used in an exploratory manner, key 
issues can be identified and methodological, practical and conceptual 
questions raised for further enquiry. One good example of using 
analogue research in this way can be found in the work of Borkovec and 
his colleagues reported in a previous section. However, the more 
typical picture is of analogue populations being regarded as sufficiently 
similar to clinical populations to warrant generalisation of results 
from one group to another. 
A related-point concerns the use of 'volunteers' for a particular 
technique. The suggestion that a volunteer for, e. g. T. M., can be 
regarded in the same light as an unsolicited subject is fraught with 
problems as are subjects solicited through "recruitment drives" through 
media advertising. It could also be argued that subjects in many U. S. 
studies who initiate contact with the treatment centres and pay for 
therapy may differ in important respects from British patients who are 
referred by their General Practitioner to N. H. S. out-patient departments. 
1 
It is also evident that some studies which report on clinical samples 
may, by the nature of the exclusion criteria employed, "clean up" samples 
in such a way as to make them less representative of typical clinical 
case-loads and, further, possibly bias their results by treating problems 
which are less hampered by associated difficulties which have been 
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removed by the exclusion criteria. An example of this is the 
Butler et al (1987) study which excluded patients reporting consistent 
anxiety for two years or more and the Borkovec and Mathews study 
(1988) which excluded GAD patients who also reported severe depression 
as a secondary problem. 
ii) Changes in Diagnostic Convention. 
More so than almost any other disorder, the definition of GAD has 
been substantially altered by changes in the DSM system over the decades. 
Thus patients diagnosed as GAD under DSM-III conventions may not be 
similar to those diagnosed under DSM-III-R conventions. In addition, 
many studies do not use DSM (or, indeed, a reliable assessment procedure) 
and thus diagnoses of "generally anxious", "anxiety state", "non- 
phobic neurosis" and "chronically anxious" dominate particularly the 
poorly controlled studies relating to the T. M., Progressive Relaxation 
and Biofeedback literature. Such diagnoses are also common in the 
group therapy literature making comparison across studies difficult 
if not impossible. 
iii). Measures of Change 
It is clearly of great importance to ensure that in any comparative study, 
a balanced assessment is conducted to minimise the possibility of any 
bias favouring any one treatment and that all relevant aspects of the 
desired behavioural change are represented. The former is particularly 
relevant where therapies of conflicting theoretical bases and conceptually 
distinct objectives are being compared. 
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There is often an overemphasis on measures of cognitive and somatic 
anxiety with the relative neglect of behavioural measures of anxiety. 
This in part reflects the view that GAD is characterised by a lack of 
behavioural dysfunction but from evidence presented in the chapter 
on the Three Systems Theory of Anxiety, the importance of adequate 
assessment of all 3 systems attains greater importance than it has 
been previously. 
Adequate follow-up is of considerable importance. For the purpose 
of most psychological research it appears that follow-up at three or 
six months is viewed as reasonable. However, several studies have 
used much shorter follow-ups, e. g. four weeks (Woodward and Jones, 
1980) and two weeks (Townsend et al, 1975). 
One final area of neglect has been the failure to investigate the 
generalised changes in day-to-day functioning which result from 
therapy. Thus measures of, for example, coping would be useful. 
The present study was designed to address these issues. 
iv). Confounding of Treatment Variables. 
At this stage in research into the effectiveness of treatments for 
GAD, many studies involve a number of techniques. For example, 
Butler et al (1987) utilised a heterogeneous treatment package in 
their study. Although showing that the package produced significant 
improvement, it is not clear why the treatment worked or what procedure 
or combination of procedures contributed to its success. 
The present study will address this issue. 
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v) Adequacy of Controls 
While most studies have employed a waiting list control, few have 
used a placebo condition to control for non-specific factors. This 
is a particular weakness in the literature. Both Blowers et al (1987) 
and Borkovec and Mathews (1988) point to the absence of a placebo 
comparison condition in all investigations of non-phobic anxiety 
disorders. In the absence of a placebo condition, these workers are 
unable to explain the similar changes found across conditions in 
their studies and are left suggesting that non-specific factors may 
be of importance. It is noteworthy that anxiety has been found to 
be among the few consistent predictors of positive placebo reactors 
(Shapiro and Morris, 1978). 
The present study will address this issue. 
vi). Concomitant medication. 
Given the large number of generally anxious patients who may be using 
benzodiazepine drugs, there is clearly a need for drug intake to be 
controlled. Little attention has been paid to this issue (e. g. 
Mathews and Shaw, 1977; Durham and Turvey, 1987). Power et al (1989) 
note that diazepam treatment, at least initially, may have useful 
clinical application while withdrawal symptoms following cessation of 
medication may significantly affect anxiety reports. Thus failure 
to control for these possibilities may influence outcome measures. 
The present study will address this issue. 
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vii). Analysis of Treatment Outcome Data. 
The most useful outcome data are those which are both statistically 
and clinically meaningful. Analyses may be statistically robust and 
significant without necessarily being of great clinical importance. 
The traditional comparison of group mean values across experimental 
conditions may be particularly suspect since no information is provided 
on the variability of treatment outcome amongst subjects in each group. 
This information is of considerable interest as clinical research 
should drive clinical practice, but may do so only when research 
findings are known reliably to predict outcome for the individual case. 
A number of workers have made recommendations as to how testing for 
clinical significance might be achieved. For example, Kazdin (1977) 
has suggested that a return to normal functioning may be a standard 
against which to determine the significance of clinical change. 
This approach requires that some normative information is available 
with which to compare post-treatment scores. The proportion of 
patients achieving normal scores after treatment can then be deduced. 
Other workers have recommended a 50% change of symptomatic level 
(Jansson and Ost, 1982) as a useful criterion. Jacobsen et al (1984) 
have also discussed these issues and have stressed the need for an 
agreed Standard convention which is "applicable to a wide variety of 
clinical problems, .... objective, relatively free of bias and sound 
from both a psychometric and clinical perspective". Although no such 
standard has as yet been determined, some analysis of this type is 
clearly required. 
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Analysis of outcome, conducted upon mean values, may be incomplete 
also if the mean score is taken to be a respresentative statistic 
descriptive of "typical" anxiety pattern. A simple measure of range 
or standard deviation would appear to be useful as an index of 
variability. Thus the employment of both mean and SD scores would 
make it possible to report treatment effects in terms of changes in 
typical anxiety patterns. 
The present study addresses both of these issues outlined above. Both 
mean and'SD scores for all variables will be analysed in the Results 
section and the clinical significance of the results obtained will form 
a major focus of the Discussion to follow. 
In this and in other ways noted in previous sections, the present 
study hopes to overcome some of the shortcomings of past research. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
In general, there is now increased emphasis being placed on cognitive 
mediation in behavioural change. This suggests that it is no longer 
as important to distinguish procedures as it is in simply defining 
effective treatment programmes combining effective strategies. There 
is a growing recognition from representatives of different schools of 
thought acknowledging the potential value of a range of techniques and 
to show increasing flexibility in the application of these techniques 
(Goldfried and Padawer, 1983). Frank (1985) suggests that this reflects 
the growing recognition that all psycho-therapeutic procedures share 
certain healing components which account for a considerable proportion 
of their effectiveness. (See Beitman et al, 1989 for a review of the 
movement toward integrating the psychotherapies). 
At this point in time, cognitive approaches seem to be a promising 
approach to the treatment of this population, however the preceding 
evidence is often marred by the methodological weaknesses outlined 
which must be seen as an indictment of a profession supposedly well 
trained in research methodology. However, final evaluation of the 
effectiveness of cognitive approaches awaits further large scale well 
conducted control trials. 
******************* 
In the preceding section on group therapy, the importance of information 
transmission during therapy was highlighted. The following chapter 
looks at an important method of information transmission utilised in 
the present study - bibliotherapy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BIBLIOTHERAPY 
69 
BIBLIOTHERAPY 
Although the concept of the use of books in the treatment of 
physical or psychological problems was not formally identified 
until the twentieth century, the idea itself was recognised much 
earlier (Alston, 1962; Sclabassi, 1973). Tews (1970) notes that 
the great libraries of three millennia ago bore the Greek inscription 
"Medicine [or remedy] for the soul". The first century Roman 
encyclopaedist Aulus Cornelius Celsus urged that critical judgement 
could be stimulated in patients by means of the reading and discussing 
of the sayings of the great orators while Rabelais prescribed literature 
for his patients as part of their treatment (Schneck, 1944). While 
of interest in classical times, the therapeutic emphasis on biblio- 
therapy has now shifted from active reading itself to become a 
medium for directive guidance (Dow, 1982). 
Although during the century the emphasis on bibliotherapy echoes 
that of wider theoretical and therapeutic concerns, e. g. Dumont's 
(1913) Self-Help Treatment for developing personal magnetism, it 
was in its application to psychoanalysis that bibliotherapy became 
an established adjunct to therapy. 
A relationship of the dynamic of psychotherapy to psychological 
principles in the application of bibliotherapy was postulated by 
Schrodes (1949,1960,1961). Theorising that the use of imaginative 
literature may produce results similar to those produced by direct 
analysis, Schrodes believed that the experiences induced by reading 
paralleled, in substance and function, the phases occurring in 
psychoanalysis: universalization, identification, projection, 
introjection, catharsis and insight (see also Slaveson, 1950). 
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The examples used in psychoanalysis include group therapy 
(Powell et al, 1952; Roman, 1957; Floch, 1958); Children (Cohoe, 
1960); Stammerers (Emerick, 1966) and Schizophrenics (Mascarino 
and Goode, 1940). However, as Dow (1982) points out, there is 
no empirical evidence to substantiate these early claims for its 
effectiveness, (see Peterson, 1935; Darling, 1957; Ryan, 1956). 
This chapter will concentrate on - 
1). BEHAVIOURAL BIBLIOTHERAPY. 
2). COGNITIVE BIBLIOTHERAPY. 
3). ISSUES IN THE EVALUATION OF MANUALS. 
4). CRITERIA FOR A TREATMENT MANUAL. 
5). MAINTAINING AND ENHANCING TREATMENT GAIN. 
6). POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF TREATMENT MANUALS. 
7). CONCLUSION. 
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1. BEHAVIOURAL BIBLIOTHERAPY 
While self-help books today relate to a wide range of techniques, 
for example, Gestalt, Rational-Emotive Therapy, Transactional 
Analysis and Hypnosis, the greatest growth in the development and 
use of bibliotherapy material has been by behavioural therapists. 
Glasgow and Rosen in their 1978 review identified 75 self-help 
manuals published or reported in the preceding five years. O'Farrell 
and Keuthen (1983) identified 124 behavioural self-help manuals. 
In both papers the authors noted that this represented only a fraction 
of all manuals available - Kimbrel (1975) identified over 100 books 
on dieting alone. The majority of manuals are problem orientated 
and so wide that almost all problem areas are covered, e. g. controlled 
drinking (Robertson and Heather, 1982); depression (Burns, 1980); 
insomnia (Alperson and Biglen, 1979); sexual dysfunction (Dow, 1980); 
social skills (Fensterheim and Baer, 1975); agoraphobia (Mathews 
et al, 1977); child behaviour problems (Matson and Ollendick, 1977); 
smoking cessation (Lando, 1977). 
The interest in self-help (or D. I. Y. ) procedures may represent 
the growing ethos of self-help which leads people to seek help 
for a wide range of problems from a wide range of sources other 
than health and social services fTurvey, 1985). 
Psychologists, aware that they are able only to see a fraction of 
the psychological problems in the community (e. g. Espie and White, 
1986), therefore see bibliotherapy as an opportunity to reach larger 
numbers of people while, at the same time, solving or at least 
reducing the dilemma voiced by Hawks (1981) of meeting the demands 
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of a large clinical population while allowing time for a detailed 
assessment in the treatment of complex problems requiring the 
therapist's direct intervention. 
Dow (1982) suggests that the development and examination of behavioural 
bibliotherapy have been prompted by a number of potential advantages 
with this form of treatment: 
a) enhanced cost-effectiveness (Kahn and Baker, 1968). 
b) may. help counteract negative views of behaviour 
therapy by providing "power to the people". 
(Rosen, 1976) 
c) increased accessibility of treatment. 
(Bastien and Jacobs, 1974) 
d) may help maintain treatment gains (1) by extending 
the involvement of significant others (Mathews et al, 
1977), or (2) by increasing perception of self- 
efficacy by self-initiated change (O'Brien and 
Kelly, 1980). 
e) providing various support by reducing feelings 
of, "standing alone" (McCary and Flake, 1971). 
f) increasing privacy and reduced embarrassment 
(Kass and Stauss, 1975). 
g) potential use in enhancing compliance with 
treatment (Ley, 1977). 
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2). COGNITIVE BIBLIOTHERAPY 
Within the 'cognitive revolution', the use of treatment manuals 
has been described as a "small revolution" (Luborsky and DeRubeis, 
1984). Many of the assumptions of cognitive bibliotherapy can 
be traced to behavioural principles. For example, in the preface 
of their treatment manual on cognitive therapy for depression, 
Beck et al (1979) stated that "Methodological behaviourism, with 
its emphasis on specifying discreet goals, delineating the concrete 
procedures instrumental for achieving these goals and providing 
prompt tangible feedback, added new dimensions to cognitive therapy" 
(page 4). 
However, cognitive bibliotherapy has modified the behavioural assumption 
that therapist variables are much less important than treatment 
variables and procedures in treatment outcome. In general, cognitive 
treatment manuals provide a greater degree of flexibility in treatment 
guidelines. For example, in the Beck et al (1979) manual referred 
to above, specific reference is made to the interpersonal context 
of therapy and the need for flexibility (see also Luborsky, 1984; r 
Beck and Emery, 1986). Thus cognitive theorists, to a greater 
degree than behavioural theorists, identify hypothesized critical 
features of both the therapist (warmth, empathy, genuineness) 
and the therapeutic interaction (basic trust, rapport) - the 
'collaborative empiricism' that Beck regards as the cardinal feature 
of the therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy. 
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3). ISSUES IN THE EVALUATION OF MANUALS 
It is important to distinguish between the varying degrees of therapist 
contact in bibliotherapy. Glasgow and Rosen (1978) divide the 
degree of patient reliance on the therapist contact into three 
categories: 
1. Self-Administered Therapy - In this condition the written 
material constitutes the sole basis of treatment and therapy is 
administered in the absence of therapist contact. 
2. Minimal Contact Therapy - Although the written material 
constitutes the main basis of treatment, some therapist contact, 
e. g. in the form of telephone calls, infrequent meetings or 
correspondence by mail can occur. 
3. Therapist Administered Therapy - Regular contact with the 
therapist with sessions focused on clarification or elaboration 
of information in the manual. This differs from therapist directed 
therapy in which the sole basis for treatment is contact with a 
therapist and a manual is not used. 
This section will concentrate on some of the main issues associated 
with the evaluation of manuals. 
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"Imagine for a moment, a group of professionals 
who adequately validated self-help books and 
who educated consumers in their proper use. 
This indeed would be something new". 
(Rosen, 1976 - page 179). 
Given the obvious attraction for busy psychologists, it is not 
surprising that there has been a vast increase in the number of 
therapy manuals available both for clinical and sub-clinical problems 
(Frankel and Merbaum, 1982). While these manuals have been developed 
from clinical expertise and experience, there has been little empirical 
research into their efficacy. This state of affairs is not unique 
in behaviour therapy - e. g. Barlow in his presidential address 
at the 1979 Association for the Advancement of Behaviour Therapy, 
criticized the current research effort as "A shallow approach to 
scientific evaluation which ignores failures and diaourages a more 
thorough analysis". Others have noticed that the effect of many 
behavioural procedures remains unclear and there are problems which 
seem refractory to almost all psychotherapeutic interventions 
(Kazdin, 1979; Yates, 1975; Agras and Berkowitz, 1980). 
In addition, difficulty relates to the assumption that a treatment 
manual shown to be effective under one condition will be efficacious 
under another. Turvey (1985) notes that this ignores possible 
problems of generalization (Stokes and Baer, 1977). He examines, 
for example, the claims on the cover of a book by Burns (1980) 
"Feeling Good", that the book contains a clinically proven drug- 
free treatment for depression. While the treatment (Beck's 
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cognitive therapy) has been shown to be effective under therapist 
directed conditions (see Rush et al, 1977; Blackburn et al, 1981; 
Teasdale et al, 1984), there is no evidence as yet for its comparable 
efficacy under self-administered conditions. 
Some authors have addressed this problem, e. g. Mathews et al (1981), 
in the treatment of agoraphobia and Robertson and Heather (1982) 
for problem drinking. The latter authors also included a control 
group to assess whether changes were due to the specific instructions 
in the manual or other factors. Heather et al (1986,1987) compared 
a self-help manual based on behavioural principles (Robertson and 
Heather, 1983) and a general advice and information booklet on 
alcohol problems (Grant et al, undated). Evidence at both six 
month and one year follow-up showed that the self-help manual showed 
a significantly greater reduction in consumption than those receiving 
the control group booklet. O'Dell et al, (1982) in a study relating 
to acquisition of parenting skills, presented the same information 
in different formats; written manual, audio tape, video tape modelling 
or live modelling and rehearsal with the parent's child. All 
training methods were superior to minimal instructions. The video 
tape manual was significantly less effective than the written manual 
or the live modelling with rehearsal. There were no significant 
differences among the written, video tape or live modelling with 
rehearsal training methods. O'Dell et al conclude that the data 
support the utility of replicable media materials as important 
adjuncts to training and in particular cite the effectiveness of 
video taped modelling. 
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a. Subject Attrition 
A major problem when self-help manuals are self-administered with 
minimal therapist contact is a large degree of sample attrition. 
Glasgow and Rosen (1987) suggest that as many as 50% of subjects 
starting self-administered desensitisation dropped out during 
treatment. Heather et al (1987) note that of the 785 individuals 
who responded to newspaper advertisements offering free help to 
cut down drinking, only 247 returned questionnaires in the free 
post envelope provided or were successfully contacted by telephone. 
This represents a 69% attrition rate between responding and completion 
of assessment measures. At one year follow-up, only 110 subjects 
returned questionnaires - an attrition rate of 86%. Turvey (1985) 
notes that knowing what proportion of the initial sample start 
and complete treatment is important in terms of evaluating cost 
effectiveness. There are also important implications in terms 
of improving the overall success of treatment. 
b. Manual Intelligibility 
Some of the above attrition rates may, in part, be due to difficulties 
understanding the manual (although Heather et al report 80% under- 
standing for the booklet), as a number of studies have shown' 
that level of readability is an important factor in reader perseverance 
and compliance with contents of the text (e. g. Klare, 1963; 
Smart, 1973). Dow (1982) stresses the importance of readability 
and comprehensibility inasmuch as they contribute to a cognitive 
hypotheses of compliance. He notes that a patient's retention and 
comprehension of the medical information presented to him are directly 
related to his satisfaction with the doctor's communication and his 
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compliance with the advice therafter. It is a criticism of 
bibliotherapy that few studies have investigated readability 
(Glasgow and Rosen, 1978; Arkell et al, 1976). 
Using the Flesch formula (1948), in the manner employed by Andrasik 
and Murphy (1977), O'Farrell and Keuthen (1983) assessed the readability 
of 124 (of the 159 listed by Glasgow and Rosen, 1978) self-help 
manuals. They concluded that 35% of the United States population 
over 25 "Might find many of the manuals too difficult for comfortable 
reading" (page 451). Dow, (1982) reviewing the readability of 
published self-help sex therapy manuals found that they were, 
in general, unsuitable for 60% of the general population. Dow (1980) 
was able to produce four manuals for sexual problems which can 
be understood by 75% of the population. 
Investigating problems of comprehension and recall of medical 
information, several authors uncovered significant areas of mis- 
understanding and-a lack of appropriate knowledge. Asking people to 
locate internal organs, Boyle (1970) found that only 20% could locate 
the stomach and 42% the heart. Boyd et al (1984) suggested that medical 
information given by doctors was based on an exaggerated estimate of 
patients' knowledge. In this study only 40% of patients understood 
doctors' verbal directions concerning location. 
There also exists a basic lack of knowledge about body function 
(for example, Spelman and Ley, 1966; Roth et al, 1962). It seems 
reasonable to suggest that patients may hold the same inaccurate 
beliefs about psychological problems as about medical problems. 
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Given the often highly inaccurate folklore which exists, it may be 
that psychologists and their patients initially look at problems 
in very different ways. Indeed, an essential component for Stress 
Inoculation Training is assessing the patients' understanding of 
their problem and, if necessary, re-definining it in more accurate 
ways (e. g. Meichenbaum, 1986). 
In a further series of studies, evidence was elicited that patients 
frequently forget or misinterpret advice. Ley et al (1973) found that 
patients forgot 50% of statements made by their General Practitioners 
within five minutes of the visit (see also Ley et al, 1976). Svarsted, 
(1976) found that half of the patients he interviewed made at least one 
error in describing what their doctor had recommended to them immediately 
after consultation. 
In a series of studies with medical out-patients, Ley and his co- 
workers found that patients could recall only between 48 - 63% of 
information stated during the consultation when interviewed up to 
18 minutes following consultation (Ley and Spelman, 1965,1967; 
Joyce et al, 1969). As expected, there was a strong correlation 
between accuracy of recall and adherence to advice. It also seems 
that the number of statements forgotten increases with the number given, 
such that the patient could be expected to remember three out of four 
statements but only four out of eight (Ley, 1979). 
Ley has suggested simple solutions to minimising these difficulties. 
Ley (1976) advises reducing the number of instructions to a minimum 
and also taking advantage of the "primacy effect", i. e. making 
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sure the important advice is given first in a consultation. 
In this study he found that recall increased from 44% to 75% and 
the important advice was given at the beginning of the consultation. 
Based on the evidence that patients recall the information which they 
believe to be most important Ley (1972) advised physicians to stress 
the information which they considered to be most important. By 
adhering to this advice, recall was increased from 44% to 66%. 
Bradshaw et al (1975), by making advice more specific, found that 
adherence and outcome improved with dieting, e. g. "you must lose 7 
pounds in weight" rather than more general advice, e. g. "You must lose 
weight". Patients given specific advice recall 49% of information 
compared to only 19% recall amongst patients given general advice. 
By increasing the readability of instruction leaflets, Ley was able 
to show increased compliance with medication advice (Ley et al, 1976). 
It is of particular importance given previous studies which have 
shown that many written communications over-estimate patients' ability 
to understand the information contained within (e. g. Wild and Evans 
1968) found that only 28% of the general population could be expected 
to understand a barium meal leaflet for patients. Similar findings 
were reported by Lovius et al (1973) with a dental leaflet. Ley and 
Morris (1984) suggested giving written information in addition to 
verbal information aids comprehension and adherence to treatment. 
Ellis et al (1979) compared two groups - one given solely verbal 
information, the other receiving verbal and written information on 
diagnosis and purpose of drugs prescribed. The authors found that 
the group which received both forms of information showed a significant 
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increase in material recall. In view of the existence of empirically 
validated readability measures (e. g. Flesch, 1948, Fry, 1968) 
assessing this variable poses no significant problems. 
In addition to the readability measures using the above formula 
(sentence length and number of syllables) Hartley (1984) offers 
practical suggestions on layout. Hartley (1981) and Stone (1981) 
demonstrate that text comprehension and recall can be aided by 
the systematic use of vertical and horizontal space. Vertical 
spacing is used to separate out into group related sections with 
the text while horizontal spacing requires equal spacing between 
words. In order to gain access to the text, Waller (1979) discusses 
devices such as title, contents pages, summaries, running headings, 
sub headings, numbering systems, references, bibliographies and 
indexes. Hartley (1978) and Waller et al (1982), discuss typographical 
aids, for example, use of italic or bold faces, different type faces, 
different type sizes, capital and lower case letters, underlining 
and colour. Brooks et al (1983) and Loman and Mayer (1983) have 
shown that the effectiveness of headings and sub headings aids recall 
and also helps readers retrieve information from the text. Hartley 
(1984) notes that with the current increase of interest in information 
technology, much research has to be done in, for example, the area of 
electronic text which includes features such as colour, scrolling, 
flashing, reverse-video, etc. 
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4). CRITERIA FOR A TREATMENT MANUAL 
Turvey (1985) offers clear guidelines for writing a treatment manual. 
These are as follows: 
1. Ensure that the manual is easily understood 
by a large proportion of the public (or of the 
client group it is intended for) and give some 
indication of the reading level or schooling 
required for understanding. 
2. Organize material clearly in labelled sections 
with the main points summarized and repeated as 
often as possible. Longer manuals should have 
a contents or index page (see also Ley, 1977). 
3. At the start give a clear description of the 
problem the manual is intended for and how this 
can be distinguished from any other similar problem. 
4. Describe any factors which indicate that people 
with this problem should not follow the treatment 
described in the manual; give advice about how 
to obtain more appropriate help (e. g. Miller and 
Boca, 1983; Heather et al 1986). 
5. Briefly describe any factors related to outcome 
and indicate rate of progress with treatment (if 
known) to help generate realistic expectancies. 
6. Summarize or give references to, any treatment 
reports (e. g. Carruthers and Murray, 1976) 
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7. Include baseline diaries or other assessment 
measures, such as forms for clients to record 
their treatment goals and progress on. 
8. Include checks on understanding - regular 
summary pages, multiple choice questions (e. g. 
Mathews et al, 1981) where a questionnaire that 
the client, having read the manual, should be 
able to answer before starting therapy. 
9. Provide background information about the 
nature of the problem - prevalence, common 
features, etc and correct common misperceptions 
about the problem. 
10. Provide the rationale for the treatment being 
suggested and a description of what factors may 
be maintaining the problem; (Sloane et al. 1975) 
found this to be rated as an important part of 
treatment by subjects in their study (page 206). 
11. Indicate how much time treatment will take with 
suggestions for fitting this into people's lifestyle. 
12. Include techniques which may help increase 
compliance with the treatment (though check that 
what you are suggesting does have a positive 
effect on the type of therapy being used; e. g. 
Barrera and Rosen, 1977). 
13. Where appropriate have a section for significant 
others to increase their understanding of the problem 
and ideas for how they can help; also, alert them to 
any behaviours they may carry out that may be 
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13. (contd. ) 
maintaining the person's problems. Mathews 
et al (1981) provide a manual for the agoraphobic 
spouse, although Cobb et al (1984) did not find 
spouse involvement to be necessary. 
14. Include a section on long term maintenance 
of progress, particularly to help anticipate 
situations that may be difficult to deal with in 
the future. 
15. Deal with set-backs. Help the person to 
accept that set-backs can occur, to work out what 
is causing them and to resume progress. Since 
some people may fail with self-help manuals, it 
may be useful to include a brief section recognizing 
this, and suggesting that, rather than give up 
with psychological treatment, assist them to 
reassess the difficulties and possibly carry out 
a more appropriate treatment with a greater degree 
of help. (Turvey, 1985 pages 239 - 240). 
. 
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5). MAINTAINING AND ENHANCING TREATMENT GAIN. 
Some studies suggest that treatment maintenance gain is greater 
under self-administered conditions (Mathews et al (1976); Baker 
et al (1973); Hanson (1976); Rosen et al (1976). Mathews et al 
(1981) reported that "about half as much change took place after 
treatment as during its course" (page 23). Clearly this is an 
area of great clinical and theoretical importance. Failure to 
achieve maintenance of gain becomes "an exercise in futility". 
(Zielinski, 1978), page 353. Dow (1982) suggests that self-help 
manuals aid generalization in the following ways: 
1. By reduced dependence on external reinforcement and 
stimulus control (Kanfer, 1971; Mahoney and Thorensen, 1974). 
2. Given a characteristically strong directive and didactic 
element, they should provide an opportunity for learning 
general coping strategies (Lazarus, 1976). 
3. By their contributing to an altered self-perception based 
on personal causal attribution of behavioural change. 
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6). POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF TREATMENT MANUALS. 
Dobson and Shaw (1988) suggest six potential disadvantages to 
treatment manual use in the field of psychotherapy research and 
theory: 
1). Inability to assess the effects of therapist variables. 
The use of treatment manuals produces an enhancement of the degree 
of control resulting in an inability to assess the variability 
associated with extraneous factors, e. g. therapist variables. Thus, 
for the purposes of investigating the maximally effective treatment 
for a particular problem, these variables only add error variance 
to this outcome data. Kazdin (1986) notes that, in comparative 
outcome research using treatment manuals, factors such as therapist 
variables may be suppressed through techniques such as crossing 
therapists with treatment conditions. 
2). Diminished ability to study the therapy process. 
Orlinsky and Howard (1978), in a review of therapist behaviour, 
suggest that this variable can be broken, for the purpose of analyzing 
the therapeutic process, into instrumental activity (clinical technique), 
communicative activity (verbal and non-verbal communication) and 
interpersonal behaviour. Manual guided treatments allow only 
communicative activity to vary to any considerable degree. Dobson 
and Shaw (1988), however, suggest modifications to manual-guided 
treatment research which could overcome these restrictions. 
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3). Focus on treatment fidelity rather than on competence. 
A potential disadvantage to the use of manuals is that, because 
they emphasize technique, they may underplay the need to assess 
and ensure competence in the therapies under consideration. Although 
therapists may be extremely knowledgeable about techniques, if 
delivery of these techniques is awkward, poorly timed, inappropriate 
or conducted within a poor therapeutic relationship, treatment 
outcome will be negatively affected. There is a need for the 
assessment, therefore, both of treatment fidelity (e. g. the Minnesota 
Therapy Rating Scale (De Rubeis et al, 1982) and treatment competence 
(e. g. the Cognitive Therapy Scale (Dobson et al, 1985). 
4). Increased expense. 
Expense accrues in terms of time required to develop the manual, to 
develop the measures to assess treatment fidelity and time required 
for the distillation of the treatment techniques. Rigorous therapist 
training and monitoring of therapy will also increase expense. 
5). Overresearching of older, codified therapy procedures. 
Dobson and Shaw (1988) suggest that 'overresearching' may arise from: 
a) the investment theorists may have with established 
treatments, particularly if treatment manuals exist. 
b) the costs associated with establishing new treatment 
manuals and procedures. 
c) pragmatic issues such as funding availability. 
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They suggest a worst-case scenario that the extensive use of treatment 
manuals will lead to a stagnant, codified set of accepted treatments 
that are set as the standard against which other treatment approaches 
are judged. 
6). Promotion of "Schoolism" in psychotherapy. 
At a time when the movement towards electicism is gaining pace 
(Smith, 1982), the use of highly specific treatment manuals may 
be viewed as an aberration. To the extent that manuals present 
unique models and methods of therapeutic intervention, they also 
implicitly reinforce the idea that it is proper to uniquely identify 
such models and methods. This issue can, however, be resolved 
by the development of eclectic manuals which could be contracted 
with pure forms of therapy. 
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7). CONCLUSIONS 
It is obvious to clinicians that irrespective of increases in staff, 
psychologists will only be able to see a small proportion of psychological 
problems in the community (Espie and White, 1986). In the absence 
of appropriately qualified and experienced psychologists, ever 
increasing consumer demands wil be dealt with by non-psychologists 
with widely varying degrees of competency. Bliotherapy can 
help psychologists bridge the gap between maintaining quality of 
service and quantity of problems seen. While in no way being a 
panacea, it can help provide therapy to a screened population allowing 
therapists to continue the provision of treatment to those requiring 
individual attention. 
There are also promising avenues developing with the expansion 
and availability of computer technology, e. g. word processors could 
allow standard material to be readily altered to take into account 
individual needs and to provide a tailored therapy. Turvey (1985) 
suggests the potential of interactive assessment programmes which 
could be made available at health centres or via teletext services. 
There is a need for psychologists to carry out a detailed assessment 
of bibliotherapy intervention as, too often, reports suggest that 
treatment manuals are based moreon. intuition than on empirical 
research. Turvey (1985) warns against immoderate claims for self- 
help therapy and suggests that unfulfilled expectations of the 
efficiency of psychological treatment could damage the reputation of 
proven psychological treatments and provoke a backlash against 
the profession in general. He cites as an example, the inappropriate 
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use, in many cases, of tranquilizers which were, following their 
introduction, hailed by some practitioners as a wonder drug. 
Current public dissatisfaction with these drugs has probably dented 
confidence in the use of other potentially more effective psychotropic 
drugs. 
It is now over ten years since the Glasgow and Rosen review of 
bibliotherapy appeared. Since then there has been a significant 
growth of interest in this area but while many studies have been 
published citing the effectiveness of this approach, there is need 
for a good deal of careful research and assessment before biblio- 
therapies can be accepted as standard therapy in clinical practice. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES 
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THEORIES OF ANXIETY 
In this section, the two currently most influential theories of 
anxiety disorders will be examined - behavioural and cognitive theories. 
Behavioural theories, in essence, conceptualise anxiety disorders as 
learned reactions which have been acquired as a result of traumatic 
or inappropriate conditioning experiences. By applying the principles 
of learning the SR chain is weakened/eliminated by counter-conditioning 
or extinction techniques (i. e. "unlearning" the mal-adaptive behaviours). 
Cognitive theories conceptualise anxiety disorders arising through such 
factors as expectation, attribution, self-perception, attitudes and 
beliefs. The focus of therapy thus becomes the removal or modification 
of these erroneous cognitions. 
This chapter divides into 3 sections: 
1). BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES. 
2). COGNITIVE THEORIES. 
3). COGNITIVE THEORY - 'REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION'. 
ýýý*ýýiýýýi*iiý#ýiii*ý 
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1). BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES. 
Behaviourism, as defined by Watson (1913), was viewed as an objective 
natural science. It can be seen as a revolt against the role of 
consciousness in the analysis of behaviour and of introspection as a 
tool of that analysis. It is possible to identify at least three 
major conceptual models in behaviour therapy. Wilson (1978) identifies 
these as: 
1. Applied behavioural analysis. 
This is the model most closely identified with the radical behaviourism 
of Skinner (1953). Treatment focuses primarily on overt behaviour 
and is based on the principles of operant conditioning. In this model, 
subjective events are regarded as epiphenomena determined by the external 
environment. While acknowledging the existence of subjective events, 
they are eschewed as subjects for scientific investigation for 
methodological reasons (Latimer and Sweet, 1984). 
2. The neobehaviouristic mediational SR model 
This model derives from the work of Pavlov. It relies heavily on the 
principles of classical conditioning and anxiety is hypothesized to 
be a classically conditioned autonomic response arising in response 
to conditioned stimuli. This model will be dealt with in detail. 
3. Social learning theory 
This model incorporates the role of both classical and operant conditioning 
processes while emphasising the importance of cognitive mediational 
processes. Wilson (1978) states: "The latter determine what 
environmental influences are attended to, how they are perceived and 
whether they might affect future action". (page 11). 
**** ******************* 
S9.4 
a. S-R Theory 
The theory and therapy as developed over the years by, amongst others, 
Wolpe, Eysenck and Rachman, owes a good deal to earlier work by Pavlov, 
Watson, Miller and Mowrer. 
By a process of classical conditioning, a previously neutral external 
or internal stimulus (CS) is paired with an aversive stimulus (UCS) 
As a result of this conditioning and subsequent stimulus generalisation 
and higher order conditioning, fear (CR) may be evoked by many stimuli 
which have no primary aversive property. 
This model was thought to have been demonstrated most clearly by the 
classic "Little Albert" experiment by Watson and Rayner (1920) which 
demonstrated that fear could be conditioned and that generalization 
could occur. By the application of learning principles, the fear could 
subsequently be "unlearned". Kazdin (1978) notes two conclusions from 
this work: 
1. Behavioural concepts and objective methods could be applied to 
investigate emotional states and private experiences. 
2. Experimental observation of how emotional responses are experienced 
provide clues as to how everyday fears might be created and how they 
could be treated. 
In view of the difficulties associated with the model, particularly 
in view of the observed persistence of fear reaction to conditioned 
stimuli in the absence of continued pairing with the UCR (e. g. see 
Eysenck (1979), Mowrer (1947), revising his earlier 1939 theory, 
proposed a two factor theory. 
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b. Mowrer's Two Factor Theory 
As classical conditioning leads to the development of fear, this fear, 
with its drive properties, motivates the organism to avoid -a behaviour 
which is reinforced by the subsequent fear reduction. "Solution" 
learning acquired in drive/fear reduction is then assimilated into the 
repertoire of the organism. The first factor - acquisition - is a 
prerequisite for the second - avoidance - (Rachman, 1976). 
Rachman (1974) has reviewed several sources of evidence which have been 
thought to support the two-factor theory: 
1. The results of observational studies on the production of fear in 
combat soldiers and disaster victims which have shown that complete 
breakdown could follow either one single traumatic incident or a long 
succession of mildly traumatic events (Gillespie, 1945; Trinker and 
Speigle, 1945; Tyhurst, 1951; Petrovic and Popovic, 1964). 
2. The animal literature - in particular aversive conditioning, avoidance 
learning and "experimental neurosis" in which neurotic behaviour was 
artificially induced by conflict, frustration or other stress (Wolpe, 
1958; Broadhurst, 1960). 
3. Traumatic stimulation studies which, if the UCS is sufficiently 
strong, can provoke one trial learning. The classical animal studies 
here are Hudson (1950) and Napalkov (1963). The effect has also been 
produced in humans using induced respiratory paralysis as the UCS 
(Campbell et al, 1964; Sanderson et al, 1963,1964). 
96 
c. Criticisms of Two Factor Theory. 
Clinical studies show clearly that problems such as agoraphobia are 
commonly found together with multiple other symptoms (e. g. see Buglass 
et al, 1977; Hallam and Hafner, 1978). Mowrer's theory does not explain 
why these symptoms develop, why they occur together nor why they are 
associated more often with agoraphobia than with other anxiety disorders. 
The theory also does not account for the possibility of observational 
learning and modelling (Bandura and Walters, 1963; Bandura, 1969), or 
the transmission of information (Ost and Hugdahl, 1985), as agencies 
for developing fear responses. 
Gray (1971) argues that not all stimuli are equally prone to conditioning 
and argues for the innateness of certain fears in certain animals. 
Seligman (1971) proposes that certain stimuli are more susceptible to 
conditioning and resistant to extinction. 
Mowrer proposes that conditioning acts as a drive leading to avoidance 
and is thus a prerequisite for avoidance behaviour. Hodgson and 
Rachman (1974) however, in an in-vivo flooding treatment, noted that 
subjective anxiety remains high even in the face of a marked decrease 
in avoidance behaviour. In addition, in the face of diminuation of 
subjective and physiological anxiety responses, avoidance persists. 
This suggests that the relationship between the two is weaker than that 
supposed (Gray, 1971). 
Eysenc/k (1979) criticizes two factor theory on the following grounds: 
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1. Lack of replicability - Watson's (1920) experiment, apart from being 
anecdotal in nature, has proven difficult to replicate (English, 1929; 
Bregman, 1934). While this may have been a function of the conditioned 
stimulus chosen (Delprato and McGlynn, 1984), many authors (e. g. 
Kimble, 1961; Marks, 1969), are of the opinion that Watson's case was 
overstated and took insufficient account of the quality of the UCS. 
2. In experimental studies great precision must be taken in the design 
in order to achieve conditioning. Such precision is highly unlikely 
in real life. 
3. According to theory, extinction should occur following presentation 
of unreinforced condition stimuli. In clinical problems, in some 
circumstances the oppposite effect is noted. 
d. Revision of the Two Factor Theory 
Three revisions of the original version of the theory, formulated in 
view of the inadequacies outlined above and as a result of more recent 
research are worth mentioning: 
i. Preparedness. 
ii. Incubation. 
iii. Safety signal theory. 
J. Preparedness. 
Seligman (1971) has proposed the concept of "preparedness". Seligman's 
thesis is that the majority of clinical phobias concern objects of 
natural importance for the survival of the species. He suggests that 
evolution has pre-programmed the human species to acquire phobias easily 
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for potentially dangerous situations. Such prepared learning is 
selective, highly resistant to extinction, probably non cognitive 
and can be acquired in one trial. This theory allows a re-interpretation 
of the two factor theory within the understanding of the biological 
boundaries of learning without any alteration of learning paradigms. 
ii. Incubation. 
Eysenck proposed the concept of "incubation" to explain the failure 
of the unreinforced CR to extinguish (Eysenck, 1968,1976,1982). He 
proposed the existence of tendencies for incubation (enhancement) or 
extinction (weakening) of the CR. The stronger tendency will dominate 
the outcome. Citing the Napalkov experiment (1963) as evidence, he 
proposes that the stronger the UCS, the more likely incubation becomes. 
He further suggests that for a CS to be reinforcing, it must have drive 
properties. In addition, incubation is made more likely if presentation 
of the CS is of short duration (see Nunes and Marks, 1975; Barkovec, 
1972 for empirical support). Clinical implications of this include 
the need for prolonged exposure to the CS in order to ensure a weakening 
rather than an enhancement of the CS. 
Paxton (1983) criticised Eysenck for advancing the model as an 
explanation of the development of anxiety disorders without distinguishing 
between the sub-categories. He suggests that with his frequent mention 
of "fear responses", it applies more readily to phobias than, for 
example, generalized anxiety. In addition, the attempt to replicate 
the Napalkov phenomenon has produced mixed results (Bersh, 1980; 
Boyd, 1981). Bandera (1979) argues that incubation does not explain 
the adaptive flexibility of obsessive rituals and Kimbel (1979) points 
to the paucity of evidence for the theory. 
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iii. Safety Signal Theory 
In response to criticisms that two factor theory was not adequate in 
accounting for the marked persistance of avoidance behaviour, 
Mowrer (1960) revised his earlier theory by introducing the concept 
of "safety signals". Gray (1971) developed the theory. He states: 
"The omission of anticipated punishment is a reinforcing 
event... (and it) confers conditioned or secondary, 
rewarding properties on stimuli (safety signals) which 
occur in association with it". (page 170) 
It is postulated that animals (and people) will learn to perform 
behaviour that is followed by such safety signals. Thus while 
Mowrer maintained that avoidance behaviour was initially reinforced 
by fear reduction, the concept of safety signals was necessary to 
explain the maintenance and extraordinary persistance of avoidance 
behaviour. Thus, many phobias could be construed as being a function 
of: 
a. classically conditioned fear. 
b. instrumental conditioning of avoidance responses. 
c. reinforcement of avoidance initially by fear reduction. 
d. in order to account for their persistance, -the secondary 
reinforcing effects of safety signals. 
The theory has been developed in some detail to account for the 
maintenarce of agoraphobia (Rachman, 1983,1984). 
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e). Conclusions 
Behavioural theories in general, have concentrated on SR connections 
and hence consists in modifying-eliminating mal-adaptive behaviour. 
This has always fitted phobias much better where the anxiety has a 
clearly identifiable external focus. In the case of, for example, 
generalised anxiety, where avoidance is expected to be minimal, 
behavioural theories are clearly lacking. By neglecting to study the 
individual perception and interpretation of events, strict behaviourism 
is unlikely to shed sufficient light on the mechanisms involved in non- 
phobic anxiety and there is now a noticeable trend even within the 
behavioural camp, to accept the necessity of cognitive processes thus 
discarding the view of such processes as epiphenomena (e. g. Goldfried 
and Davison, 1976; Lazarus, 1971). In any case, it is clear that 
there is a large discrepancy between the practice of behaviour therapy 
and the limited theory justifying its use (Guidano and Liotto, 1983). 
It is clear that no one theory is likely to provide a model for all 
the anxiety disorders. Progress depends on accepting that different 
theories can help provide partial explanations, e. g. Ullman and 
Krasner (1975) concentrate on operant processes and especially social 
factors in anxiety disorders. Rachman suggests three "pathways" to 
fear acquisition - vicarious/observational; informational/instructional 
learning and conditioning (see also Rimm et al, 1977). In general, 
however, there has been a distinct lack of fresh theorising within the 
behavioural literature without taking into account concepts stemming 
from the current "cognitive revolution". 
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2). COGNITIVE THEORIES 
Despite the surge of interest in cognitive approaches in recent years, 
the idea that emotional suffering is related to cognition is by no means 
new (Mahoney, 1977). Beck (1976) cites the "Radical cognitivist position" 
of Marcus Aurelius: 
"If thou are pained by any external thing, it is not this 
thing that disturbs thee but thine own judgement about it - 
and it is in thy power to wipe out this judgement now". 
Meichenbaum (1977) quotes Epictetus: 
"Man is disturbed not by things but by the view he takes of them" 
Philosophical roots can be traced back to Kant (1798) who considered 
the substitution of "private sense" for "common sense" to be basic to 
the development of all mental disorders. - According to Kant, judgements 
made on the basis of "common sense" are modified by feedback from others; 
judgements that arise from "private sense" however, are idiosyncratic 
and are not tested in the external world (see also Adler's (1936) 
distinction between "private intelligence" and "common sense"). Other 
proponents include Sullivan (1953) who considered correction of 
"parataxic distortions" (i. e. patients' misperceptions of situations) 
to be crucial to psychotherapy. Kelly (1955) developed a therapy based 
on his cognitive theory of personality, which involved the modification 
of disordered "personal constructs" or schemata which he assumed 
constituted the core of the patient's disorder. (See Rainy (1975) 
for a description of the historical development of cognitive approaches). 
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More recently, cognitive theory and therapy has developed from. two 
directions: 
1. From dissatisfaction with psychodynamic approaches (Beck, 1976) 
2. From dissatisfaction with behavioural approaches (Meichenbaum, 1977). 
The latter author points to criticisms of the conceptual basis of 
learning theory on both theoretical grounds (e. g. Bandura, 1974; 
Breger and McGaugh, 1965; McKeachie, 1974) and empirical grounds 
(e. g. Brewer 1975; Mahoney, 1974; Meichenbaum, 1974). 
Meichenbaum cites Bandura's presidential address to the American 
Psychological Association: 
"So called conditioning reactions are largely self- 
activated on the basis of learned expectation rather 
than automatic labels. The critical factor therefore 
is not that events occur together in time but that people 
learn to predict them and to summon up appropriate 
reactions". (1974, page 860). 
Other influences on the development of cognitive theory include: 
1. Information processing which involves such concepts as feedback 
loops and serial information processing in describing memory, language 
problem-solving and perceptual functions -a process begun by 
experimental psychologists in the 1950s (McLeod, 1987). 
2. piagetian theories - rather than seeing the child as a passive 
receptor of environmental input, Piaget put the view of the child 
as an active information seeker and processor. 
3. Social learning theory. Bandura's work on modelling (e. g. 
Bandura 1968) produced evidence for cognitive mediation in the 
regulation of some behaviours, i. e. observation rather than direct 
reinforcement could lead to the acquisition and maintenance of a 
new behaviour. 
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Within the behavioural schools, there was an increasing awareness 
of the need to study cognitive processes. Homme (1963) introduced 
the term "coverant" -a contraction of "covert operant". Coverants 
encapsulated events such as thinking, imagining, fantasizing, etc and 
he assumed that these "private behavioural events" obey the same laws 
as non-private ones. He discussed the possibility that these coverants 
could be controlled, assuming: 
1. Everybody is an organism and obeys the same laws of nature including 
the laws of reinforcement. 
2. The occurrence or non-occurrence of covenants can reliably be 
discriminated by at least one organism - the one to whom they are 
private. 
3. The organism to whom the events are private can control the 
presentation of reinforcement in the form of permitting the 
occurrence of high probability behaviours. 
ý***ý********************** 
Current approaches to cognitive therapy differ widely and it is not 
possible to present a precise model unifying these approaches. The 
following principles are, however, fundamental to most of them: 
1. That human beings respond not to environments per se 
but to the cognitive representations of those 
environments. 
2. That thinking, emotion and behaviour are all 
causally related. 
104 
3. That human learning involves the active 
acquisition of complex rules and skills 
("deep structural changes") rather than the 
passive conditioning of simple habits or 
responses ("surface structural manifestations"). 
4. That the task of the clinician is to teach skills 
and offer experiences which replace mal-adaptive 
cognitive representations with more adaptive 
cognitive systems. (Heide and Mahoney, 1980 page 100). 
Cognitive therapy can be thought of as an intermediary between behaviour 
therapy and psychodynamic therapy (Gelder, 1983). As in behaviour 
therapy, treatment is structured, the therapist assumes an active role, 
the goals of therapy are circumscribed, treatment is in the "here'and 
now" and therapy endorses the belief that mal-adaptive reactions can 
be altered without insight into the precise origin of the symptom. 
Unlike behaviour therapy, cognitive approaches concentrate explicitly 
on the ideation associated with the symptom. In addition to producing 
symptom reduction, cognitive therapy seeks to modify attitudes, beliefs 
and expectations. Thinking processes constitute a quasi autonomous 
system which can, at times, function independently of the environment. 
In general terms, cognitions are given central role on behavioural 
disorders - abnormalities of behaviour and mood are seen as a consequence 
of abnormalities in cognitions. 
Three cognitive therapies will be considered, those of Ellis, Beck 
and Meichenbaum. 
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RATIONAL/EMOTIVE THERAPY - ELLIS 
Ellis developed rational/emotive therapy (RET) in the 1950s and 60s 
and is now regarded as a pioneer of cognitive therapy, even although 
RET itself is in decline. The basic premise is that much, if not 
all, emotional suffering is due to the irrational ways people construe 
the world and the assumptions they make. These assumptions lead to 
self-defeating internal dialogue or self-statements which have an 
adverse affect on behaviour. The task of therapy, therefore, is 
threefold: 
1. The therapist must determine precipitating external events 
which lead to distress. 
2. The therapist must then determine the specific thought 
patterns and beliefs which constitute the internal response 
to these events and give rise to negative emotions. 
3. The patient is helped to alter these beliefs and thought 
patterns. 
Ellis postulated an ABC of irrational thinking and emotional 
disturbance. In its most recent form (Ellis, 1984) 
RET supposes: 
A: The activating events, e. g. current events, thoughts, feelings or 
behaviours related to these events, memories or thoughts about 
past experience. 
B: Forms the mediation between the activating event (A) and the 
consequences M. This takes the form of the individual's beliefs, 
cognitions about the activating event and exerts a strong 
influence on 
C: The consequences. These take the form of cognitive, emotional 
or behavioural disturbance. 
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Ellis assumes that psychological problems are a function of the 
individual implicitly or explicitly accepting strong, absolutistic 
"musturbatory" irrational beliefs. Thus a sequence of unqualified 
shoulds, oughts, musts and commands end inevitably in emotional 
distress - in what Horney (1965) termed a "tyranny of shoulds". 
Grieger and Boyd (1980) view anxiety as involving three "fantasies": 
1. A belief in a "have to" - e. g. "I have to be liked". 
2. A belief in a negative outcome relating to this first belief, 
e. g. "Nobody will like me - they think I am not a nice person". 
3. A belief in the "awfulness" of these events, e. g. "It will be 
awful if nobody likes me". 
Acceptance of these beliefs will, inevitably, lead to distress. 
Therapy, aimed at removing these beliefs begins at point D during 
which time patients are initially made to adopt the point of view that 
mal-adaptive behaviour and feeling arise from their belief systems. 
Phadkel (1982) divided stage D into three areas: 
1. Detecting irrational beliefs and clearly, seeing that they are 
illogical and unrealistic. 
2. Debating these irrational beliefs and showing oneself exactly how 
and why they are irrational. 
3. Discriminating rational beliefs from irrational beliefs and 
showing onself that the former leads to healthier results than 
the latter. Success at this stage leads directly to stage E- 
a stage where old, harmful beliefs are discarded in favour of a 
more appropriate belief system. 
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Meichenbaum (1976) suggests that it is not simply the incidence of 
irrational beliefs that distinguishes "normal" from "abnormal" 
populations. He assumes that non-clinical individuals also hold many 
of these irrational beliefs about themselves, but goes on to suggest 
that it is what the population say to themselves about these irrational 
beliefs, i. e. the coping mechanisms they employ that may distinguish 
them from a clinical population, e. g. the set of management techniques 
employed - the ability to "compartmentalize" such events or use humour, 
rationality or what Meichenbaum calls "creative repression". 
There is a paucity of controlled experimental studies of RET although 
a few encouraging studies are available (Baker, 1966; Di Loretto, 1971; 
Karst and Trexler, 1970; Wolfe and Fodor, 1975). Mahoney (1974) 
however, reviewing the outcome literature on RET concludes: 
"The clinical efficacy of Ellis's rational emotive 
therapy has yet to be adequately demonstrated" 
(page 182) 
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COGNITIVE BEHAVIOUR THERAPY - BECK 
This was first developed for the treatment of depression (e. g. Beck, 
1967; Beck and Greenberg,. 1974; Beck et al, 1978) and has since 
evolved into treatment for anxiety disorders (e. g. Beck and Emery, 1979). 
Within the system, behavioural techniques are utilized for cognitive 
purposes, i. e. to undermine irrational beliefs and style of thinking. 
As with BET, Beck posits the view that the core of the cognitive model 
is that it is not events per se, but rather people's interpretation 
of the event that determines the emotional response.. In depression, 
the interpretation considered important relates to perceived loss; 
in anxiety the interpretation relates to the perception of danger. 
In pathological anxiety, this perception of danger is unrealistic in 
that it is based on an overestimation of the danger inherent in the 
given situation. Clark (1986) lists four errors involved in these 
overestimations: 
1. Overestimating the probability of a feared event. 
2. Overestimating the severity of the feared event. 
3. Underestimating coping resources (what you can do about it). 
4. Underestimating rescue factors (wiatother people can do to help 
you). 
In a situation perceived as dangerous, the "anxiety programme" is 
automatically activated. Clark and Beck (1988) suggest this programme 
is a complex constellation of cognitive, affective and behavioural 
changes inherited from our evolutionary past. These changes are 
hypothesized to have been designed to protect us from harm in a 
primitive environment. These include: 
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a. Marked changes in autonomic arousal as a preparation for flight, 
fight, freezing or fainting. 
b. An inhibition of ongoing behaviour. 
c. Selective scanning of the environment for threat. 
In primitive environments, the anxiety programme would have been a 
useful survival mechanism. While this may also be the case in 
contemporary life, the system is seen to be activated following mis- 
perception or exaggeration of danger and thus the experience of anxiety 
is inappropriate for initiating remedial action (Clark and Beck, 1988). 
Beck distinguishes between two different levels of disturbed thinking. 
1. Negative Automatic Thoughts. These refer to the thoughts and images 
present in specific situations, e. g. an agoraphobic patient may have 
the automatic thought of "I am going to pass out" or "I am going to 
make a fool of myself". The characteristics of these "automatic thoughts" 
are that they are usually upsetting, irrational, concern the near future, 
are habitual and may come "out of the blue". 
2. Dysfunctional assumptions. These underlying values are said to 
predispose the individual to the above dysfunctional automatic thinking. 
These assumptions result from early learning experiences and may lay 
dormant until activated by a specific event which meshes with them. 
Dysfunctional assumptions may revolve around the themes of, e. g. love, 
(e. g. if your father dislikes you you are bound to be less happy); 
approval (e. g. "I need other people's approval in order to be happy"); 
omnipotence (e. g. "I should be upset if I made a mistake"). 
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These dysfunctional beliefs relate to higher order cognitive structures 
called schemas. According to Anderson (1985), once activated, these 
schemas facilitate the processing of information consistent with the 
content of the schema and inhibits the processing of information 
inconsistent with the schema. Activated schemas also lead to an 
increase in false alarms consistent with the content of the schema. 
(Clark and Beck, 1984). 
Marzillier (1980) suggests that, within cognitive therapy, there is 
considerable vagueness in the use of these terms. He quotes Meichenabum 
(1977) who notes; 
"Cognitive structures seem to be the cognitive psychologist's 
Rorschach Card or Linus Blanket...... He can see anything he 
wants in it and it gives him a sense of security" (page 212). 
During therapy, three key epistemological principles are conveyed 
to the patient: 
1. Perception or interpretation of reality is not identical 
to the reality itself. 
2. Interpretation-of reality is dependent on cognitive processes 
which are in themselves, inherently fallible. 
3. Beliefs are hypotheses which are subject to disconfirmation 
and modification. 
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According to the model, Beck asserts that if we know the meaning a 
person attaches to a given situation then we should be able to predict 
his or her emotional reaction. He states that the different neurotic 
disorders are not in form but in content. Within these categories, 
reality is changed in order to fit the concepts that dominate the 
patient's thinking. Therefore, the idiosyncratic ideational content 
of depressed thoughts reflects the devaluation of the patient's personal 
domain; in anxiety, a danger to that domain and, in paranoia, an 
unjustified intrusion into that domain (Beck, 1976). 
While the range of cognitive distortion is potentially infinite, Beck 
cites the following as occurring regularly in clinical practice: 
1. Selective abstraction: This involves focusing on a context so 
that the significance of the total situation is missed. 
2. Arbitrary inference: Refers to conclusions which are made on 
the basis of inadequate or improper information - e. g. the anxiety 
patient indiscriminately interpreting his perception stimuli in 
terms of personal danger. 
3. Overgeneralization: This involves blanket judgement or predictions 
based upon a single incident. 
4. Polarized thinking: This involves sorting information into one 
of two dichotomous categories; good or bad, success or failure, etc. 
5. Magnification: Another manifestation of the tendency to make 
extreme judgements. This refers to an over-emphasis on the most 
unpleasant, negative consequences that can arise in any situation. 
6. Minimisation: This refers to an underemphasis of, e. g. positive 
personal attributes, etc. 
7. Assuming excessive responsibility: In this form of distortion, 
patients may attribute negative events to their supposed personal 
deficiencies. 
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These thinking errors can be found by helping the patient recognise 
his dysfunctional thoughts either by discussion, diaries, or through 
imaginal techniques such as "As If". A range of behavioural techniques 
such as relaxation, behavioural rehearsal, exposure, activity 
scheduling, etc may be utilized, usually early on in therapy, to help 
disconfirm distorted thinking. 
Cognitive techniques include, e. g. decentreing, decatastrophizing, 
re-attribution, etc may be used as more permanent ways of altering 
cognitions. Within sessions, patient and therapist work in a 
collaborative fashion to try and identify and modify these irrational 
thoughts. Socratic questioning such as "What is the evidence for 
this thought? ", "Am I confusing a low probability event with a high 
probability event? ", "Is my judgement based on feelings rather than 
facts? ", etc can be used to help patients examine and reality test 
negative thoughts. In this way, rational responses are acquired 
leading to the modification or elimination of automatic thoughts. 
In addition to modifying these thoughts, therapy should aim at 
modifying the dysfunctional assumptions assumed to underly the 
thoughts. 
11.3 
STRESS INOCULATION TRAINING (SIT) - MEICHENBAUM 
Meichenbaumn came to cognitive therapy from a different route from Ellis 
and Beck. Increasingly dissatisfied with traditional behavioural 
approaches, he initially sought cognitive factors to explain improvement 
in behaviour therapy, e. g. systematic desensitisation (Klein et al, 1969; 
Sloan et al, 1975); assertiveness skills training (Glasgow and Arkowitz, 
1975; Schwartz and Gottman, 1974); aversive conditioning (Steffy, 
Meichanbaum and Dest, 1970; McFall and Lillesand, 1971). Early work 
on coping skills training (. e. g. Meichenbaum et al, 1971; Meichenbaum 
et al, 1975) led directly to the development of SIT. 
SIT is not a single technique. It combines elements of didactic teaching, 
Socratic discussion, cognitive restructuring, problem-solving and 
relaxation training, behavioural and imaginal rehearsal, self-monitoring, 
self-instruction, self-reinforcement and efforts at environmental change. 
It is designed to nurture and develop coping skills and provide for 
a pro-active, defense or set of coping skills to deal with future situations 
(Meichenbaum, 1985). 
The term is analogous to the concept of medical inoculation - SIT alms 
at developing a set of "psychological antibodies" (coping skills) and 
to enhance resistance through exposure to stimuli powerful enough to 
arouse defences but not powerful enough to over come them. Specifically, 
SIT is designed to: 
1. Teach clients the transactional nature of stress and coping. 
2. Train clients to self-monitor mal-adaptive thoughts, images, 
feelings and behaviours in order to facilitate adaptive appraisals. 
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3. Train clients in problem-solving, i. e. problem definition, 
consequence, anticipation, decision-making and feedback 
evaluation. 
4. Model and rehearse direct-action, emotion-regulation, and self- 
control coping skills. 
5. Teach clients how to use mal-adaptive responses as a cue to 
implement their coping repertoires. 
6. Offer practice in vitro imaginal and in behavioural rehearsal and 
in vivo graded assignments that become increasingly demanding, to 
nurture clients' confidence in and utilization of their coping 
repertoires. 
7. Help clients acquire sufficient knowledge, self-understanding and 
coping skills to facilitate better ways of handling (un)expected 
stressful situations. 
(Meichenbaum, 1985 page 22) 
SIT comprises three phases: 
1. Conceptualization. 
2. Skills acquisition and rehearsal. 
3. Application and follow-through. 
These vary according to the target population, the severity of the 
problems and the length of treatment. A brief over-view of each 
of these stages will be given. 
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1. Conceptualization Phase 
Meichenbaum, (1985) outlined the following as the main objectives 
during this phase: 
i. Establish a collaborative relationship with the client and 
with significant others where appropriate. 
ii. Discuss the client's stress-related problems and symptoms 
focusing on a situational analysis. 
iii. Collect information in the form of interviews, questionnaires, 
self-monitoring procedures, imagery based techniques and 
behavioural assessments. 
iv. Assess client's expectations with regard to effectiveness 
of the training programme and formulate treatment plans, 
establishing short, intermediate and long term goals. 
v. Educate the client about the transactional nature of stress 
and coping and consider the role that cognitions and emotions 
play in engendering and maintaining stress. 
vi. Offer a conceptual model or reconceptualization of the 
client's stress reactions. 
vii. Anticipate and subsume possible client resistance and 
reasons for treatment non-adherence. 
Skills Acquisition and Rehearsal Phase 
(page 27). 
In this phase the patient is helped to develop various coping strategies, 
tailored to his own personal need. The coping strategies are of 
two types: 
i. Instrumental (problem focused). 
ii. Palliative (emotion regulation). 
(Lazarus and Launier, 1978) 
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The following strategies will be utilised at this stage: 
a. Cognitive strategies. 
b. Problem-solving training. 
c. Self-instructional training (guided self-dialogue). 
Meichenbaum-presents examples of coping self-statements which patients 
should adapt to meet their own requirements. They are divided into 
four stages: 
Preparing for the stressor. 
Confronting and handling the stressor. 
Coping with feelings of being overwhelmed. 
Evaluation of coping efforts and self-reward. 
The thoughts differ from the simple positive thinking suggested by, 
e. g. Norman Vincent Peale in that they are not said as a "psychological 
litany" but rather the patient personalises his self-statements which 
should be rational rather than unrealistic, e. g. "one step at a time" 
not "I can cope with anything". 
3. Application and Follow-Through Phase. 
The objectives of this phase are to help patients implement coping skills 
in daily life and to institute generalized change. A variety of techniques 
can be used to aid these objectives, e. g. imagery rehearsal - this allows 
the patient to rehearse coping efforts which approximate real life 
situations while in the clinic.. Behavioural rehearsal is closely 
related to this. Role reversal (when the patient takes on the role 
of the therapist and vice versa) may help the patient generate strategies, 
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arguments and examples that are personally convincing (Janis and Mann, 
1977). It also helps the therapist evaluate the patient's understanding 
of the therapy. 
Time will also be spent in relapse prevention - in particular to help 
patients identify and deal with factors that could contribute to 
relapse. Meichenbaum also recommends "follow-through" or booster 
sessions rather than abruptly terminating therapy. 
************************ 
Although the brief review of three cognitive therapies has shown 
differences between the approaches, the three models all share the 
central concept of the importance of irrational thinking patterns on 
behavioural and emotional disturbance and, consequently, their long- 
term improvement for these disorders will only be achieved by the 
identification, assessment and elimination of these cognitive distortions. 
The most recent reviews of cognitive therapy (Miller and Berman, 1983; 
Shapiro and Shapiro, 1982; Dush, et al, 1983) suggest that: 
1. Cognitive therapies are superior to no treatment controls over a 
wide range of problems. 
2. The extent of difference diminishes when compared to placebo 
conditions. 
3. They are equally effective when administered to a group or 
individual form. 
4. Cognitive behavioural therapies are no more effective than 
cognitive only approaches. 
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There is a need, in the face of current popularity of these techniques 
for controlled research before dismissing other forms of treatment and 
-in particular multi model therapies which, irrespective of theoretical 
difficulties, have been accepted as a clinically effective approach 
for many emotional disorders (Barlow and Wolfe, 1981). 
3. COGNITIVE THEORY - 'REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION' 
Thomas Kuhn (1970) in "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", 
proposed that the history of a science is punctuated by "revolutions" - 
the essence of these revolutions being the emergence of a new paradigm 
which replaces in whole or in part, the old paradigm to which it is 
incompatible. He states: 
"Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and 
look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions, 
scientists see new and different things when looking with 
familiar instruments in places they have looked before". 
(page 111). 
In light of this, cognitive theory and therapy can be seen as revolutionary 
only when contrasted with Skinnerian behaviour modification. Even 
then, as Blackburn (1986) notes, Skinner (1963) in "Behaviourism at 
Fifty" concedes that - 
"It is particularly important that a science of behaviour 
face the problem of privacy .... an adequate science of 
behaviour must consider events taking place within the skin 
of the organism... as part of behaviour itself" 
(page 956) 
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Cognitive models with their emphasis on cognitive mediation are best 
seen as evolving from neo-behaviouristic and social learning theories 
which were already familiar with cognitive concepts and practices, 
(e. g. systematic desensitization, covert sensitization, thought stopping). 
Indeed Blackburn (1986) suggests that behaviour therapy has "come of 
age" in that it can accommodate the investigation of cognitive functions 
without fear of losing its hard-won scientific status. Salkovskis (1986) 
notes that cognitive therapy and behavioural therapy clearly make 
"comfortable bed-fellows". 
Recently, there has been a greater emphasis on a more critical approach 
to cognitive theory, e. g. Rachman's (1981) contention that clinical 
data fail to identify patterns of automatic thoughts that correlate 
with emotional arousal or anxiety. Leventhal (1984) believes that 
the emotional system is largely inacce-able to conscious influences 
(e. g. cognitive therapy), while Eelen (1982) states that cognitive therapists 
have given too much emphasis to patients'conscious or sari-conscious 
private "self-talks". He believes this self-talk represents epiphenomena, 
or surface structures, that might or might not be congruent with some 
deeper knowledge of their world. 
It is worthwhile quoting the criticisms of a leading cognitive 
researcher, Michael Mahoney: 
"Much of what is being popularized in today's wave of 
cognitivism seems superficially mediational and 
unnecessarily restrictive in its notions of contemporary 
cognitive psychology. I do not believe that the simple 
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cueing, recitation, or reinforcement of "positive self- 
statements" or the rationalistic "reconstruction" of 
explicit beliefs are optimal or sufficient approaches 
for facilitating significant and enduring personal 
development. These interventions on explicit surface 
structures are, I believe, a-welcome movement towards 
the refinement of our understanding, but I think we 
should be careful not to over-rationalize a developing 
system (the person) that contains powerful and primitive 
prerational modes of knowing and adapting to it world. 
(Mahoney, 1985, pages 13-14) 
These criticisms should be attended to and the likelihood is that 
following what can best be described as a 'honeymoon period', during 
which many clinicians began jettisoning behavioural techniques in favour 
of cognitive techniques perhaps without a full understanding of these 
techniques, a more mature consideration of the advantages and disadvantages 
of congnitive therapy will take place and new paradigms emerge. 
Teasdale (1982) argues that new paradigms directly stimulate clinically 
useful strategies due to the growth of new hypotheses and methodology. 
These new ideas and approaches supplement the most useful of the tried 
and tested ones. Marshall and Segal (1988) note that researchers and 
clinicians are now less interested in distinguishing procedures as 
in designing effective treatment programmes which may combine strategies 
adopted from various theoretical models. While this may obfuscate 
differences among approaches, it does allow for better theories, more 
precise research and more comprehensive therapy programmes. 
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Salkovskis (1986) would find in this strong evidence in favour of 
the "scientific eclecticism" which he regards as a hallmark of research 
orientated clinicians in behaviour therapy. 
The logical extension of this "eclecticism" involves the study of 
behavioural, cognitive and somatic processes involved in the 
anxiety disorders. The next chapter concentrates specifically on this 
area and also investigates the status of affect in a systems analysis 
of anxiety. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THREE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
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THREE SYSTEMS MODEL OF-ANXIETY 
Following criticisms of Mowrer's two factor theory and related 
unitary models of fear, Lang (1968,1967) suggested that anxiety 
comprises three loosely correlated response systems (behavioural, 
physiological and cognitive). These "three systems" were described 
as highly interactive but also partially independent, the latter being 
attributed to the fact that none of the systems uniquely defined an 
emotional state and each could be influenced by non-emotional factors 
(Craske and Craig, 1984). "Three Systems Analysis" of anxiety has 
now achieved a wide degree of acceptance amongst clinicians. From 
both a theoretical and clinical point of view, the importance of the 
three systems model is that fear is no longer seen as an entity or, 
in Lang's phrase "a, lump" which could be measured in different ways 
(Hugdahl, 1981). As Lang et al (1972) put it: 
"In human subjects, emotional behaviour includes responses 
in three expressive systems; verbal, gross motor, 
physiological (autonomic, cortical, neuro-muscular). 
The responses of no single system seem to define or 
encompass an "emotion" completely. Verbal statements 
of hostility are obtained from subjects who show no 
tendency to avert attack. Individuals may report no 
fear of objects they have systematically avoided for 
a lifetime. Subjects in rage show elevated blood 
pressure, but the same reading can be caused by kidney 
failure or exercise. The clinical examples are legion, 
and the laboratory is yielding a similar range of low 
correlations between systems, even when the subject 
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population and the emotional stimuli are quite 
homogeneous". (page 624). 
This chapter divides into 5 sections: 
1). THREE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS. 
2). CRITICISMS OF THREE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS. 
3). MEASUREMENT OF THE COMPONENTS. 
4). AFFECT AS A SEPARATE COMPONENT. 
5). IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE. 
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1). THREE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS. 
a) Development of the concept of multi-measurements. 
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a) Development of the Concept of Multi-Measurements. 
Impetus for multiple response measurement predates behaviour therapy 
and can be seen, for example, in Jung's measurement of the emotional 
responses accompanying word association. It has, however, had to 
battle against behaviourists such as Thorndike who felt it sufficient 
to rely on a single index of behaviour change, for example, rate of 
lever pressing (Himadi et al, 1985). 
While Lang played the pioneering role in the development of three systems 
theory, credit must be given to the work of Campbell. In arguing against 
the use of single fallible methods such as questionnaires, Campbell 
and Fiske (1959) called for a multi-trait - multi-method matrix (i. e. 
relatively different but ultimately convergent measurements of behavioural 
processes). While most behaviour therapists recognised the ideas behind 
Campbell and Fiske's proposals, only a small minority of treatment studies 
have included a "Triple Response Measurement""(TRM). Generally, 
assessments have been limited to a single response mode, usually a 
psychiatric rating scale or patient functioning (Mathews et al, 1981). 
Himadi et al (1985) suggests that two factors have contributed to this. 
resistance: 
1. The behavioural tradition of single peripheral measurements 
as explified by Thorndike. 
2. The inherent difficulties of TRM (see Boice, 1983). 
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b) Development of Three Systems Analysis. 
The starting point for Lang was the finding by Lang and Lazovik (1963) 
on automated desensitisation of snake phobics. While some subjects 
showed rapid change in overt behaviour (i. e. decreased avoidance) they 
still continued to verbally label themselves fearful. Others showed 
a lessening of fear when measured by fear questionnaires but still 
exhibited marked physiological responding. From this, Lang (1968, 
1971,1978) concluded that different systems - cognitive, physiological 
and behavioural - are, to some extent, capable of independent change 
through the shaping of environmental demands. 
Evidence for Lang's theories came from the work of the Laceys in the 
late fifties and early sixties (see Lacey's review, 1967). 
Physiological and behavioural measures rarely coincided and instead 
low correlations were legion. Lacey and Lacey (1958) put forward the 
view of individual response-stereotypy. Using various groups of subjects 
and several different stressors, they found that individuals tend to 
respond by showing the greatest degree of activity in the same 
physiological system no matter what the source of stress was. For 
many subjects, the pattern of physiological responding was repeated 
from stressor to stressor. 
Engel (1960) advanced the notion of stimulus-response specificity to 
explain discrepancies within a single system. He suggested that 
different emotional stimuli would have their own autonomic correspondence 
irrespective of individual differences. Support for this view was 
demonstrated by Ax (1953). He found anger and fear could be 
differentiated in terms of autonomic response. Anger resulted in a 
more intense increase in diastolic blood pressure and decrease in heart 
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rate compared to the corresponding autonomic responses when the subject 
was made fearful. These results were replicated by Weerts and Roberts 
(1976) who had subjects simply imagine being in the situation used by 
Ax. However, as Hugdahl (1981) points out, these studies are exceptions 
and the overall impression from a review of the literature is that the 
systems do not covary and especially not in clinically significant 
emotions. FFessler and Engel (1977) make the point that stimulus 
response specificity and individual response stereotypy are not mutually 
exclusive. 
Support for Lang's idea that anxiety comprises relatively independent 
systems was found by Leitenberg et al (1971) who noted, that by adding 
physiological measures to overt behavioural measures, discrepancies 
were found as patients functioned well despite continuing high heart 
rates. Leitenberg drew two important conclusions from the study: 
1. There may have been too much emphasis on reducing anxiety and 
not enough on. training patients to function well regardless of 
anxiety. 
2. Wolpe's notion (based on Hullian psychology) that anxiety must be 
inhibited before avoidance behaviour could be reduced, needed 
reconsideration (see also Bernstein and Paul, 1971). 
c) Synchrony and Desynchrony 
Rachman and Hodgson (1974) suggested the terms "synchrony" and 
desynchrony" to describe the relationships between the existing response 
systems. These terms were in addition to the concept of concordance 
which refers to the degree of correlation between two or more response 
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systems at any one time. Synchrony refers to the degree of 
, 
covariance as response systems change over time. 
Hodgson and Rachman (1974) extended the three systems model on the 
basis of the observation that not only are the three systems imperfectly 
correlated at any given point in time (discordance) but they also change 
at different rates (desynchrony). These authors emphasise the significance 
of desynchronous changes in fear: 
"There is no doubt that, during the next decade, psychologists 
will be concerned with the differential changes of various 
response systems and need to consider the factors which tend 
to reduce correlations between measures at a particular point 
in time (i. e. discordance) and between change scores from 
one point in time to another (i. e. desynchrony). 
(page 319) 
Hodgson and Rachman (1974) developed five hypotheses to provide a 
framework for predicting degrees of concordance and/or synchrony. 
Partial empirical support for the hypotheses that concordance between 
response systems is likely to be high during strong emotional arousal 
comes from the studies of Sartory et al (1977) and Marks et al (1971). 
Indirect support derives from studies examining mildly fearful individuals 
which suggest, in general, an absence of autonomic'responding (Borkovek, 
1973; 1976). Sallis et al (1980) reviewed 41 clinical and 54 analogue 
studies and reported that incongruence amongst channels tended to be 
higher for the clinical populations. 
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Empirical support has also been offered for the hypothesis that the 
degree of concordance between measures and different response systems 
after treatment intervention will increase during follow-up period. 
(Foa et al, 1980; Lande, 1982; Nunes and Marks, 1975; Watson et al 
1982). There is evidence that desynchronous patterns, especially 
those involved in the continued manifestation of anxiety in at. least 
one response system, increases the likelihood of treatment failure 
(Poplar, 1977; Vermilyea et al, 1984). Evidence for the hypothesis 
that flooding would produce desynchrony whereas participant modelling 
would produce synchrony remains inconclusive (Craske and Craig, 1984). 
As Himadi et al (1985) assert, three generalisations can be drawn from 
tests of these hypotheses: 
1. Most reports deal exclusively with simple phobias 
(e. g. fear of spiders). 
2. The tests have appeared at a rather slow rate. 
3. Attempts at confirming hypotheses have met with mixed success 
where, for example, concordance was predictably high during 
strong emotional arousal while discordance was not evident 
during mild emotional arousal (Sartory et al, 1977). 
In contrast to the prediction of Rachman and Hodgson, Kaloupek and 
Levis (1983) found that low fearful subjects produced a greater 
degree of response concordance than high fearful subjects and where 
expected desynchrony appeared in the high demand treatment, it occurred 
at an unexpected time - during and not between treatment sessions 
(see Gray et al, 1979). 
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Craske and Craig (1984) compared three systems analysis theory to 
Bandura's Self Efficacy Theory (Bandura, 1977). The latter theory 
proposes that the strength of an individual's conviction in his or her 
ability to perform particular tasks mediates the degree of subjective, 
autonomic and behavioural anxiety, i. e. cognition is accorded causal 
status. Bändura confirmed that different therapeutic strategies 
strengthen self-perception of efficacy and that subsequent behaviour 
corresponds to the degree of self-efficacy change regardless of the 
method by which it was enhanced (see Bandura and Adams, 1977; Bandura 
et al, 1982; Bandura, 1982). The theory has been the subject of 
extensive theoretical and experimental analysis (Eysenck, 1978: 
Kazdin, 1978). In studying performance anxiety in pianists, Craske 
and Craig contrasted three systems theory which associates concordance 
and synchrony with specific conditions and self-efficacy theory which 
suggested that although systems can be discordant and desynchronous, 
they are generally concordant and synchronous. Results favoured three 
systems theory. There was greater synchrony amongst behavioural, 
cognitive and physiological measures in the relatively anxious group 
while there was a greater tendency towards desynchrony in a relatively 
non-anxious group. Results were consistent with the three systems 
emphasis on the relative Independence*of the different measures. 
While the above study dealt with a non-clinical population, Barlow et 
al (1980) investigated synchronous and desynchronous changes between 
heart rate and subjective anxiety during 12 sessions of cognitive therapy 
with three agoraphobic women. While substantial behavioural improvement 
was noted in all three cases, different patterns of synchrony were 
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observed between heart rate and self-report. They concluded that 
desynchrony was "an established fact in the treatment of phobias". 
(page 447,1980). Lehner and Leiblum (1981) looked at the three systems 
measurement of assertiveness anxiety. Results revealed low correlations 
between the three channels thus supporting three systems theory. 
d) Implications for Clinical Psychology : 
individual responses to treatment. 
Paul (1969) formulated the important questions to be answered in behavioural 
research: 
"What treatment, by whom is most effective for the 
individual with a specific problem, under which set of 
circumstances and how does it come about? " (page 44). 
As Ost et al (1981) point out, behavioural research in the 1970s focused 
almost exclusively, on the first question and, to some extent, on the 
last. Borkovec (1976) states that research "lumping" together 
individuals with the same diagnoses almost completely ignored the role 
of individual differences in anxiety response components despite Paul's 
(1969) warning that - 
"The question of technique effectiveness cannot be 
divorced from the subject characteristic considerations". 
(page 274). 
Acceptance of three systems analysis by the National Institute of 
Mental Health (MIMH) and the Albany Research Conference (Barlow 
and Wolfe, 1981) helped stimulate research directed towards effective 
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treatment based on this new method by first assessing which components 
played the prominent role in an individual's anxiety and secondly 
applying the treatment which focused on that component (see Ost et al, 
1981,1982,1984; Cobb, 1983). 
Davidson and Schwartz (1976) suggest that maximum treatment effectiveness 
should occur when patients are treated with a technique which matches 
the most prominent system of reaction (i. e. consonant treatment). 
This means that a treatment method emphasising cognitive effects should 
primarily be used with patients with strong negative cognitions as their 
primary complaints. Similarly a physiological treatment method such 
as Applied Relaxation should primarily be used with patients with profound 
physiological reactions as their primary complaint (Haug et al, 1987). 
In order to help match the patients to the treatments, Ost et al (1981) 
suggested the following divisions: 
1. Treatments focusing on the behavioural component. 
Reinforced practice. 
Flooding. 
Modelling. 
Contact-desensitisation. 
2. Treatments focusing on the cognitive component. 
Stress inoculation training. 
Systematic rational restructuring. 
3. Treatments focusing on the physiological component. 
Relaxation methods. 
Anxiety management training. 
Systematic desensitisation. 
Biofeedback. 
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Norton and Johnson (1983) compared the effectiveness of two different 
relaxation procedures in the treatment of snake anxious individuals 
who expressed anxiety primarily in a somatic or a cognitive manner. 
Forty moderately snake phobic subjects were categorised as either 
"somatically-anxious" or "cognitively-anxious" on the basis of a 
questionnaire. Half of the subjects in each group were given modified 
progressive muscular relaxation and the other half received training 
in Agni Yoga for four sessions. The results provided tentative evidence 
that the two relaxation procedures produced differential effects according 
to whether subjects expressed anxiety somatically or cognitively. The 
authors, however, stressed that the interpretation of the results must 
be tempered by the fact that the subjects were college students who 
expressed only a moderate fear of snakes. They quote the finding that 
clinically anxious subjects may not respond to progressive relaxation 
(Borkovec and Sides, 1979) or other behavioural procedures (Emmelkamp, 
1979) in the same way as moderately anxious college student volunteers. 
They note that it is not certain that the results of the study therefore 
apply to clinical populations. (See also Sharhar and Merbaum, 1981). 
Haug et al (1987) categorised flying phobic patients as either 
cognitive or physiological responders on the basis of pre-treatment 
evaluation. Within each group, half the patients were assigned to 
cognitive treatment (Stress Inoculation Training, Meichenbaum and Turk, 
1976 or Applied Relaxation (Ost et al, 1981). Both treatment methods 
yielded significant reduction in both physiological arousal and subjective 
anxiety. The reduction during post treatment follow-up compared to 
pre-treatment measurements was more marked for the consonant compared 
to the non-consonant treatment group particularly for self-reported 
physiological arousal and fear of flying scale scores. However, no 
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differential effects between the consonant versus non-consonant 
treatment groups were found for changes in heart rate and subjective 
anxiety. 
Ost and his colleagues have reported on a series of consonant treatments. 
Ost et al (1981) stressing the importance of individual response patterns 
in the treatment of social phobia, assessed patients during a social 
interaction test and physiological and behavioural indices. On the 
basis of this information, patients were divided into behavioural and 
physiological reactors. Half the patients within each group were then 
assigned to a behaviourally focussed method (Social skills training) 
or to a physiological focussed method (Applied Relaxation). Within 
group comparisons showed that Social skills training was better for 
behavioural reactors than was Applied Relaxation in six out of ten 
measures while Applied Relaxation was significantly better for 
physiological reactors in three of the measures. 
Ost a nd his colleagues found similar results with claustrophobics 
(Ost et al, 1982) although with agoraphobics, state that "in no case 
was exposure in vivo significantly better than Applied Relaxation for 
the behavioural reactors or-vice versa for the physiological reactors" 
(Ost et al, 1984, page 705). Jerremalm, Jansson and Ost (1986) again 
focusing on the treatment of social phobics, report that classifying 
patients into physiological and cognitive reactors did not predict 
different outcome, with a physiologically and cognitively-focussed 
method respectively. 
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Thus the literature currently offers only weak support to the hypothesis 
that "tailoring" a treatment method in accordance with the most prominent 
response system is most effective for treatment outcome. Haug et al 
(1987) suggest that the role of "tailored" consonant anxiety coping 
strategies could be of importance for the maintenance of treatment effects. 
When the individual has to confront the anxiety-provoking situation, 
the availability of coping strategies related to the most prominent 
response in terms of three systems model could be beneficial. 
The above authors, however, note that the clinical value of the above 
studies still remains an open question. They point out that frequently 
the non-consonant subjects benefitted from treatment and thus the 
obtained statistical significance may not have a corresponding clinical 
significant. 
These studies are, however, open to the criticism that the specificity 
of treatment is undocumented. For example, the view that cognitive 
restructuring selectively affects cognitive responding and that exposure 
techniques primarily alter motor behaviour are based on intuition rather 
than empirical evidence. (Bellack and Lombardo, 1984). Odom et al 
(1978) reported that cognitive restructuring reduced heart rate more 
effectively than systematic desensitization, and that guided participation 
was more effective than cognitive restructuring in change self-reported 
anxiety. These data therefore suggest that the hypothesized specificity 
of various treatments may differ from their actual effects. Therefore 
while the idea of "tailoring" therapy to fit an individual's needs is 
appealing, further research is clearly needed to clarify this issue. 
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e) Relationship between the Mode of Acquisition and Anxiety Responses 
In a further series of papers, Ost and his colleagues investigated 
Rachman's 1977 paper on the acquisition of fears and phobias. 
Dissatisfied with Mowrer's (1979) two factor theory, Rachman proposed 
three "pathways" to fear acquisition: 
a. Conditioning. 
b. Vicarious acquisition. 
c. Information/instruction. 
It was suggested that physiological reactors would predominate in 
fears acquired through conditioning whereas on fears developed indirectly 
through vicarious learning or information, negative cognitions would 
predominate. 
Ost and Hugdahl (1981) looked at ways of acquisition among animal phobics, 
social phobics and claustrophobics. Taken together, 57.8% of these 
patients reported conditioning experiences, 17% vicarious acquisition 
and 10.4% reported information/instruction acquisition. 15.1% could 
not recall any specific circumstances. In addition, the highest proportion 
of conditioning experiences were reported by the claustrophobic group 
followed by the social and animal-phobic groups. A tendency toward 
higher self-reported physiological arousal was observed in the animal 
phobic group amongst those patients exposed to conditioning experiences. 
However, when actual heart rate recordings during exposure to the phobic 
situation were taken into account, higher activity was observed only 
in the claustrophobic group. Ost et al (1981) suggest that the hypothesis 
of differential loadings on the physiological versus cognitive/subjective 
anxiety component depending on the way of acquisition (conditioning 
versus indirect) was only partially supported. 
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Ost and Hugdahl (1983) studied the acquisition of agoraphobia and anxiety 
response patterns. The overwhelming majority of the agoraphobic patients 
in this study (81%) described the onset to conditioning experiences, 
9% recalled vicarious experiences, no patient developed the phobia through 
instruction/information while 10% had no recall of onset. Regarding 
the relationship between the ways of acquisition and the anxiety response 
patterns, questionnaire data yielded no significant difference between 
the conditioning and the indirect-onset groups on any of the components. 
The results were therefore similar to the authors' 1981 study. It 
was concluded that, in agoraphobia, there does not seem to be any 
significant relationship between the way the phobia is acquired and 
the degree of loading on the different anxiety response components. 
Ost and Hugdahl (1985) applied the same approach to blood and dental 
phobics. In this study, 45% of blood phobics acquired their phobia 
through conditioning compared to 68% of dental phobics. 32% reported 
vicarious experiences (12% in dental phobics) 9% through instruction/ 
information (6% in dental phobics) while 14% in each'group had no recall. 
In terms of relationship between the ways of acquisition and the anxiety 
response pattern, the results were similar to the two previous findings 
where no significant relationship between the way of acquisition and 
the degree of loading on the different anxiety responses was found. 
f) Role of Synchrony in Treatment Outcome 
Schroeder and Rich (1976) in a study of female student snake phobics, 
analysed the process of fear reduction during systematic desensitisation. 
They noted linear reduction on behavioural and subjective measures but 
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a cubic trend was detected for baseline heart rate. The initial variable 
in unravelling the fear response seemed to be idiosyncratic to the 
individual subject and the process of change appeared to involve complex 
interactions among the components, i. e. changes in one system could 
not be considered primary in initiating change in other systems. Based 
on the hypothesis proposed by Hodgson and Rachman (1974) that the degree 
of concordance between measures and different response systems after 
treatment intervention will increase during the follow-up period, it 
has been suggested that these synchronous patterns, especially those 
involved in the continued manifestation of anxiety in at least one response 
system increases the likelihood of treatment failure (Poplar, 1977; 
Vermilyea et al 1984). Thus the view has developed that desynchrony 
is a useful prognostic index. 
Barlow et al (1980)reportirg on three agoraphobic women treated in a group 
therapy programme, noted that the three patients demonstrated varying 
patterns of synchrony with one example of marked desynchrony. The 
authors noted that these divergent patterns were all the more striking 
in view of the fact that each patient had the same problem (agoraphobia), 
were seen in the same group therapy setting and thus received the same 
treatment administered at identical times. The desynchronous patient 
relapsed thus providing the suggestion that desynchrony could be 
predictive of treatment outcome. 
Vermilyea et al (1984) in a cognitive rehearsal/graded practice treatment 
outcome study involving agoraphobics, noted overall modest improvement. 
When the data were divided into synchronous and desynchronous patients, 
treatment effects became much clearer in favour of the synchronous patients 
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with desynchronous patients showing a tendency towards increase. in heart 
rate. When patients were divided into treatment responders and non- 
responders, five of the six non-responders were desynchronous compared 
with eleven of the twenty-two treatment responders. It was also noted 
that those patients who began with the most substantial problem showed 
most responsiveness to treatment thus lending support to the-Law of 
Initial Values (Hodgson and Rachman, 1974). 
Vermilyea et al (1984) state that the link between desynchrony and poor 
response to treatment gives credence to the suggestion made in the 
Barlow et al study noted above. It also supports the theory expressed 
by Lang (1979) that exposure to fear stimuli without processing of the 
emotional component (as indicated by changes in heart rate) is necessarily 
ineffective. Foa and Kozak (1976) elaborated Lang's model and suggested 
that physiological habituation is a prerequisite for successful permanent 
processing. Craske et al (1987) report on 21 of the 28 patients treated 
in the Vermilyea study noted above. At six month follow-up, they noted 
continued improvement between post therapy and follow-up for both synchronous 
and desynchronous groups and thus conclude that response desynchrony 
did not predict treatment failure. 
Michelson et al (1988) randomly assigned 88 severe agoraphobics to either 
cognitive, behavioural or psycho-physiological treatment. The phenomenon 
of concordance was investigated with regard to both treatment outcome 
and short term follow-up. Results indicate no significant differences 
in concordance rates between the three treatments. In terms of outcome 
measures at post and follow-up, concordant subjects exhibited superior 
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functioning. These findings corroborate previous studies which 
depicted differential outcomes and follow-up between concordant versus 
discordant subjects (Michelson et al 1985; Michelson, 1986). 
The current research seems to suggest that the role of desynchrony may 
be of importance in terms of treatment outcome. A limitation to 
generalising these results stems from the fact that all the above studies 
have involved phobics. Further studies with non-phobic populations 
are clearly required. 
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2). CRITICISMS OF THREE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Himadi et al (1985) point out that Three Systems Analysis can be seen 
as placing too much emphasis on response as scientific unit. Hugdahl 
(1981) suggests that the model discourages the search for distinctions 
between stimuli and responses, i. e. that it may predispose researchers 
to neglect controlling stimulus functions and to overemphasise response 
patterns. Cone (1979) cautions that Three Systems Analysis may be 
tantamount in its emphasis of modes and channels to speaking in trait- 
like notions. 
a. Methodological Problems. 
Agr'as and Jacob (1981) reviewed studies of Three Systems Analysis 
and noted typically small numbers. They further complain of inappropriate 
use of statistics. Jansson and Ost (1982) in their review found only 
three studies which used in vivo physiological recording. They criticised 
all of these papers for their inappropriate follow-up measures. Schwartz 
(1978) criticised the nature of psychophysiological data, describing 
much of it as "meaningless". Schwartz goes on to suggest a "bio- 
psychosocial" model of emotion. He argues that the lack of concordance 
among anxiety measures may result primarily from a failure to assess 
patterns of responding within and between systems. Chambless et al (1981) 
criticised the unsystematic measurement of the cognitive component. 
This point will be described in detail later. 
b. Convergent Validity 
Cone (1979) points to the necessity for measures of a construct such 
as anxiety sharing a high correlation in order to fulfill the requirements 
of convergent validity. However, in Three Systems Analysis, the response 
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modes do not necessarily correspond in expected ways. A common finding 
in three systems research is that while measurements of self-reported 
anxiety and behavioural avoidance show expected improvement in, for 
example, agoraphobia, heart rate does not. Kozak and Miller (1982) 
led to ask "If... triple response measurement produces nothing but 
confusion (i. e. a lack of expected convergence) why bother? ". 
However, Lang, in his theory has detailed the reasons why correlation 
would often be low. (e. g. the enormous variety of internal and external 
stimuli that can differentially effect responses). He also warned 
against assuming that any single event could be used in an exact 
substituted way to index a psychological state (Himadi-et al 1985). 
Lang refers to an expectation of correspondance as the "indicant fallacy". 
c. Definitional problems 
Hugdahl (1981) suggests that one of the most important consequences 
of three systems theory is that the definition of fear is shifted from 
the behaviour to the stimulus which may be the only available source 
of information as to what constitutes "fearful behaviour" if no single 
behaviour can be taken as a reliable index of fear. He asks how we 
can define two individuals who show different responses (e. g. physiological 
and cognitive) to the same stimulus. Are these two people sharing 
the same emotion?, are they equally disturbed?. He suggests you may 
have to speak of "physiological snake phobics" as compared to "cognitive 
snake phobics". While this complicates the picture, from the three 
systems theory point of view, both are anxious regardless of the component 
through which the anxiety is manifested (Koksalf, 1987). 
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d. Content and Method Differences 
Cone (1979) notes that "It has been difficult to know whether lack of 
correspondence between systems or contents was due to real differences 
between them or to differences in the methods used to assess responding 
within them". (page 91). 
Cone presents an example of assessments of heterosexual interpersonal 
interaction. To show that the demonstrated relationship between various 
behavioural responses are not merely the result of a common measuring 
method, the same behaviours would be assessed differently, for example, 
the study of trembling and eye contact could be assessed by: 
1. The use of true/false questions. 
I tremble noticeably when talking to a stranger. 
I don't look people in the eye when talking to them. 
2. By direct observation. 
Thus by studying these behaviours by self-report and by direct 
observation only the method changes while the content remains stable. 
Cone suggests that failure to find relationships between the measures 
may be due tb content (systems)differences, method differences or 
content-method interactions. 
Lehrer and Woolfork (1982) carried out a three systems assessment of 
anxiety by means of self-report, i. e. they used the same method to 
investigate three content areas - cognitive, behaviour, physiological. 
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By subjecting the data to factor analysis, they found that the systems 
could be measured as orthogonal factors. Lehrer and Woolfork thus 
showed that desynchrony and discordance could not be attributed to 
method differences in the assessment of anxiety in the three different 
systems. 
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3). MEASUREMENT AND QUANTIFICATION OF COMPONENTS. 
a. Behavioural component 
Most studies utilise approach-avoidance tests of behavioural anxiety. 
Behavioural avoidance tests (BATs) allow for precise measures of 
approach behaviour. Schroeder and Rich (1976) designed a behavioural 
avoidance test which consisted of a graded series of tasks that range 
from allowing a four foot boa constrictor to be brought into the therapy 
room to holding the snake on one's lap for fifteen seconds. In the 
behavioural measurement of agoraphobia, Agras et al (1968) have devised 
"the behavioural walk". In order to assess the behavioural system 
in a social situation, the Social Interaction Test (SIT) (Marzillier 
et al 1976) has been devised. In this, such items as volume, tone, 
pitch, clarity, pace of speech, speech disturbance, proximity, 
orientation, facial expression, gaze, posture, gesture, length of speech, 
meshing, turn taking and question asking can be rated. 
Hugdahl (1981) notes that the quantification of the behavioural load 
in phobic disturbance is often made with reference either to how far 
the subject can approach the stimulus or the time spent within the 
situation. This, however, fails to take into account covert avoidance 
(Borkovec, 1979) where the subject is "avoiding" the stimulus by such 
techniques as blunting (Miller and Grantz, 1979); covert pep-up talks 
(Meichenbaum, 1977) or through emotional processing (Rachman, 1980). 
Hugdahl (1981) asks how we are to conceptualise a patient scoring low 
on a behavioural avoidance test if it is caused by proximal blunting 
from the impact of a distal event? (A distal event is any specific 
identifiable stimulus that can elicit a fear reaction. A proximal 
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event relates to the perception and cognitive process whereby the 
individual identifies and attends to the distal event). 
Hugdahl asks if this person is having a low load on the behavioural 
component and a high on the cognitive or is covert avoidance part of 
the behavioural system? 
In addition to these problems for phobic assessment, behavioural 
assessment seems to have difficulties in the identification of the 
behavioural component in non-phobic states, e. g. GAD where the 
assumption is made that avoidance will be minimal. 
b. Physiological Component 
On the face of it, this component should be precisely and reliably 
measured without any great difficulties. However, there are various 
problems associated with the quantification of physiological response. 
Individual response stereotypy tells us that subjects may make 
idiosyncratic responses in a situation where quite a different pattern 
response might be expecbad (Stern et al, 1980). Stimulus-response 
specificity tells us that we should record several psychophysiological 
measures. However, against activation theory (Duffy, 1962; Lindsley, 
1951; Lacey, 1967) observed that while some behavioural manipulations, 
e. g. mental arithmetic produced the classic pattern of physiological 
arousal, e. g. increases in both heart rate and electrodermal activity, 
other manipulations such as those involving perceptual processing, 
produce "directionally fractionated" response patterns (simultaneous 
decrease in heart rate and increase in electrodermal activity). 
(Papillo et al, 1988). 
147 
Sturgis and Arena (1984) consider subject variables affecting psycho- 
physiological responding. These variables include age, sex, race, 
menstrual cycle and even meteorological variables. There is also a 
growing body of literature suggesting that seasonal changes can affect 
the electrodermal response (Wegner and Cullen, 1962). 
In addition, Sturgis and Arena (1984) suggest that the following factors 
have to be taken into account - length of time the participant is given 
to adapt to the experimental setting, the impact of carry over effects 
from one stage of the evaluation to another and once quantification 
and interpretation of the data begin, the laws of initial values and 
homeostasis will influence the response patterns obtained. In addition, 
the issue of response variability patterns must be considered and 
decisions made as to how this variability will be dealt with. 
Himadi et al (1985) noted that results obtained in their study of 
agoraphobics supported the laboratory assessment study by Arena et al 
(1983) that test - re test reliability figures for heart rate were low. 
Results by Arena et al (1983) and Holden and Barlow (1984) on the temporal 
stability of physiological recordings suggest caution in the use and 
interpretation of results from physiological measurements obtained in 
treatment outcome studies. Himadi et al (1985) suggested unreliable 
physiological measures will also adversely affect efforts to demonstrate 
the prognostic significance of patterns of responding among the three 
response systems. 
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c. Cognitive Component 
Hugdahl (1981) points to the marked discrepancies in what is meant by 
the cognitive. component (see also Kozak and Miller, 1982). Lang (1971) 
and Lang et al (1972) seem to include only verbal statements of overall 
subjective feelings without specification of the source of these state- 
ments. (i. e. whether the referrant is physiological or behavioural 
activity). Sartory et al (1977), Grey et al (1979) and Ost et al 
(1981,1982,1984) used the fear thermometer. Ohmen and Ursin (1979) 
however, view the cognitive component as the "awareness of the irrationality 
of the behaviour". Hollandsworth (1986) points to the definition of 
the cognitive component as the most problematic area of three systems 
theory. 
Hugdahl points out that the lack of consistency in the definition and 
identification makes comparisons between various studies difficult. 
He suggests that the cognitive component may mean at least three 
things: 
1. The first conceptualisation is that the subject has perceived 
his autonomic arousal and has cognitively labelled it fear or anxiety. 
This is reminiscent of the view of Schachter (1964). Vermilyea et al 
(1984) and Himadi et al (1985) have, however, suggested that the 
conceptualisation of the cognitive component is simply a perception 
of autonomic arousal. 
2. The second conceptualisation involves subjects showing anticipatory 
fear in the form of worrying about forthcoming fear-provoking events, 
i. e. negative thoughts in advance of exposure. 
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Hugdahl contrasts the indiviudal who shows anticipatory anxiety 
towards a forthcoming plane journey with another who shows no 
anticipatory anxiety but experiences great distress on boarding the 
plane. He asks whether they are sharing the same load in the cognitive 
component and again suggests, following the operationalist emphasis 
built into the model, dividing the component and speaking of "anticipatory 
cognitive phobics" and "exposure based cognitive phobics". (page 80). 
3. The third conceptualisation refers to changes in mood and feelings 
of unreality, uncontrollability, guilt, self-blame, etc. This accords 
with the approaches of Ellis, Beck and Meichenbaum. Problems associated 
with this conceptualistion include how worry should be quantified - 
e. g. the number of thoughts per day?, duration of thoughts?. 
An additional conceptualisation suggests a division of the cognitive 
component to produce a fourth component - affect. This will be dealt 
with in detail in a subsequent section. 
d. Use of Self-Report Measures. 
Cone (1979) suggests that studies which employ three different kinds 
of measurement to assess the three different components of anxiety are 
bound to obtain low levels of correlation. As Koksalf (1987) points 
out, the relationship between two behaviours (e. g. I tremble and I 
do not look) which were related to the same underlying construct 
(heterosexual interpersonal anxiety) was consistently highest when 
measured in the same way, i. e. assessor observation. Lowest 
correlations resulted when different behaviours were assessed in different 
ways, e. g. "I do not look" is measured by observation while trembling 
is assessed by asking the subject. 
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Lehrer and Woolfork (1982) developed a checklist to assess subjective 
report of cognitive, behavioural and somatic complaints. They found 
that cognitive behavioural and somatic self-reports could be measured 
as orthogonal factors, i. e. by using the same methods of measurement 
to assess the level of anxiety in three different content areas, orthogonal 
factors were obtain. The low correlation among the three systems 
obtained, is therefore less likely to be due to methodological error. 
(Koksalf, 1987) 
In addition, several studies have found a high correlation between 
the subjects own perception of physiological arousal and objective 
physiological measurement. Ost et al (1982) found that changes in the 
Autonomic Perception Questionnaire paralleled changes in heart rate 
in social phobics. Douglas et al (1988) found that physiological and 
cognitive questionnaires were good predictors of physiological anxiety 
and cognitions in a social interaction test. 
It was pointed out in a previous section that due to stimulus response 
specificity, at least two physiological measurements should be taken. 
The use of a somatic questionnaire would help overcome the various 
measurement problems detailed earlier. Lehrer and Woolfork's (1982) 
questionnaire includes 16 items assessing various somatic symptoms in 
different parts of the body. As such a comprehensive assessment is, 
due to time, methodological and financial considerations, impossible 
to do by physiological measurement, the use of self-report may be a 
useful way to measure the "somatisation" of anxiety. 
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4). AFFECT AS A SEPARATE COMPONENT 
In dealing with the conceptualisation of the cognitive component, a 
fourth possibility relates to separating affect from cognition. 
In terms of twentieth century psychological theory, emotions and feelings 
have played a very ambiguous role. While psychodynamic practice emphasises 
the emotional determinants of overt or hidden behaviour, when we deal 
with a theoretical presentation of this matter, we discover a state 
of utter confusion (Ratier, 1970). Of particular interest here, is 
the determination of the status of emotions in human behaviour and, in 
particular, whether affect is independent of cognition and thus can 
be accorded causal status. 
a) Cognitive Theory 
While psychodynamic theory, in common with the philosophical traditions 
of Plato, Kant and Hume, distinguishes between cognition and affect, 
cognitive and three systems theorists assume affect to be post-cognitive. 
Thus while a psychodynamic theory focuses on affect and attributes a 
primary role to feeling in the aetiology of anxiety (e. g. Valenstein, 
1962), Kuiper and McDonald (1983) note two inherent assumptions can 
be identified in cognitive theory: 
1. Emotional and psychological disturbances are caused largely 
by illogical or irrational thinking. 
2. The restructuring of cognitions accessible to awareness 
represents a therapeutic solution. 
Thus the role of cognitive therapy is to identify and alter the 
individual's mal-adaptive conceptualisation and interpretations by 
concentrating on thinking style readily accessible to the conscious 
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mind. This confers a critical function to the role of "appraisal" 
defined by Strongman (1978) as cognition(s) intervening between 
environmental stimulation and physiological and behavioural responses, 
the appraisal being an evaluation of the personal worth of incoming 
stimuli. 
Arnold (1970) suggests that appraisals are the crucial elements leading 
to the development of emotions, i. e. appraisal is given causal status 
and thus treatment should focus solely on cognitions as the generation 
of emotion presupposes the evaluation of the stimulus situation as good 
or bad. Peters (1970) states: 
"They. [emotions] differ from each other because of the 
differences in what is appraised... These differences in 
appraisals are largely constitutive of the different 
emotions. By that I mean that the least logical necessary 
condition for the use of the word emotion is that some kind 
of appraisal should be involved and different emotions must 
be involved in different appraisals. In other words, 
emotions are basically forms of cognition" (page 188). 
Lazarus et al (1970) sees man as an evaluating organism searching 
his environment for cues about what he needs and wants and evaluating 
each stimulus as to its personal relevance and significance. In this 
model, affect is seen as. aiepiphenomenon. (Scheff, 1985). 
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Arnold (1970), however, modifies this model of man. She states that 
man is more than simply an information processing system and suggests 
that not only are some appraisals "intuitive" but also suggests that 
emotions can be sub-divided into two elements: 
"One static, the appraisal, which is a mere acceptance or 
refusal of the expected effect of the situation on us; another 
dynamic, the impulse towards what is appraised as good and 
away from anything appraised as bad... Whatever is perceived 
remembered, imagined will be appraised; if it is appraised 
as desirable or harmful, an action tendency is aroused" (page 176) 
b. Criticisms of Cognitive Theory 
The view of man as an information processing system is analogous to 
computers. While models of man often resemble current technological 
knowledge (e. g. Descartes and the Hydraulic Statues of Versailles), 
the analogy should not be stretched beyond certain limits. Weisser 
(1963), although accepting that both man and computer are goal directed, 
learn from experience-and can produce novel or creative output, cites 
four major differences. 
1. Computers never get bored; people do. 
2. Computers have a single motivation; people have many. 
3. Computer memories can be instantly erased; people have 
little control over what they will learn or forget. 
4. Computers neither dream nor play. 
Strongman (1978) points out the contradiction between, on the one hand, 
accepting some appraisals as being intuitively determined and, on the 
other, the view of man as an evaluating organism capable of controlling 
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his emotions. Costello (1976) criticises the cognitive view of the 
determining status of appraisal in the development of emotion as this 
implies that the object of emotion must always be its cause. While 
this may often be the case, he points out that, on certain occasions, 
the cause may be inaccessible to awareness at that moment (see also 
Kenny, 1963). 
While cognitive theorists restrict the definition of cognitions to 
include only those accessible to awareness, Derry and Kuiper (1981) 
suggest that cognitive schemata may not always be readily accessible 
to consciousness and that those which are not would, by definition, 
be immune to change using current cognitive techniques. 
Costello (1976) criticises the view of negative emotions being disorganised 
and useless. These emotions may serve a useful signalling function, 
i. e. may serve to indicate an individual's present behaviour repertoire 
as inadequate to deal with environmental demands. If so, then focusing 
simply on removing these negative emotions would be futile. Kuiper 
and McDonald (1983) therefore suggest a more eclectic therapeutic approach 
which, in addition, to the modification of faulty cognitions, would 
also modify inadequate behavioural-repertoires and, if necessary, the 
modification of the patient's environment. 
Drawing from the psychodynamic literature, Koksalf (1987) suggests 
that affect and cognition are relatively independent systems. This is 
in accord with various psychodynamic theorists who view affective and 
cognitive processes as parallel but separate (e. g. Freud, 1940; 
Green, 1977). Velenstein (1962) states that: 
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"Affects and ideas stand in an interesting relationship 
to one another developmentally. Affect being closely 
related to instinctual drives and tension levels close to 
the primary process and, in this sense, more archaic than 
ideas. Ideas as thought representatives are expressions 
of secondary processes and ego functioning. " (page 322). 
The implication is that in one (anxious) individual the affective (primary 
process) may dominate leading to distress being experienced mainly in 
the affective domain, while in another, the cognitive (secondary process) 
may dominate leading to distress mainly being experienced in the form 
of mal-adaptive thought processes (Koksalf 1987). This echoes the 
view of Kendall (1984) who states: 
"It is...... possible for there to be individual differences 
in the degree to which affect versus cognition contributes 
to the development and/or maintenance of certain types of 
maladjustments". (page 131). 
A well adapted personality has both processes functioning harmoniously 
(Arlow and Brenner, 1984). 
c. Affect as a Separate Component - Supporting Evidence. 
Zajonc (1980) in a rather speculative paper, argued against the orthodox 
view that affective judgements are post cognitive. Based largely on 
social psychological research, his hypothesis is that affect and cognition 
are separate and partially independent systems. Although they generally 
function con-jointly, affect could be generated without a prior 
cognitive process. He-states: 
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"Affective judgements may be fairly independent of and 
precede in time, the sorts of perceptual and cognitive 
operations commonly assumed to be the basis of these 
affective judgements. Affective reactions to stimuli 
are often the very first reactions of the organism and 
for lower organisms they are the dominant reactions. 
Affective reactions can occur without extensive perceptual 
and cognitive encoding, are made with greater confidence than 
cognitive judgements and can be made sooner... It is concluded 
that affect and cognition are under the control of separate 
and partially independent systems". (Zajonc, 1980 page 151) 
Aithugh Zajonc admits that "The language of my paper has been stronger 
than can be justified by the logic of the argument or the weight of 
the evidence" (page 1972) his article has sparked off a vigorous 
debate in literature, e. g. Rachman, 1981; Watts, 1983; Lazarus, 1984; 
Zajonc, 1984). 
Zajonc (1984) presents an up-dated summary of, evidence for his position 
first stated in 1980. Evidence for and against is presented here: 
i. Affective reactions show phylogenetic and ontogenetic primacy. 
Izard (1984) provides, in an extensive examination of the ontogenetic 
primacy of emotion, convincing evidence to support the hypothesis, i. e. 
that if the emotion precedes cognition at some level of the individual's 
development then, at that level of development, no cognitive appraisal 
is necessary (or even possible) for the arousal of an affective 
reaction. 
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Lazarus (1984) suggests that due to methodological limitations in 
developmental research, doubt must be cast on Zajonc's "facts". 
ii. Separate neuro-anatomical structures can be identified 
for affect and cognition. 
Izard (1984) states that: 
"The limbic system is sometimes referred to as the "emotional 
brain" and that at least one limbic structure, the hippocampus, 
has been strongly implicated in information processing 
(Simonov, 1972) and memory. (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1979) suggest 
the existence of brain mechanisms specially adapted for 
mediating emotion - cognition interactions". (page 25). 
Zajonc states that emotional reactions are likely to be under the control 
of the right brain hemisphere whereas cognitive processes are predominantly 
the business of the left hemisphere (Cacioppo and Petty, 1981; Schwartz 
et al 1975; Suberi and McKeever, 1977). He further quotes the Ross 
and Mesulam (1979) study which found that patients with lesions directly 
across from Broca's area could produce intelligible speech but devoid 
of emotional inflections and other affect-dependent prosodic parameters. 
However, Sperry, 1982 notes: 
"Unlike other aspects of cognitive functioning, emotions have 
never really been readily confinable to one hemisphere... 
In tests of self-consciousness in social awareness, it was found 
that even subtle shades of emotion of semantic connotations 
generated in the right hemisphere could help the left hemisphere 
guess the stimulus known only to the right hemisphere. The 
results suggested that this affective, connotational or semantic 
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component could play an important role in cognitive processing" 
(pages 1225 - 1226). 
Lazarus (1984) suggests that it is dangerous to pontificate about 
cognition/affect relationships in an area where confusion still 
reigns. 
iii Appraisal and affect are often uncorrelated and disjointed. 
Anderson and Hubert. (1963) and Posner and Snyder (1975) produce 
evidence that affective judgments of persons are characterised by a 
primacy affect whereas appraisal information is more likely to display 
recency affect. Zajonc (1984) states that if cognitive appraisal is 
a necessary determinant of affect, then changing appraisal should result 
in a change in affect. This is frequently not so and persuasion is 
one of the weakest methods of attitude change (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981). 
Lazarus (1984) criticises the use of the above study as evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis. The study is highly selective and its 
results contrary to a mass of psychophysiological research carried out 
in Lazarus's laboratory. If the failure of persuasion is relevant 
to the argument, it suggests, to Lazarus, only that it may not always 
be so easy to alter how people think about themselves and the world. 
iv. New affective reactions can be established without an apparent 
participation of appraisal. 
Zajonc quotes the Garcia and Rusiniak U980) study where taste aversion 
was established even when the possible association between food (CS) 
and the delayed nausea (UCS) was obliterated by anaesthesia. Kunst- 
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Wilson and Zajonc (1980) found that preferences for stimuli (tones, 
polygons) could be established by repeated exposure, degraded to prevent 
recognition. Seamon et al (1983) showed that affective preferences 
were best for stimuli presented in the right visual field and recognition 
memory was best for stimulation on the left visual field. 
Birnbaum (1981) criticises the use of studies to support this contention 
first expounded by Zajonc in his 1980 article. Birnbaum points to 
methodological weakness in these studies and therefore suggests that 
Zajonc's conclusions are not justified by the evidence. He also suggested 
that the key findings can easily be explained by the theory that 
recognition mediates the exposure effect. Mellors (1981) suggests 
that the main arguments for Zajonc's position are based on a 
misinterpretation of the theories under consideration. 
d. Affect as a separate component - Cognitive view 
Lazarus (1984) criticises Zajonc for his lack of precision in defining 
what an emotion is. or is not. He states that: 
"An emotion is not definable solely by behaviour, subjective 
reports or physiological changes; its identification requires 
all three components since each one can be generated by 
conditions which do not necessarily elicit emotion. An 
emotion researcher must worry about which response states or 
processes can be called emotions and which cannot" (page 125). 
Lazarus (1984) suggests that while cognition is a necessary precondition 
for emotion, this does not imply that emotions, once elicited, do not 
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affect cognition. He states that: 
"The causal linkages one perceives among emotion, motivation 
and cognition depend, in part, on where in an ongoing 
behaviour sequence one arbitrarily stops the action". 
(Page 125). 
Watts (1983), commenting on Zajonc's earlier 1980 paper, states 
that: 
"One of the problems in Zajonc's argument is an ambiguity 
as to whether "cognition" refers solely to conscious 
cognitive processes or whether it also includes pre-conscious 
cognition. If some cognitive processes are preconscious, then 
an absence of awareness of cognitive processes associated with 
affective reactions cannot be used as evidence of the absence 
of any involvement of cognition in affective reactions". 
(Page 89). 
In similar vein, Rachman (1981) criticises the imprecision of much 
of Zajonc's language. 
e. Conclusions 
Swann et al (1987) in a study comparing Self-Consistency and Self- 
Enhancement Theory, found evidence supporting the view of relative 
independence of cognitive and affective responses. They cite the 
work of Dual - and Multiple-Systems Theorists (for example Gazzaniga, 
1985; Greenwald, 1982) which suggests that the cognitive and affective 
systems are designed to perform very different tasks. The major 
difference is in terms of how they improve the organism's chances of 
survival. 
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The cognitive system's function is to systematically analyse the 
subjective veridicality of stimuli; the affective system quickly 
recognises threats to safety spurring the organism to action. 
Thus, although the distinction between the two systems is not 
clearcut (e. g. Epstein, 1983), Swann et al (1987) stress the utility 
of conceptualising them as relatively independent systems with distinct 
capabilities and agendas. 
Lazarus (1984) urges that a more precise theory about the conditions 
underlying diverse emotion qualities and intensities is needed. 
Zajonc (1984) offers the notion of affective independence and primacy 
as a hypothesis to be empirically verified not as a definition to be 
disputed. If strong evidence does become available that not all 
affect is dependent on appraisal, it will have significant implications 
for three systems analysis and clinical practice. 
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5). IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 
In a previous section, we surveyed the work of Ost and his colleagues 
who, on the basis of a social interaction test, divided socially phobic 
patients into behavioural and physiological reactors (Ost et al, 1981). 
Within each group half of the patients were assigned to a behaviourally 
focused treatment and half to a physiologically focused treatment. Some 
weak evidence was produced to show the behavioural reactors benefitted 
more from the behaviourally focused therapy and physiological reactors 
from the physiologically focused therapy. 
Thus on the basis of a thorough assessment of the three systems, it 
could be discoveredwhich of the systems is functioning most abnormally 
and the treatment be "matched" to the individual's pattern of dysfunction - 
cognitive therapy for cognitive reactors, etc. 
If Zajonc is correct in his hypothesis that the affective and cognitive 
components are at least partially independent, we can expect even more 
(and different) instances of desynchrony and discordance than was 
originally anticipated (Rachman, 1981). 
Pavio (1978) argues that affective judgements are more closely related 
to the imagery system than the verbal system and thus if the affective 
and cognitive systems have different forms of coding retrieval and 
processing then we may suggest that Zajonc's conclusions would cast 
doubt on the prospects of developing powerful cognitive therapies 
for modifying abnormal affective reactions (Watts, 1983). 
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By challenging the assumption that cognitive and behavioural therapies 
are, in themselves, sufficient to produce affective changes, there is 
a need for clinicians to attempt týsystematically modify affective 
reactions. Koksalf (1987) suggests that psychodynamic techniques 
could be utilised to deal with an affectively orientated patient while 
Rachman (1981) suggests the use of visual material, the use of imagery 
and musical stimulation (see Sutherland et al, 1981). These interesting 
views await empirical studies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRIMARY CARE 
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PRIMARY CARE 
Primary Care, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, represented the single 
most salient growth area in clinical psychology. Indeed as Hood (1979) 
pointed out, it had become one of the more 'trendy' areas of the profession 
After initial optimism and enthusiasm regarding the role of clinical 
psychology in this area, there has, more recently, been some more thoughtful 
discussion in the literature concerning, amongst other issues, the role 
of psychologists in primary care, evaluation of that role and, indeed, 
whether psychology has a place in primary care (e. g. Spector, 1984). 
This has, however, in no way restricted interest in the area. 
Broadhurst (1977) estimated that one in seven clinical psychologists 
were involved in primary care work and, by 1986 27% of posts in England 
had some involvement in this area (Hall et al 1986). As psychology 
posts in general have not increased at the same pace, it seems as if 
primary care is increasingly obtaining a larger slice of psychologists' 
time than before and now involves more psychologists than are involved 
in geriatrics or general medicine (Salmon, 1984). 
This chapter will concentrate on the development of clinical psychology 
in primary care, and in particular, look at recent developments intended 
both to improve service provision and to develop the role. The present 
study is part of that development. 
The chapter divides into 3 Sections: 
1). REASONS FOR INTEREST 1-4. 
2). DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY IN PRIMARY CARE. 
3). CONCLUSIONS. 
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1). REASONS FOR INTEREST 
a. Reasons for Interest 1: The experience of psychiatry 
Interest in psychiatric morbidity in the community had been stimulated 
by studies in the 1960s showing a higher incidence than had previously 
been thought (Kessel, 1960; Shepherd et al, 1966; Watts, 1966). These 
studies led to experimental attachments by psychiatrists to G. P. practices 
(e. g. Brook, 1967; Lyons, 1969; Rodger, 1973). As Mitchell (1985) 
notes, enthusiastic reports increased in the seventies (e. g. Brook and 
Cooper, 1975; Corser and Ryce, 1977; Schniewind, 1977) and that in the 
1980s, the interest continued unabated (e. g. Oxman and Smith, 1980, 
Tait, 1983; Mitchell, 1983,1984; Tyrer, 1984). 
Strathdee and Williams (1984), in a survey of all consultant psychiatrists 
in England and Wales listed in the 1981 Medical Dictionary, found that 
one in five respondants indicated that they, or their junior staff, 
spent some time working in primary care settings. The study identified 
three distinguishable working patterns: 
1. The Consultation Pattern - 28% of the psychiatrists chose to adopt 
the 'consultation' pattern of working. This consisted of the assessment 
of patients, often in collaboration with the general practitioner' with 
treatment being administered by the general practitioner. 
2. The 'Shifted out-patient clinic' pattern - 64% of respondants favoured 
this approach in which the format was similar to that used in hospital 
out-patient clinics. 
3. The 'Liaison-attachment team' pattern - This was found to be more 
characteristic of the longer standing attachments. The psychiatrists 
had instituted working links in training with other professionals, e. g. 
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social work, clinical psychology, community psychiatric nursing.. 
Brown et al (1988) compared referrals to psychiatric clinics in primary 
care and hospital out-patient clinics. Women in all diagnostic groups 
were preferentially referred to primary care clinics which provided 
especially for psychotic and chronic illnesses. Hospital clinics were 
those with less common neuroses and personality disorder. 
Based on the severity of patients' problems presenting to primary 
care clinics, the authors were able to refute the claim that these clinics 
serve only the "worried well". 
b. Reasons for Interest 2: General Practitioners. 
Many of the above studies consist of anecdotal or. uncontrolled surveys. 
Hassall and Stillwell (1977) noted that patients seen in primary care 
in liaison with psychiatric services did not reduce consultation rates. 
While lower consultation rates may be, in themselves, an insufficient 
objective, it would be likely to influence G. P. s perception of agencies 
to which they could refer a group of patients who are regarded as more 
difficult to treat and manage and whom G. P. s feel insufficiently trained 
and equipped to deal with (Cooper, 1964). Shepherd (1972) described 
G. P. s handling of psychological problems as 'often haphazard and inadequate' 
(page 175) (See also Goldberg and Huxley, 1980; Goldberg et al, 1982). 
Salmon et al (1988) report that problems with a large psychological 
component lead independently to dissatisfaction in the G. P. and to a length- 
ened consultation. Bennett et al (1978) reported that G. P. s cite 
termination of consultation to be a particular source of difficulty 
with such patients. 
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Koch (1979) reviewed studies showing that patients with psychological 
problems make more demands on G. P. s' time than most other groups (see 
also Trepka et al, 1986; Westcott, 1977). With the exception of patients 
suffering from respiratory disorders, this group make most demands on 
primary care services. Patients receiving psychotropic drugs consult 
1.7 times more than patients not receiving these drugs (Wilks, 1975). 
Indeed, Hassell and Stillwell (1977) suggested that this represents 
an underestimate of G. P. time as it fails to take into account the longer 
consultation times given to these patients. These authors report that 
30% of all consultation time is taken up with these patients. 
As later surveys suggest that a mean of 19% of patients in a practice 
present primarily with a psychological complaint (e. g. Espie and White, 
1986) and that the vast majority of these cases are dealt with by G. P. s 
(between 81% and 95% Espie-and White, 1986, Eastman and McPherson, 1982, 
Mayou, 1980), it is not surprising that G. P. s respond favourably to 
psychiatric approaches aimed at establishing a closer tie. 
c. Reasons for interest : external factors. 
In addition to the increased awareness of the extent of psychological 
problems in primary care, Spector (1984) cites, as additional factors 
contributing to the development of primary care psychology, the NHS 
reorganisation of 1978, developing interest in 'holistic' medicine 
(Engel, 1977) and the Trethowan report (1977) which strongly advocated 
that psychology could make a positive contribution in primary care 
and suggested that pilot studies be carried out on G. P. referrals. 
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During the late seventies and eighties, G. P. s were looking more. 
favourably at alternatives to a medical model as anxiety conditions 
were increasingly viewed as being due to emotional or behavioural 
disturbance rather than being seen as mental illness. Consequently, 
G. P. s were more likely to welcome non-medical interventions for these 
problems. 
This, in part, reflected a growing dissatisfaction with the benzodiazepine 
group of drugs which, in the past, were used extensively in primary 
care in-the management of anxiety. Current concerns about cognitive 
impairment (Golombok et al, 1988); dependence (Lader, 1987); withdrawal 
symptoms (Tyrer and Murphy, 1987) and also the more general issues 
related to efficacy (Woods and Charney, 1988) has led the Committee 
on the Review of Medicine (1980) to produce strict guidelines on the 
use of these drugs. Interest has been generated into non-pharmacological 
treatment which would, in theory, do more than provide symptomatic 
treatment as obtained by benzodiazepine prescribing. 
d. Reasons for interest 4: psychologists. 
Johnston (1978) suggested that compared to hospital based psychologists 
primary care psychologists offered the following advantages: 
1. Access to psychological patients with a need for such help 
but who could not attend the central clinic owing to problems 
associated with travel, work, physical disability, or even a 
presenting problems such as agoraphobia. 
2. Greater continuity of care of patients. 
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3. Increased communication between psychologists and members of 
the primary care team. 
4. The possibility of the psychologist seeing the patient 
earlier, before the problems have become entrenched. 
5. Less need for referral to other agencies. 
6. Reduced stigma for the patient. 
7. Development of new therapeutic approaches relevant to 
problems presenting in primary care. 
8. More flexible and more relevant therapy due to seeing 
patients in their home setting. 
9. Greater therapeutic involvement with the patient's family. 
10. Reduced costs and inconvenience to the patients. 
11. Reduced administrative and ambulance service costs. 
(page 661) 
Spector (1984) suggests that the interest in working this area reflect 
more selfish concerns, 'e. g. the congeniality of the working environment 
and the work itself. There is also the unspoken assumption that moving 
from the psychiatric hospital helps psychologists come from beneath 
the wing of psychiatry and, in so doing, gain increased professional 
autonomy. 
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2). DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY IN PRIMARY CARE. 
In discussing the development of primary care psychology, we can usefully 
divide its progress into five stages: 
a. Phase 1: Making the case 
The first paper to make the case was first published in 1972 (Broadhurst) 
and was followed by others generally concerned with 'selling' psychological 
skills to G. P. s. For example, Kinsey (1974) writing in the Journal 
of the Royal College of General Practitioners, described the training and 
qualifications of psychologists, expounded the psychological skills 
and the problems that might usefully be tackled by psychology, and, 
in general, informing G. P. s of the suitability of having a psychological 
resource. 
Kinsey suggested a possible classification of clinical problems which 
could be used by the G. P. as a form of 'shorthand' for assessing cases 
which could benefit from referral to a psychologist: 
a. Problems of anxiety and stress: generalised anxiety, 
panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
psychosomatic illness. 
b. Habit disorder: smoking, obesity, enuresis/encoperesis, 
alcohol/drug abuse, tics, stammering, childrens' 
behavioural disorders. 
C. Educational/occupational difficulties. 
d. Interpersonal-social-marital problems. 
e. Psychological adjustments to problems from physical 
illness or other significant life events involving 
medical care. (page 883 - 884). 
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McAllister and Phillip (1975) published the first descriptive study 
of primary care work. In an uncritical study, -they reported 
on 
94 cases referred in one year (1% of patients registered at the practice). 
52% of these referrals were for children under the age of 16. Asked 
how these patients would have been dealt with in the absence of a 
psychologist, G. P. s would have dealt with 46% themselves, not out of 
choice but of necessity as no appropriate resource would have been 
available. The remainder would have been referred to psychiatry, 
educational psychology, paediatrics or hospital based psychologists. 
P, 
Davidson (1977) in a survey of G. P. s found that 80% of respond, nts 
were in favour of direct access and the main requirement was for the 
provision of psychological treatment. The largest demand, (75% of 
G. P. s) was for psychological treatment of sexual/marital problems 
followed by phobic disorders (56%). 59% requested intellectual 
assessment for patients. 
Timms et al (1981) point out two facts based on surveys (Davidson 
1977; Timms, 1978; Dhillon, 1980): 
1. G. P. s wanted to have psychologists involved in their area of work. 
This was based on the high percentage of returns in each survey and 
the high number of respondants requiring teaching facilities. 
2. G. P. s lacked a clear idea of what psychologists do. This view 
was based on the findings of low levels of requests for well known 
treatment techniques, e. g. relaxation training, social skills training. 
In a national survey of G. P. s, Broadhurst (1977) found that when primary 
care involvement existed, initiation for contact was usually taken 
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by the psychologists and usually provoked a satisfactory response in 
terms of referring (see Liddell, et al 1981). 
Virtually all the papers published in this first phase are enthusiastic 
and optimistic in terms of the contribution psychology could make to 
primary care although the studies by Kat (1978) and Taylor (1979) 
ssted that traditional individual treatment models were not 
appropriate in primary care. 
b. Phase 2- Examining the role of clinical psychologists in primary care. 
Kat's (1970) paper on 'Finding one's Place in the Team' discussed the 
fact that psychology traditionally did not have a role in primary health 
care and any role had therefore, to be created. He loosely classified 
his patients into three groups: 
1. Sexual and marital problems. 
2. Psychosomatic complaints. 
3. Anxiety based problems. 
In common with many of these early studies, Kat reports on relatively 
few referrals - in this case 64 patients over a period of 3 years 
(see also McAllister and Phillip, 1975; McPherson and Feldman, 1977; 
Johnston, 1978; Ives, 1979; Koch, 1979; Clark, 1979; Spector, 1981). 
Taylor (1979) one of the G. P. s serviced by Kat reviewed the psychology 
service. He noted that the 64 referrals represented the 'tip of the 
iceberg'. They comprised 19 cases of chronic anxiety, 11 phobics, 
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16 cases of marital/sexual problems, 2 bereavement reactions, 4 patients 
with dependency problems and a heterogeneous group of 9 patients. 
There was little evidence of improvement in any of those categories 
although as Jerrom (1983) notes, Taylor presents a clinical review of 
treatment rather than an objective assessment. 
McAllister and Phillip (1975), in a review study of one year's clinical 
work in a health centre, noted that as referrals to the psychologist 
increased, it beame increasingly impractical to continue to treat 
patients in the traditional one to one manner of hospital based psychology. 
They stressed the need to develop methods more suited to primary care. 
This need was further highlighted by McPherson and Feldman (1977) who 
assessed a number of patients in two practices, who, according to 
psychologist and G. P. ratings, could benefit from referral. They 
extrapolated a figure of 3,500 full-time psychologists in primary care 
which was, at that time, three times greater than the total number of 
psychologists employed by the NHS (Barden, 1977). It was therefore 
suggested that psychologists use group therapy as a more appropriate 
method of dealing with a large number of patients and also involved 
non-psychological resources, e. g. G. P. s, community nurses, health 
visitors or family members. However, even if these ideas were 
implemented, the implication was that psychologists could easily be 
'swamped' by referrals. 
Hood (1979) viewed the move into primary care with some reservations, 
noting: 
"Given the present state of the evidence, we must not let our 
enthusiasm for an attractive area of work blind us to the possibility 
that such a service does not represent an efficient use of very limited 
manpower" (Page 422. ) 
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She stressed the need to develop a wider concept of the psychologist's 
role to include not only the provision of a direct therapeutic service 
but also teach and support lay counsellors and help in the area of 
preventative work. She anticipated that the psychologists working 
in primary care would become a 'jack of all trades and master of none' 
while attempting to provide a generalist service in the absence of 
establishing a genuinely different role. 
Stress was placed on the need to identify and set up the criteria for 
a useful intervention and to evaluate that intervention as an alternative 
to existing treatment or simply as an adjunct to them. 
c. Phase 3: Evaluating the work. 
Ives (1979) reported on 149 patients discharged over a two year period. 
Subjective assessment of global improvement indicated that, of this 
number, 47 patients were almost free of presenting symptoms; 42 showed 
good progress with patients coping adequately and 34 showing little 
or no progress. Broken down into diagnostic categories, good prognosis 
was more likely with anxiety disorders (which comprised 42% of all 
patients referred). With the exception of personality disorders, 
the outcome was poor of all: other groups. Thus, although Ives reports 
decrease in consultations and prescription rates during the twelve to 
fifteen month follow-up period, it is impossible to tell whether this 
reflects the outcome of the group as a whole or for only the anxiety 
group. It was also noticeable that of all the patients referred, the 
author rejected 21% prior to the study. 
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Koch (1979) reported on 30 patients referred during a year from a 
university teaching practice. Following behavioural treatment, patients 
attending surgery decreased by 50% and prescriptions decreased by 30%. 
Koch divided G. P. consultations into four types; advice only, psychotropic- 
prescription, physical drug prescription and mixed prescription. He 
found that the decrease in consultation and prescribing related only 
to the first two groups. 
Wilkinson (1986) points out these studies are limited as the method 
of patient selection may have been biased, and measures used of unknown 
reliance and validity. There was no no-treatment control group, independent 
assessment or individual measures of severity by the patient or patient's 
relative. Jerrom et al (1983) cast doubt on the two main outcome 
measures used, viz. drug intake and consultation rate. While these 
represent objective measures of behaviour and are easy to obtain, they 
have not yet been demonstrated to be valid indicators of symptomatic 
improvement. The former, in particular, will be affected by changes 
in-the G. P. s prescribing practices. 
Earll and Kincey (1980) randomly allocated consecutive referrals 
either to behavioural treatment (N = 23) or to a no treatment condition 
(N = 19). Between referral and discharge, improvement was achieved 
by the treatment group in terms of a reduced frequency of prescriptions 
for psychotropic medication. Although patients in the treatment group 
were highly satisfied with the service, this difference was not maintained 
at the 7 month follow-up period and the authors point to the need for 
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further studies to devise ways of maintaining short term improvement. 
Again the study is open to the criticisms cited by Jerrom in terms of 
outcome measures employed (see also Freeman and Button, 1984). 
In contrast to the above studies on heterogeneous groups of patients, 
Jannoun et al (1981) reported on a small sample (N = 15) of patients 
referred for help with non-phobic anxiety disorders. Treatment involved 
a modification of Richardson and Suinn's (1971) Anxiety Management 
Training and included a treatment booklet. Improvements during treatment 
were maintained at the three month follow-up and in terms of therapist 
time (2j hours with each patient) cost effective. This study, and 
its criticisms, have been dealt with in a previous chapter. 
France and Robson (1982), in a paper written from the perspective of 
a behaviourally orientated G. P., suggested that the aim of treatment 
should be to carry out treatments designed to achieve quick recovery 
rather than looking for long term benefits. The authors argue that 
many of the problems in general practice are short term and related 
to life transitions and that these problems, which have been over- 
shadowed by the long term chronic conditions, take up a large proportion 
of G. P. time and create significant problems in the community (see also 
Robson et al, 1984). This point will be looked. at in greater detail 
below. 
d. Phase 4: Primary care psychology from the G. P. point of view. 
Eastman and McPherson (1982) note: 
"The striking... degree of variation among general practitioners in 
the perception of psychological problems, their practice and dealing 
with these and their view of the involvement of other professions 
in primary care" (Page 84). 
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Davidson (1977) reported that 80% of G. P. s responding to her survey 
wished direct access to a psychologist while Eastman and McPherson 
(1982) found 57% who wished this access. However, when asked to 
rank the professions in paramedics in terms of utility, psychologists 
were rated, along with psychiatrists, only eighth (of ten). The 
relevance of this finding is, however, limited. The G. P. s were asked 
to rate groups such as midwives, health visitors and district nurses 
who are long standing integral members of the primary care team. 
Reid and Kahn (1983), in a subjective study of treatment outcome, 
report that 73% of patients referred, and who attended, recovered 
partially or completely. G. P. s felt that psychologists had a 
significant contribution to make in the assessment and treatment of 
anxiety states, phobias and sexual/marital problems. Only 50% of 
G. P. s however, felt that psychology had a part to play in the treatment 
of depression. Reid and Kahn concluded there was a significant correlation 
between G. P. s' perception of, and the actual efficacy achieved by, 
psychological treatment for the above conditions. 
These optimistic findings, have however, been challenged by Jerrom 
et al (1983) who reported that psychological treatment produced definite 
benefit in only 56% of a sample of 261 cases according to G. P. ratings. 
Patients' ratings, however, were more positive - 94% reported that seeing 
the psychologist helped 'a bit/lot'. This study highlighted the problems 
of a well developed primary care service where problems referred are 
probably wider and more severe than those reported previously. 
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Robson et al (1984) reported on 429 patients given psychological treatment. 
The treatment group showed greater improvement more quickly although 
the control, during the follow-up period of. one year, improved almost 
the same degree although only with more frequent consultations and 
psychotropic prescriptions. 
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The autors attribute this finding to short-term life transitions 
("worst year" effect). Freeman and Button (1984) similarly found 
evidence of this "worst year" effect, i. e. that the problems being 
tackled by psychologists had a natural history of crisis and remission. 
This leads to the conclusion that attending a psychologist is not 
beneficial as the passage of time can be expected to produce improvement. 
While this conclusion may be true for the less chronic psychosocial 
cases presenting in general practice, (although see the criticisms of 
this study by Haines (1984) and Bennett (1984) ), Milne (1987) and 
Milne and Souter (1988), evaluating a routine clinical psychology service, 
produce firm evidence that, firstly, patients referred to the service 
show no sign of a transient life stress phenomenon and that, secondly, 
the presenting problems require specialist intervention. The implications 
of these findings are that psychologists have a clear role to play in 
the treatment of the chronic and severe problems referred to primary 
care services which are unlikely to remit without psychologist treatment. 
Evidence for this was found by Espie and White (1986a) in a descriptive 
study of 1165 patients who surveyed 85 G. P. s in 35 practices within 
Hamilton/East Kilbride Unit. 50 replies were obtained - 74% rated 
the service as very useful, 78% reported that the service had "definite 
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benefit upon patients' problems" and G. P. s also cited "specific skills" 
as the greatest advantage of the service. Relatively few disadvantages 
were reported. G. P. s also reported interest in the provision of 
seminars/workshops. In a related study on 132 consecutively referred 
patients (Espie and White, 1986b), ratings were obtained by patients, 
G. P. sand psychologists. Statistical comparisons revealed high inter- 
rater agreement and indicated 43% of patients had reliably achieved 
either "moderate" or marked" improvement and 75% had shown at least 
slight improvement. Favourable outcome was particularly associated 
with anxiety disorders. The results were viewed as disappointing and 
the authors argued that psychologists had to develop more efficient 
ways of dealing with problems presented in primary care. 
e. Phase 5: Creating alternative roles. 
In the light of the disappointing findings reported on the better controlled 
studies, a series of papers considered whether the traditional one to 
one therapeutic relationship was the most appropriate role for psychology 
in primary care. Salmon (1984) points out that the treatment of anxiety 
predominates in the primary care literature, i. e. problems typically 
seen by hospital based psychologists. He notes that the hopes of the 
Trethowan report (1977) which envisaged a widening of psychological 
services to include areas previously sparsely dealt with - neurology 
physical handicap, general medicine, geriatrics and preventative medicine 
have not been realised. Bender (1981) points to the imbalance of the 
allocation of NHS resources and has argued that psychologists should 
be attempting to redress this by offering services in these less well 
staffed areas. 
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This view has yet to be accepted by many psychologists who have, to 
some extent, failed to heed Eastman and McPherson's (1983) warning that 
concentrating on "showing off" our skills has led to the establishment 
of a stereotype and that by giving a priority to "traditional" psychiatric 
problems, psychologists are now finding themselves swamped with referrals 
and hence incapable of developing other roles, e. g. in the areas of 
preventative work, education and research (see Griffiths, 1978; 
Cape, 1982; Holden, 1980). 
Espie and White (1986a) suggested future research should aim at 
identifying those factors which were predictive of outcome and also 
investigate the maintenance of improvement over time. They also suggest 
a departure from individual out-patient therapy in favour of group therapy 
and the provision of self-management skills which would allow truly 
preventative work to be carried out. The present author has now 
organised workshops and seminars for G. P. s with the aim of teaching 
basic behavioural assessment and therapy skills. 
Various projects have now involved the adoption of alternative 
approaches: 
Alternative treatment approaches. 
Cormack and Sinott (1983) reported on a project'to provide direct 
psychological alternatives to a long term benzodiazepine use. No 
significant differences were found between treatment group patients 
and patients who were simply advised by letter to cut down their pills. 
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Trepka et al (1986) compared group therapy for anxious patients - 
an anxiety support group and an anxiety management group. Neither 
offered clinically significant results (see also Skinner, 1984; 
Medlik and Fursland, 1984). Ross and Scott (1985) however, showed 
that group cognitive therapy was as effective as individual cognitive 
therapy in the treatment of depression. Treatment gains were maintained 
at one year follow-up. 
Heller (1985), faced with a long waiting list, set up a "walk-in clinic" 
to service a number of functions. 
a. To enable people who might otherwise be many months 
on the waiting list of prompt access to psychologists 
who could provide advice, support and reassurance 
to tide them over the long waiting period. 
b. To enable an assessment to be made of those who most 
urgently needed and could benefit from, psychological 
help and thus offer an appointment more quickly than 
might otherwise have been possible. 
c. To serve a clearing house funtion so that referral 
could be made to relevant agencies for investigation, 
counselling or other forms of help and support thus 
avoiding a long and perhaps pointless waiting period. 
d. To provide information to the-client on the likely 
ways in which a psychologist could help, and on other 
helping agencies in the area. 
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e. To enable a proportion of people attending the 
clinic for one or more visits to be sufficiently 
helped by information, advice and brief counselling 
so that they no longer needed further help. They 
could then either be removed from the waiting list, 
or, as a consequence of this front line contact, avoid 
entering the "psychiatric system" with its attendant 
problems of stigmatisation. (Page 27). 
Subjective evaluation of the clinic was favourable by psychologists, 
clients and referring agencies (although most clients were self-referred). 
While this raises issues concerning accountability and clinical 
responsibility (Lewis, 1985), in general, the authors feel that it 
represents a useful addition to primary care work. 
There has been an increasing emphasis on psychologists teaching self- 
help in primary health care (e. g. see Robinson, 1980). Butcher and 
de Clive-Lowe (1985) report on a 12 session adult education evening 
class aimed at teaching strategies to improve self-awareness and 
relationships to control anxiety, confront fear, reduce worrying thoughts, 
fight depression and cope with major life events (page 275). The 
authors felt that the students who attended (biased towards professionals) 
benefitted from the course. The approach was deemed to offer a useful 
alternative to the traditional treatment approaches although it should 
be noted that these students were not probably clinically anxious or 
depressed (see also Davis and Butcher, 1985). 
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Training other groups. 
Weinman and Medlic (1985) discuss sharing psychological skills in a 
general practice setting with patients, staff and students. They 
discuss a course organised for G. P. s, the general aims of which were: 
1. To examine the process of clinical problem solving and decision 
making in order to consider what, when and how decisions are made 
during consultation. 
2. To understand the different types of decision which are made by 
the doctor and the patient. 
3. To consider various constraints on problem solving and decision 
making which can either facilitate or interfere with the process. 
Another course, for undergraduate medical students, aimed at: 
1. Developing the students' awareness of the role of psychological 
factors in physical disease and hence the importance of understanding 
why the patient is seeking help. 
2. To increase the students' awareness of the prevalence and nature 
of psychological problems in general practice and the extent to which 
these often present in conjunction with physical disorders. 
In addition, they helped in the development of specific patient 
management skills for G. P. s. Weinman and Medlic (1985) view such 
courses as useful not only for G. P. s but also for psychologists . 
By helping G. P. s identify their own learning needs, psychologists 
had to become aware of a very different model of clinical involvement; 
one based on community care and brief consultations which, in the 
view of the authors, is beneficial in identifying the areas in their 
own ways of working that could change and improve service delivery. 
(see also Cormack and Forrest, 1985). 
186 
Long and Bourne (1985) describe a project involving psychologists in 
self-help groups. They trained project leaders in the use of anxiety 
management skills and established anxiety management courses for self- 
referred clients (although they also had to have the consent of the 
G. P. s). Results indicate improvement across different measures 
(self-report, decreased tranquilliser intake, decrease G. P. 
consultation rate). For the psychologist, it represented an efficient 
way of providing help to a greater number of people; 'as a self-help 
group it represented a useful way of using a professional's skills 
and experience whilst still retaining its autonomy. 
Self-help packages 
Kiely and McPherson (1986) report on the use of self-help packages 
for stress (six separate leaflets containing information on the 
causes, consequences and control of stress). G. P. s involved in the 
study selected patients who were then randomly allocated to a treatment 
group (N = 14) and control group (N = 12) who received existing G. P. 
treatment. 
At 3 month follow-up, "clinical state" as judged by the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ) and patients' self ratings were superior in the 
experimental group who also consulted less frequently for psychological 
problems in the three month follow-up period. Both groups, however, 
showed an increase in prescriptions for psychotropic drugs during 
follow-up. The authors were aware of the limitations of the study. 
They did not have pre-treatment GHQ scores and thus differences at 
follow-up may simply have reflected pre-treatment differences. G. P. s 
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also spent longer with the experimental group patients and the self- 
help package was found to be difficult to understand and the information 
contained in it, insufficient (personal communication). 
Despite these criticisms, the authors feel that this approach is 
promising in terms of clinical effectiveness, low cost and ease of 
dissemination. The project represents a useful approach to increasing 
the flexibility of provision of psychological services while maximising 
scarce professional resources. An improved version is currently 
being evaluated. 
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3). CONCLUSIONS. 
As Trepka and Griffiths (1987) point out, the measures frequently used 
to assess the impact of psychological intervention in primary care are 
of doubtful validity and that evaluation outcome for a mixed group of 
patients (both in terms of diagnosis and severity of problems) poses 
difficult methodological problems. 
It does seem that the preoccupation of psychologists with global 
evaluation of primary care work is of limited value. It also diverts 
attention from studies which show clearly that psychological treatment 
in primary care can be effective for particular problems (e. g. Jannoun 
et al, 1981; Blackburn et al, 1981). 
At this stage in primary care work, psychologists should be concentrating 
on better studies of specific intervention strategies on specific 
problem areas. There will be an increased demand for psychological 
services in primary care but it is to be regretted that over the past 
decade, we have not been well served by poor research design and we 
have been negligent in deciding what are the appropriate questions we 
wish to answer in primary care work. We must accept that the question 
of what the psychologist's role in primary care is, or can be, must 
still be an open one. 
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PART 2 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
CHAPTER 7 
REASONS FOR PRESENT STUDY 
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REASONS FOR PRESENT STUDY 
There appears to be a growing gulf between researchers and clinicians 
in clinical psychology (Jacobsen et al, 1984). Bergen and Strupp (1972) 
point to the irrelevance of much psychological research for clinical 
practice while Barlow (1981) notes "At present clinical research has 
little or no influence on clinical practice". (page 147). Indeed, 
Cohen (1976) cites the findings of a survey indicating that 40% of 
mental health professionals thought that there was no research which 
was relevant to their practice. 
While analogue research allows the use of sophisticated research 
methodology and control over extraneous variables, the utility of such 
studies is limited for clinicians partially due to the very precise 
control which can never pertain in "real life" settings. American 
college students receiving course credits for participation in treatment 
trials (e. g. Borkovec et al, 1987) have little in common with clinically 
anxious individuals presenting for treatment at busy out-patient N. H. S. 
clinics. While the clear solution is for clinicians to carry out 
research with relevant populations, too often the value of this research 
is limited by methodological flaws. This is particularly true of 
primary care research. 
Milne and Souter (1988) point out the inadequacies of much psychological 
research in primary care including the use of unrepresentative or biased 
samples, use of global outcome measures and the use of criteria. which 'Irre 
of only indirect relevance to the evaluation of an intervention, e. g. 
G. P. consultation and use of medication. Trepka and Griffiths (1987) 
suggest that global evaluation of psychological treatment for disparate 
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problems represents an attempt by psychologists to convince G. P. s 
of the benefit of their techniques. Bennett (1984) argues that it is 
time to go beyond questions such as "are psychologists effective? " and 
to address questions relating to specific techniques designed to 
tackle specific problems using appropriate outcome criteria. 
This view accords well with the view of experts (clinicians, research 
workers, policy makers) in the primary care field. Wilkinson and 
Williams (1985) report on the findings of a Delphi study 
(1) 
which 
was conducted with a multi-disciplinary group of experts attending a 
conference on mental illness in primary care settings. In keeping with 
the importance of economic appraisal, the focus of the study was on 
research which was likely to maximise the benefits for service developments. 
The study showed marked agreement that priority should be given to the 
investigation of: 
1) Effectiveness of treatment measures. 
2) Problem of mental health presenting to primary care 
services. 
Milne (1987) also stresses a number of general pressures on the clinician 
to engage in research. They include a shift in public attitudes 
towards greater accountability on the part of the health services, more 
concern for patients' rights, a growing demand for more efficient 
services and a trend toward community care. In addition, Milne cites 
the considerable restriction on financial resources. In a period of 
(1) Participants in a Delphi study are given information and their 
anonymous judgements are prepared and returned to them; and their 
judgements are solicited again. This process may be continued 
until the change in group opinion between successive judgements is 
negligible. 
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increasing dissatisfaction with benzodiazepine prescribing, there is a 
clear need for primary care psychologists, in particular, to achieve a 
reasonable compromise between effective treatment and minimising service 
costs. 
One way in which to do this is through group therapy which represents an 
economical use of scarce therapist time although treatment effectiveness 
may, as a result, be reduced due to fewer opportunites to deal with patients' 
specific difficulties (Trepka et al, 1986). 
In view of the generally disappointing results of group therapy noted in 
a previous chapter and arguing in favour of the development of innovative 
techniques in primary care, the present study combines elements of 
"traditional" group therapy and an educational/self-help package for 
clinically anxious patients. By combining a didactic teaching element 
with workshops, a multi-faceted therapy package was developed. The 
package was planned in such a way as to allow a much larger number of 
individuals to attend the group than could be dealt with in "traditional" 
group therapy. By doing this, the present study hopes to achieve an 
alternative short-term, cost-effective approach to the treatment of a 
group of patients who are likely to present themselves to primary care 
psychology clinics in large numbers - namely those individuals suffering 
from GAD 
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In addition to this pragmatic attempt to improve primary care services, 
the present study also addresses theoretical issues. 
Barlow and Wolfe (1981) report on a National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) sponsored conference of leading and active researchers in the 
area of the anxiety disorders in the world. The conference was 
convened to recommend research strategies into the 1980s. Noting 
that the effectiveness of psychosocial treatments for GAD is either 
unknown or undemonstrated, the researchers recommend: 
1). There is a need for outcome studies for this group. 
2). Research involving either process or outcome questions 
should use the 3 systems model in the assessment. 
3). Related to 2), the researchers confer high priority to 
the determination of the prevalence of, and implications 
of, desynchrony in anxiety disorders. 
4). Priority should also be given to the study of cognitive changes 
and their relationship to changes in mood. They suggest 
that they should precede or accompany attempts to determine 
the relative efficacy of cognitive therapies in conjunction 
with, or compared with, other therapeutic approaches. 
5). Research is needed into cost-effectiveness measures. 
6). Research should be conducted to examine differences between 
treatment responders and non-responders. 
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7). Research should be conducted to examine the usefulness of 
self-help manuals combined with various levels of therapist 
intervention. 
8). Research is needed on methods for reducing relapse and for 
increasing genralisation of treatment effectiveness. 
The present study hopes to incorporate all of these recommendations. 
** ******************* 
Particular attention will be paid to cognitive theory and therapy. 
As noted previously, much has been made of the "cognitive revolution". 
However, as Latimer and Sweet (1984) point out, unless it can be shown 
that the inclusion of cognitive procedures in existing behavioural 
techniques increases treatment effectiveness, then nothing "revolutionary" 
has been added and perhaps nothing of value. There is, therefore, a 
need to evaluate not only whether cognitive procedures are effective 
but also to evaluate the cognitive theory underlying those procedures. 
In particular, Latimer and Sweet ask: 
1). Are cognitive distortions altered by effective therapy? 
2). If so, is cognitive therapy better at this than behavioural 
therapy? 
3). Is the alteration of these distortions necessary for 
successful outcome? 
The present study will direct its attention towards these questions. 
*********************** 
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In summary, the present study intends to look at the following 
questions: 
1). Does a multi-dimensional group therapy package result in 
significant improvements in GAD patients treated in primary care? 
2). Are treatment gains maintained at six month follow-up? 
3). Are there any outcome differences between Cognitive, Behavioural, 
Cognitive-behavioural, Placebo and Waiting List conditions? 
4). Do patients in each condition show a different process of 
change - specifically in terms of the three (or four) systems 
of anxiety? 
5). Does cognitive change, in terms of positive and negative self- 
statements differ between the therapy conditions? 
6). Does the presence of panic affect outcome within and/or between 
the therapy conditions? 
7). Does matching the patient to therapy (i. e. consonant therapy) 
improve outcome? 
r 
8). Does the presence of desync}Zonous change affect outcome? 
9). Can treatment outcome be predicted from pre-treatment variables? 
10). Can treatment responders and non-responders be reliably 
discriminated? 
11). Are the results also of clinical as well as statistical 
significance? 
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CHAPTER 8 
METHOD 
METHOD 
1. OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURE 
Consecutive out-patients, referred to the Primary Care Service for 
treatment of generalised anxiety, were assigned to one of five 
conditions: 
1. Cognitive Therapy. 
2. Behaviour Therapy. 
3. Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy. 
4. Placebo. 
5. Waiting List. 
There were two groups for each of the active therapy conditions and 
one placebo group. 
Patients were initially assessed during an individual appointment one 
to three weeks prior to the group therapy using the revised Anxiety 
Disorder Interview Schedule (ADIS-R) (Di Nardo et al, 1985). Those 
patients meeting the ADIS-R criteria for generalised anxiety disorder 
(GAD) and meeting other criteria, were offered a place on the next 
Stress Control group therapy programme. The therapy, run by two 
psychologists, comprised six two hour sessions. 
Main measures were taken pre-, mid-, and post-therapy and at six month 
follow-up. Process measures were taken throughout the group therapy 
and at six month follow-up. Baseline measures (diaries) were recorded 
between the individual assessment interview and commencement of the 
course. 
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2. SUBJECTS AND SUBJECT RECRUITMENT 
a). General. 
All subjects were referred by their General Practitioners to a well 
developed Primary Care Service in Hamilton/East Kilbride Unit 
(Lanarkshire Health Board). On the basis of details in the referral 
letter, subjects were put on to a 'Stress Control' waiting list instead 
of being placed on the general waiting list. At this point, they were 
sent a standard letter (sent to all referred patients) informing them 
that due to the very long waiting list, it would be approximately one 
year before an appointment would be offered. Approximately one month 
before a course and approximately 3 months after being referred, 
consecutive subjects were offered an individual assessment appointment. 
They were also informed at this stage, that the assessment would be to 
judge their suitability for group therapy. The individual assessments 
took place between one to three weeks prior to a group beginning. 
It was made clear that if they did not wish to take part in the group 
therapy, they would be placed back on the general waiting list at the 
appropriate point (patients who did not reach criteria were generally 
offered alternative individual therapy immediately). Random allocation 
was not possible as, generally, only one course ran at any one time 
therefore a 'batch' of subjects were allocated to whichever course 
was next to take place. 
On the basis of information in the referral letter, 185 subjects were 
offered an individual assessment interview. 133 reached the criteria 
imposed and were offered a place on a Stress Control group therapy. 
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Information regarding each treatment condition is provided separately 
below. 
As Stress Control was part of a regular clinical service, patients 
with other diagnoses were, where appropriate, offered a place on the 
course if it was thought attendance at the group would augment 
individual therapy. For example, agoraphobic patients could attend the 
group not only to learn control over generalised anxiety symptoms but 
also to expose themselves to an anxiety-provoking situation. Similarly, 
a socially phobic individual could use the setting as an appropriate 
situation to practise conversation skills in-vivo. Thus, total numbers 
attending each group exceed the number of GAD individuals noted below. 
Although all individuals attending the course completed the measures 
only data on GAD subjects are presented here. 
Exclusion Criteria. 
It was decided to exclude subjects from data analysis if data were 
missing for more than one test point for main measures (pre-, mid-, post- 
therapy and follow-up) and/or more than two of the seven test points 
for process measures. In addition, subjects were excluded from 
analysis if they attended for less than five of the six group sessions. 
In the following sections, information concerning subjects within 
each condition is presented. 
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b). Cognitive Therapy Condition. 
Group 1. 
29 patients were offered an assessment interview, 26 of whom attended. 
3 patients did not reach trial criteria; they comprised 1 panic disorder, 
1 marital problem and 1 patient who had a sub-clinical problem. Of 
the 23 patients offered a place on the course, 22 accepted, 19 attended 
the first session and 1 dropped out during therapy. 3 patients did 
not furnish adequate data and were thus excluded from the analysis 
leaving 15 CAD subjects in all. 
In addition to these GAD patients, 4 patients receiving concurrent 
individual therapy attended all sessions. These comprised 2 agoraphobics 
(with panic) and 2 panic disorder patients. Thus in all, the group 
consisted of 23 patients of whom 22 completed the course. 
Group 2 
31 patients were offered an assessment interview, 30 of whom attended. 
7 patients did not reach trial criteria; they comprised - 
1 schizophrenic, 3 panic disorder, 2 depressed and 1 sub-clinical problem. 
Of the 23 patients offered a place on the course, 21 accepted. 11 of 
these were initially put into the waiting list condition for 6 weeks 
jprior to the group therapy. 20 attended the first session and 2 dropped 
out during therapy. 2 patients did not furnish adequate data and were 
thus excluded, leaving 16 GAD subjects in all. 
In addition, 2 patients receiving concurrent individual therapy attended 
all sessions, both having panic disorder and-both of whom completed the 
course. Thus, in all, the group consisted of 22 patients of whom 20 
completed the course. 
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c). Behaviour Therapy Condition. 
Group 1 
24 patients were offered an assessment interview, 21 of whom attended. 
5 patients did not reach trial criteria: they comprised 2 agoraphobic, 
2 depressed and 1 socially phobic patient. Of the 16 patients offered 
a place on this course, all accepted and attended the first session, 
and completed the course. 2 patients did not furnish adequate information 
and were thus excluded from analysis, leaving 14 GAD subjects in all. 
In addition, 4 patients receiving concurrent individual therapy attended 
the course of whom 1 dropped out. They comprised 3 agoraphobics 
(2 with panic) and one socially phobic patient. Thus, in all, the 
group consisted of 20 patients of whom 19 completed the course. 
Group 2. 
33 patients were offered an assessment interview, 29 of whom attended. 
6 patients did not reach trial criteria: they comprised 3 agoraphobics 
and 3 depressed patients. Of the 23 offered a place on the course, all 
accepted. 22 attended the first session and 2 dropped out, 3 patients 
did not furnish adeuate data and were thus excluded, leaving 17 GAD 
subjects. 
In addition, 2 patients receiving concurrent individual therapy completed 
the course. Both had agoraphobia with panic. Thus, in all, the 
group consisted of 24 patients of whom 22 completed the course. 
ý 1 
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d). Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy Condition. 
Group 1 
30 patients were offered an assessment interview, 27 of whom attended. 
6 patients did not reach trial criteria: they comprised 3 panic disorder, 
1 agoraphobic, 1 depressed and 1 alcohol abusing patient. Of the 
21 patients offered a place on the course, all accepted. 19 attended 
the first session and 2 dropped out. 2 patients did not furnish 
adequate data and were thus excluded leaving 15 GAD subjects in all. 
In addition, 3 patients receiving concurrent individual therapy completed 
the course. Two had agoraphobia with panic and one was socially phobic. 
Thus, in all, the group consisted of 22 patients of whom 20 completed 
the course. 
Group 2 
23 patients were offered an assessment interview of whom 20 attended. 
4 patients did not reach trial criteria: they comprised 1 schizophrenic, 
1 agoraphobic and 2 depressed patients. Of the 16 patients offered a 
place on the course, 15 attended, 1 dropped out and 3 did not furnish 
adequate data leaving 11 GAD subjects in all. 
In addition, 2 agoraphobic (with panic) patients completed the course. 
Thus, in all, the group consisted of 18 patients of whom 17 completed 
the course. 
e). Placebo Condition. 
This comprised 1 group. 15 patients were offered an assessment interview 
of whom 14 attended. 3 patients did not reachltrial criteria. They 
comprised 2 panic disorder and 1 depressed patients. Of the 11 patients 
offered a place on the course, 1 declined. The remaining 10 attended 
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the first session and completed the course. All subjects furnished 
sufficient data. There were no concurrent individual therapy 
patients in this group which thus comprised of 10 GAD subjects who 
began and completed the course. 
ý***ý***ý**ý*****ý****** 
f). Summary of subject allocation and subject characteristics. 
In summary, Table 1 provides information regarding subject 
allocation. 
TABLE 1: Subject allocation details for the five experimental conditions. 
Ccgnttive B: haviour Cogs. -Beh. Placebo Waiting 
RM-aw w T1Y List 
Umber r hirg 
criteria and accept- 41 39 37 10 - 
irg place cn course 
? &rter attending 
first session 39 33 34 10 - 
Umber cm pletlrg 
ccm->-- (> 5 sess3. ns) 36 36 31 10 - 
Umber anpleting 
adequate data 31 31 26 10 11 
203 
Table 2 details subject characteristics. 
TABLE 2: Details of subject characteristics for the five 
experimental conditions. 
Oaipitive Behavi oural Ccgn. -$eh. Placebo Waiting 
List 
ýian SD Mean SD Mean SD an SD Nh., an Sd 
Age (Years) 36.9 11.4 40 11.7 41.8 12 33.1 7.7 37.9 11.2 
Duratirn (Years) 6.4 6.1 6.6 4.2 8.9 6.9 4 3 3.7 2.5 
Time an waiting 
list (weeks) 
12.8 9 13.5 10.5 15.8 7.3 13.5 6.6 6.9 5 
n n n n n 
Male 
s 
6 10 6 5 3 
ex 
Fanle 25 21 20 5 8 
Prcvi'ots Yes hi t i 
6 5 3 3 2 Psyc a r c 
Treatcmt cb 25 26 23 7 9 
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3. ASSESSMENT INTERVIEW 
Subjects were assessed by either the present author (JW) or by the 
co-therapist (MK), using a shortened version of the revised Anxiety 
Disorder Interview Schedule - ADIS-R (Di Nardo, O'Brien, Barlow, Waddell 
and Blanchard, 1985). This involves a structured interview designed to 
permit differential diagnosis among the anxiety disorders according 
to DSM-III-R and to provide detailed information for functional analyses 
of the anxiety disorders. 
DSM-III-R and ADIS-R do not adhere to the hierarchical organisation 
that was present in DSM-III, where, for example, any anxiety disorder 
such as panic disorder could be subsumed under an affective disorder if 
an affective disorder were also found. Thus ADIS-R, which also requires 
clinical judgement and experience of the anxiety disorders, involves the 
clinician assessing patterns of comorbidity and making a distinction 
between a primary and a secondary disorder, based on severity and 
interference with functioning. In some cases a patient may be assigned 
2 (or conceivably more) primary diagnoses. 
In addition to providing information required for establishing the 
diagnostic criteria, ADIS-R gathers information on the history of the 
problem, situational and cognitive factors influencing the anxiety and use 
of symptom ratings (including depression). As the full version of 
ADIS-R takes about two hours to complete and as it was hoped to use 
ADIS-R on a routine basis in primary care work, it was decided to omit 
the rating scales (Hamilton Anxiety and Depression Scales). In addition, 
only patients receiving a primary diagnosis of GAD (with no other primary 
diagnosis present) were considered for inclusion in the present study. 
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Di Nardo et al (1983), using ADIS (DSM-III criteria) found a low-KAPPA 
co-efficient (. 467) for CAD based on only six subjects. Barlow (1985) 
extending this study, found a KAPPA co-efficient of . 571 based on twelve 
patients. Although suggesting diagnostic reliability, the KAPPA 
co-efficient, for GAD remain lower than for disorders for which clear 
behavioural referrants are available, e. g. social phobia (. 905). 
ADIS-R is reproduced in Appendix 1. 
If subjects were assigned a primary diagnosis of GAD and also met 
additional criteria (see below), the nature of the therapy and research 
were explained in detail. Subjects were given a therapy booklet 
(see below), consent form, pre-treatment questionnaires and baseline 
diaries to complete at home. They were also given written information 
about the nature of the therapy and research. The referring General 
Practitioner was written to and a standardised consent form sent. 
Subjects were then not seen until the first session of the Stress Control 
group therapy. 
Additional criteria. 
1. Age between 18 and 65. 
2. Vo previous contact with the Clinical Psychology Department 
or concurrent therapy from Clinical Psychology or Psychiatry. 
3. Symptoms existing for at least 1 year. 
4. Written consent obtained from subject and G. P. 
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5. Those patients currently taking psychotropic medication 
accept maintaining regular dosage throughout therapy. 
6. Subjects rate anxiety level at a minimum of 5 on a 12 point 
scale ranging from no anxiety to extreme anxiety. 
Although ADIS-R requires symptom duration of at least six months, 
it was decided to impose a criterion of at least 1 year duration of 
symptoms in order to have chronic anxiety patients who were representative 
of primary care referrals. In fact, all patients who met the six 
month criterion imposed by ADIS-R also met the 1 year criterion imposed 
by the present study. 
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4. TREATMENT CONDITIONS - 1. 
a). General - "Stress Control" entails six two hour sessions in the 
Hunter Health Centre, East Kilbride. It was devised by the present 
author and female co-therapist (MK). Both therapists have extensive 
experience in cognitive and behavioural treatment of anxiety disorders 
in primary care in both individual and group therapy. Both psychologists 
had run four Stress Control groups prior to the present study (Cognitive 
Behavioural therapy). The present author, following training in 
behavioural theory and therapies, participated in several cognitive therapy 
workshops including those led by Meichenbaum and Beck. 
Subjects were encouraged to see Stress Control as an "evening class" 
rather than "group therapy". The classes were held in a large, 
comfortable staff room at a time when the Health Centre was empty. 
Stress Control entails a large didactic component although subjects' 
comments were welcome. However, prior to , and during, the course, 
subjects were explicitly told that they did not have to speak if they 
did not wish to. . As Stress Control comprised up to 24 subjects, this 
was easily accomplished. Subjects were told that the aims of Stress 
Control were: 
1. To teach them about the nature of anxiety and its associated problems. 
2. To teach them methods for controlling these problems. 
3. To give them the opportunity of practising these techniques both 
within and between sessions. 
4. To turn them into their own "therapists" and thus be able to 
deal with present and future problems. 
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Therefore subjects were asked to see Stress Control as a training 
course rather than as a therapy during which the psychologists 
"treated" patients. 
b). Teaching Style 
In agreement with Meichenbaum (1985), we believe that many therapy 
programmes do not emphasise the important role of the therapist - patient 
relationship which provides a framework in which coping skills are 
nurtured. Both psychologists deliberately adopted a relaxed style, 
first names were used and humour introduced when appropriate. Teaching 
was augmented by anecdotes about (generally fictitious) patients. In 
accordance with Meichenbaum (1985), it was felt that, by the use of 
these "stories", anecdotes could act as a retrieval cue for the recall 
of relevant information. The use of anecdotes also allowed the 
psychologists to talk about problems and failures and ways in which 
these past "patients" had dealt with them. 
Subjects were explicitly asked not to discuss personal problems unless 
this would involve a discussion in ways of dealing more effectively or 
to enhance understanding of the topic under discussion. 
c). Group Format 
All therapy conditions followed the same format. In general, each 
session entailed: 
1. Review: of last session. Feedback encouraged re problems/successes 
in using techniques between sessions. 
2. Education : The psychologists talk in detail about that session's 
topic, e. g. nature of negative self-statements, avoidance, etc. 
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3. Therapy: Based on 2. This involves teaching a specific approach 
to be used to deal with the session's topic, e. g. relaxation techniques, 
'graded practice, etc. 
4. Tea Break. 
5. Imaginal Test (see page 229) 
6. Workshop: Group divides into two, each sub-group led by a psychologist. 
Subjects are given the opportunity to practice the skills learned 
earlier in the session. Subjects are also given the opportunity to go 
over any aspect of the session they had not understood or to ask for 
additional information, etc. 
7. Review: Information taught during session reviewed. 
8. Homework assignment: Based on the therapeutic technique taught and 
practised during the session. 
Subjects were discouraged from asking for individual help at any 
point during or after each session. It was emphasised that 
Stress Control was a "complete" therapy and that subjects would not 
be offered further therapy following the end of the course. 
All sessions in all conditions were audio-taped. 
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TREATMENT CONDITIONS -2 
There were five conditions: 
1. Cognitive Therapy. 
2. Behaviour Therapy. 
3. Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy. 
4. Placebo. 
5. Waiting list. 
There were two groups in each of the active therapy conditions, and 
one Placebo group. The ten subjects in the Waiting list group later 
joined the second Cognitive therapy group. 
A brief summary of the therapy conditions is given here. A detailed 
description of the therapies appear in Appendix 2. 
a. Cognitive Therapy 
This therapy, devised by the present author, developed from the work of 
Beck and, in particular, Meichenbaum. The course entailed: 
Session 1- Overview of information contained in the cognitive booklet. 
Session 2a) -A description of tranquillisers and their usage. 
b) - Identification of negative self-statements. 
Session 3- Monitoring of negative self-statements and use of 
rational re-appraisal. 
Session 4- Continuation of the previous session and the division 
of anxiety management into Meichenbaum's four stages. 
Session 5a) - The assessment and alteration of dysfunctional assumptions. 
b) - Cognitive treatment of panic attacks. 
Session 6a) - Associated problems (depression and insomnia). 
b) - Review and relapse prevention. 
211 
b. Behaviour Therapy. 
This approach, devised by the present author, comprised behavioural 
therapies found useful in previous individual and group therapies. 
No cognitive approaches were utilised. The course entailed: 
Session 1- Overview of information contained in the behavioural 
booklet. 
Session 2 a) - Information about tranquillisers. 
b) - Progressive muscular relaxation. 
Session 3- Functional analysis of anxiety. 
Session 4- Exposure therapy - targeting and graded exposure. 
Session 5 a) - Behavioural relaxation training. 
b) - Behavioural treatment of panic attacks. 
Session 6 a) - Associated problems (depression and insomnia). 
b) - Review and relapse prevention. 
c. Cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
This approach was devised by the present author and the co-therapist (MK). 
It had been developed over the course of four Stress Control groups 
which took place prior to the present study. 
Session 1- Overview of information contained in the 
cognitive-behavioural booklet. 
Session 2- As Behaviour therapy condition. 
Session 3- An amended cognitive approach based on Sessions 2, 
3 and 4 of the Cognitive Therapy condition. 
Session 4- An amended behavioural approach based on Sessions 3 
and 4 of the Behaviour therapy condition. 
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Session 5 a) - Meshing the therapies. 
b) - Cognitive-behavioural treatment of panic attacks. 
Session 6 a) - Associated problems (depression and insomnia). 
b) - Review and relapse prevention. 
d. Placebo - "Subconscious Reconditioning" 
The term was borrowed from Lent et al (1981). The treatment, devised 
by the present author, entailed highlighting the role of the subconscious 
in the production of, and maintenance of, anxiety. By reference to 
subliminal perception, it was explained that messages received by the 
sub-conscious mind could result in an alteration in behaviour. Thus 
by aiming anti-anxiety messages at the subconscious, it was suggested 
that anxiety could be alleviated. Anti-anxiety messages, both general 
and specific were said to be embedded in white noise and in musical 
tracks recorded on audio tapes which patients passively listened to 
both in group sessions and at home (a list of the musical tracks can be 
found in Appendix 3). In fact, no subliminal messages appear on the 
tapes. The aim of therapy was to "recondition the sub-conscious". 
The structure of each session adhered as closely as possible to that of 
the active therapy conditions. The course entailed: 
Session 1- Overview of information contained in the placebo booklet. 
Session 2 a) - Introduction to generalised anti-anxiety tape. 
b) - Specific anti-anxiety tape 1: Controlling your body. 
Session 3- Specific anti-anxiety tape 2: controlling your thoughts. 
Session 4- Specific anti-anxiety tape 3: controlling your actions. 
Session 5- Specific anti-anxiety tape 4: controlling panics 
Session 6 a) - Specific anti-anxiety tape 5: Asserting yourself. 
b) - Specific anti-anxiety tape 6: Controlling depression. 
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The placebo condition differed from the active therapy conditions 
in the following ways: 
1). Only 1 group of 10 patients were involved. 
2). Only 1 therapist (JW) ran the group. 
3). Patients were told it was an experimental condition and no 
expectation of success was given. 
4). Based on 3), patients were told, in person and in writing, before 
and immediately after therapy and, in writing, at six months 
follow-up that, if they felt they had not benefitted from 
Sub-conscious Reconditioning, 'traditional' individual treatment 
would be immediately offered. General Practitioners, who had 
consented to their patients being offered Placebo therapy were given 
the same information (no patient subsequently asked for individual 
therapy). 
e. Waiting List. 
Subjects who met the various criteria were told that they would be offered 
a place on Stress Control in six week's time and asked if they would 
complete (and return) questionnaires and diaries posted to them weekly 
during this time. Subjects therefore completed the main questionnaires 
at Weeks It 3 and 6. Diaries were completed daily and other process 
measures weekly. 
Subjects in this condition were then offered a place on the second 
cognitive therapy group thus the measures taken at Week 6 became the 
pre-treatment scores for the cognitive therapy condition. It should be 
noted that as no significant statistical change (indeed little change at 
all) took place, including this group in the cognitive therapy condition 
seems justified. 
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5. BOOKLETS 
a. General 
Four booklets have been written: 
1). Cognitive therapy. 
2). Behaviour therapy. 
3). Cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
4). Placebo. 
All four booklets are about 64 pages in length and in A5 size. All 
follow the same format and all divide into two main sections: 
i information section. 
ii treatment section. 
i Information Section 
Anxiety is described by use of the acronymn TAB. 
T: thoughts 
A: actions. 
B: body. 
The information section in each of the four booklets contains eight 
sub-sections. 
1). Information. 
2). What is anxiety? 
3). Anxiety symptoms. 
4). Are there different types of anxiety? 
5). What causes anxiety? 
6). What keeps anxiety going? 
7). Conclusions. 
8). Important statements about anxiety. 
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The main differences between the booklets are contained in Sections 
5,6 and 7 where the causes, maintenance and conclusions are suited 
to the particular therapy associated with that booklet. The aim of 
the first part of the booklet is to inform, rectify misconceptions 
(e. g. "anxiety is a mental illness") and help fit the therapy into a 
comprehensible framework. 
ii. Treatment section. 
The second half of the booklet, printed on different coloured pages, 
summarises the content of each session and provides written information 
on the treatment of anxiety which augments the spoken information given 
during each session. This part of the booklet: 
1). Helps guide subjects, prior to the course, towards the type 
of therapy involved and to generate realistic expectations 
about Stress Control. 
2). Acts as an aid to retrieve information discussed during sessions, 
most of which, in accordance with the findings of Ley 
(1972,1979) 
may be quickly forgotten. 
b. Specific 
i. Cognitive booklet. 
While discussing the same TAB model as in the other booklets, the 
cognitive booklet highlights a cognitive model of stress acquisition 
and maintenance. It highlights the causal status of cognition and 
diminishes the importance of behavioural and somatic symptoms. The 
therapy section emphasises the importance of identifying and eliminating 
dysfunctional thinking and replacing it with rational re-appraisals. 
The booklet is reproduced in Appendix 4. 
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ii. Behavioural booklet 
This booklet emphasises both the role of heightened arousal and 
mal-adaptive behaviours in causing and maintaining stress. It 
emphasises the need to control these two systems in order to achieve 
control over anxiety. Cognitive symptoms are seen as a consequence 
of these systems. This booklet is reproduced in Appendix 5. 
iii. Cognitive-behavioural booklet. 
This booklet accords equal importance to all three systems in causing 
and maintaining the 'vicious circle' of anxiety. The treatment 
rationale is based on the need to control all three. This booklet 
is reproduced in Appendix 6. 
iv. Placebo booklet. 
Adhering as far as possible to the same format as the other booklets, 
this booklet suggests that the three systems of anxiety (T A B) are 
caused and maintained by underlying subconscious conflict with the 
conscious mind. Therapy is based on the need to 'recondition' the 
subconscious by means of generalised and specialised 'anti-anxiety 
messages'. This booklet is reproduced in Appendix 7. 
c). Booklet intelligibility 
Flesch Formula reading scores (Flesch, 1948) have been calculated 
for all four booklets. This formula involves a 'reading ease' score 
on a scale between 0 (practically unreadable) and 100 (easy for any 
literate person). Based on the 'reading ease' score, Flesch (1948) 
provides a description of the style and enables an estimation of the 
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U. S. population who would understand a given piece of writing.. 
Ley (1977) provides a 'cautious' estimate of the IQ level required 
for understanding. 
Table 3 provides a description of reading ease for the booklets. 
TM E 3: Reading ease and intelligibility measures for the treatment booklets. 
Reading Ease Description 
of style 
% of population 
who would 
mderstand 
IQ required 
for 
caipreho-zirn 
0: *Pitive 73.8 Fairly easy 80 87+ 
BeFavi al 74.7 Fairly easy 80 87+ 
Co -Behav1 Ural 73.2 Fairly easy 80 87+ 
Placebo 73.2 Fairly easy 80 87+ 
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6. VIDEOS 
Two videos were used - an assessment interview standard to all 
conditions and a 'follow-up' interview. Three versions of the latter 
were produced each emphasising the techniques appropriate to the 
particular therapy condition. It was not possible to produce a 
follow-up video for the placebo group. 
Assessment Interview Video. 
The assessment interview was carried out by the co-therapist (MK). 
The 'patient' -a generally anxious middle-aged man, was role played 
by a Senior Nurse Tutor chosen specifically because of his experiences 
in dealing with anxiety patients and role playing ability. The 
interview lasts for 20 minutes and the symptoms are broken up into 
the three systems model. It emphasises the role of life events in 
the aetiology of the condition (death of mother, problems at work) and 
proved convincing to subjects. The limitation of the video/ is a 
slight over-emphasis by the 'patient' on his fear of cancer. 
Follow-up Video 
The 'follow-up' interview is set six months after Stress Control treatment. 
It involved the same 'therapist' and 'patient'. In each version of 
this video, the 'patient' is considerably improved although still 
experiencing some anxiety problems. He emphasises the importance of 
working hard at putting the techniques learned on the course into 
practice and the importance of accepting 'bad days'. Again this 
video seemed convincing to subjects. 
Copies of both of these videos are available from the present author. 
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?" BENZODIAZEPINES 
In order not to confound autonomic symptom ratings, subjects taking 
psychotropic medication (in practice all benzodiazepines) were asked 
to stay on their regular dosage until the end of treatment. Due to 
time limitations in setting up these groups, it was not possible to 
take patients off medication prior to the study. As all subjects 
had been taking benzodiazepine medication for more than four months, 
it is unlikely that any subject was receiving any active therapeutic 
effect from the medication (Committee on the Review of Medicines, 1980). 
Tranquilliser intake was noted on daily diary forms and inspection 
shows that, generally, subjects did maintain prescribed levels 
throughout the course. At the end of the course, they were offered, 
with G. P. approval, a self-help booklet written by the present 
author, giving information about tranquillisers and offering a slow 
reduction method. 
Table 4 shows the number of subjects in each condition taking 
benzodiazepines. 
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TABLE 4. Subjects taking benzodiazepines during therapy. 
Yes No 
Cognitive therapy 
19 12 
Total n= 31 
Behavioural therapy 
14 17 
Total n= 31 
Cognitive- 
Behavioural therapy 
12 14 
Total n= 26 
Placebo 
7 3 
Total n= 10 
Waiting list 
3 8 
Total n= 11 
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8. MEASURES 
For practical purposes, reliance was placed on self-report scales 
although some objective indices of change were also recorded. 
In order to provide a comprehensive assessment of treatment effects, 
a wide range of measures wý, re incorporated into this study. Whenever 
possible, measures were selected on the basis of established validity 
and reliability. Another consideration in the choice of some of the 
measures was their use in related research to help render the findings, 
to some extent at least, comparable. 
The measures can be divided into 3 categories: 
a) Main measures. 
b) Process measures. 
c) Other measures. 
All of the measures are detailed in Appendix 8. 
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a) MAIN MEASURES. 
These were completed at pre-, mid- and post-therapy and at six month 
follow-up and were as follows: 
I STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY - STAI 
(Spielberger et al 1970) 
ii MODIFIED SOMATIC PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE - MSPQ 
(Main, 1983) 
iii FEAR SURVEY SCHEDULE III - FSS-III 
(Wolpe and Lang, 1964). 
iv DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE -DAS 
(Weissman and Beck, 1978) 
v BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY - BDI 
(Beck et al, 1961). 
In terms of a three systems analysis of anxiety and in the absence of 
physiological and behavioural measures, the STAI, MSPQ and FSS were 
chosen as verbal measures of the three systems. The advantages and 
disadvantages associated with this approach will'be discussed elsewhere. 
The STAI: A-TRAIT and BDI in particular are used in most GAD studies 
thus comparison with these studies can also be considered. The DAS 
was chosen to test whether therapies which do not attempt to modify 
dysfunctional thinking can, nevertheless, alter dysfunctional attitudes. 
As Clancy et al (1978) have reported that 44% of GAD and PD patients 
present with secondary depression the BDI was included in the present 
study. 
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Further details of each measure 
i. STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY -STAI. 
The STAI consists of two scales each of twenty items. State anxiety 
(A-State) indicates how an individual feels at a particular moment in 
time. Trait anxiety (A-Trait) refers to relatively stable individual 
differences in anxiety proneness. 
The split-half reliabilities of the A-State and A-Trait scales, based 
on over 1500 college and high school students, indicate high levels of 
reliabilityfbr both scales (between the ranges of . 92 and . 83). Test- 
re-test reliabilities taken over one hour, 20 and 104 day intervals 
indicate that A-Trait scores were reliable (ranging from . 86 to . 73). 
A-State scores have lower levels of reliability (ranging from . 16 
to . 54). However, by definition, A-State refers to a transient level 
of anxiety and therefore low correlations are expected. 
Concurrent validity of A-Trait has been calculated by evaluating the 
correlation between A-Trait and IPAT (Cattell and Scheir, 1963), the 
MAS (Taylor, 1953) and the Zuckerman Affective Check List (Zuckerman 
1960). Results indicate a satisfactory level of validity (ranging from 
. 52 to . 84). 
ii. MODIFIED SOMATIC PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE - MSPQ 
This questionnaire was developed from the Mandler Autonomic Perception 
Questionnaires (MAFQ). The 33 item scale differentiating anxious 
patients from normal controls was used in this study. 
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Main (1983) reports on test - re-test reliability (taken over 1 day) 
only. Variables with a retest correlation of at least . 60 or a 
KAPPA value reaching significance at the p< . 01 level were included. 
Split-half reliability of the scale is . 89. 
Concurrent validity of the MSPQ when correlated with the MMPI 
flypochondriasis scale is . 61 and . 54 with 
the Zung Depression In' tory 
(lung 1965). 
M. FEAR SURVEY SCHEDULE. - FSS-III 
This consists of 72 items measuring the following sub-classification 
of fears : Animal; tissue damage; illness; death and associated stimuli; 
classical phobias; social stimuli; noises and miscellaneous fears. Only 
total scores are presented here. 
Geer (1965) found a split-half reliability for the FSS-II of . 939. 
Braun and Reynolds (1969) assessing test - retest reliability over 
10 weeks found correlations of . 88 for males and . 
85 for females. 
Lang and Lazovik (1963) note a concurrent validity of . 80 when 
correlating the FSS and the MAS (Taylor, 1953). 
iv. DYSFUNCTIONAL ATTITUDE SCALE - DAS 
In its original 100 item form, this form has been shown to be a reliable 
and valid measure of the beliefs and assumptions thought to underly 
the faulty cognitions associated with anxiety. 
These assumptions or beliefs act as schemas by which the individual's 
world is construed (for detailed psychometric data see Weissman and Beck, 
1978) 
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In order to facilitate compliance in completing this measure, it was 
decided to use the shorter, 35 item scale devised by Burns (1980). The 
scale measures 7 'value systems' - approval, love, achieving, perfectionism, 
entitlement, omnipotence and autonomy. Only the total score is presented 
here. The lower the total score, the more distored is the individual's 
way of thinking. There have been no reliability or validity studies 
on this version of the DAS. 
v. BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY - BDI 
This 21 item form, measuring depressed mood, has been shown to be a 
reliable and valid measure of depression. Beck and Beamesderfer (1974) 
report a split-half reliability coefficient of . 93. No test - retest 
reliabilities are reported as the above authors view traditional methods 
of assessing the stability and consistency of inventories as not being 
appropriate for the evaluation of the BDI. Indirect methods of 
evaluation strongly suggest stability over time. 
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b) PROCESS MEASURES 
The following were included as process measures: 
i. DAILY DIARY (devised by present author) 
1i FOUR SYSTEMS ANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE - FSAQ (Koksalf, 1987) 
iii COPING RESPONSES QUESTIONNAIRE -CRQ (Billings and Moos, 1981) 
iv IMAGINAL TEST (devised by present author). 
i. DAILY DIARY 
Subjects were given a weekly 'booklet' of diaries. The cover page 
contains instructions, the second page a completed example, followed by 
seven pages - one for each day of the week. Subjects completed three 
measures, each on an 11 cm line and scored 1 to 12. In the first two 
measures, a score of 12 indicates greatest distress. In the third 
measure, a score of 12 indicates least distress. 
a) Daily anxiety. 
Subjects were asked to rate : 
"How anxious have you been today? " A cross was placed at the 
appropriate point on the line graded from: 
"no anxiety" through "mild anxiety", "moderate anxiety", "marked anxiety" 
to "extreme anxiety. " 
b) Daily cognitions. 
Subjects were asked to rate: 
"How much time have you spent thinking or worrying about your 
problems today"? 
Subjects placed a cross on the line graded from: 
"No time" through "a bit of time", "a lot of time" through "all the time". 
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c) Daily coping 
Subjects were asked to rate: 
"How well have you coped today? " 
Subjects placed a cross at the appropriate point on a line graded 
from: 
"Extremely badly" through "Badly", "Moderately", "Well" to 
"Extremely well". 
Baseline measures were obtained for 1 to 3 weeks prior to commencement 
of therapy. Thereafter the diaries were kept throughout the course. 
ii FOUR SYSTEMS ANXIETY QUESTIONNAIRE - FSAQ 
This consists of 60 Thurston type (Yes - No) items. It comprises 
15 cognitive, 15 behavioural, 15 somatic and 15 mood items developed so 
that mean weights of each component are almost equal. 
The split-half reliabilities based on the responses of 
272 respondants 
(218 University students, 54 anxiety patients) were satisfactory 
for 
Total anxiety score (between the ranges . 89 to . 94); 
for the Mood 
component (. 76 to . 86); for the Cognitive component 
(. 71 to . 85); for 
the Behavioural component (. 59 to . 74) and-for 
the Somatic component 
(. 59 to . 74). 
Concurrent validity was evaluated by calculating the correlation between 
the FSAD and the Three Systems Anxiety Questionnaire (Lehrer and Woolfork, 
1982). Results indicate acceptable levels of validity (ranging from 
. 62 to . 87). 
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The FSAQ was completed, at home, after each session of Stress Control 
and at six month follow-up. 
iii COPING RESPONSES QUESTIONNAIRE - CRQ 
This consists of a 19 item scale measuring personal coping strategies. 
The CRD gauges three dimensions of coping: 
1) Active cognitive coping. 
2) Active behavioural coping 
3) Avoidance coping. 
Billings and Moos (1980) report that the internal consistencies of the 
method of coping categories are . 72 for active cognitive coping, . 
80 for 
active behavioural coping and . 44 for avoidance coping. 
The inter- 
correlations among the three methods of coping categories (X = . 21) indicate 
that the categories are relatively independent. 
The present study used the amended rating scale devised by Milne 
(personal communication, undated). Thus a five point frequency rating 
was employed ranging from 'almost never' to 'almost always' and scored 
0to4. 
The CRQ was completed at the same times as the FSAO. 
iv IMAGINAL TEST 
Devised by the present author, this was carried out during each session 
of Stress Control (i. e. six times in all). Cognitive theorists assume, 
not only that mal-adaptive cognitions are causally related to stress but 
also that successful treatment of anxiety involves removing these cognitions 
and replacing them with more adaptive cognitions. Thus, in order to 
a 
assess changes in cognitions and in particular negative and positive 
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self-statement, an expressive method has been devised based on studies 
by Sutton-Simon and Goldfried (1979), Craighead et al (1979) and 
Galassi et al (1981a, 1981b). (See Martzke et al, 1987, for a 
recent review of cognitive assessment techniques). 
Sutton Simon and Goldfried (1979) developed the Situations Questionnaire 
which allowed for open-ended responding. In that study, an anxiety 
provoking acrophobic situation was read to subjects who were then asked 
to complete two sentences: 
"In this situation I am feeling........... ". 
"I am feeling this way because I am thinking.......... " 
This, however, led to subjects being unable to produce a sufficient 
number of negative self-statements and scores were not sensitive to 
change. 
Therefore, in the present study, six diverse anxiety provoking situations 
were devised. Prior to the commencement of the present study, the 
situations were rated by 13 GAD patients outwith the study using a 
4 point scale. 
1. "Didn't make me feel anxious". 
2. "Made me feel a bit anxious". 
3. "Made me feel anxious". 
4. "Made me feel very anxious". 
All six situations were rated at "4" (Made me feel very anxious). 
The situations were based on those elicited from a factor analysis 
of the FSS carried out on the responses of a neurotic sample (Lawlis, 
1971) and from the studies identifying specific cognitions in GAD 
(e. g. Hibbert, 1984; Rapee, 1985). All situations are reproduced in 
Appendix 9. 
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In summary, the situations involved: 
Situation 1. 
This situation involves standing at the counter of a busy department 
store. You are unable to attract the assistant's attention to 
serve you even although people who have arrived after you at the 
counter are being served. 
Situation 2. 
You are sitting in a church at a wedding service when you feel 
increasingly hot and uncomfortable. You feel you may be sick and have 
to decide whether you should leave the church during the service. 
Situation 3. 
You are in the shopping centre. You chat to a neighbour until another 
neighbour comes up and begins talking to the other person and ignoring you. 
Situation 4 
You have been invited into your new neighbour's house for a drink. 
You do not know anyone else there. The atmosphere is formal and you 
feel out of your depth. 
Situation 5. 
You are standing in a queue outside the cinema. A down-and-out is 
being abusive to the people in the queue and is approaching you. 
Situation 6. 
You are sitting in your doctor's waiting room and having to listen to 
two men who are speaking loudly and contemptuously about anxiety sufferers. 
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One situation was read out during each session. The group was asked to 
close their eyes and the following standard instruction given: 
"In the following excerpt, I want you to imagine yourself 
in this situation, as if you are really there. Concentrate 
on how you feel and what you are thinking. Immediately 
after the situation has been described twice, continue to 
be aware of your thoughts and feelings and complete the 
questionnaire". 
The situation was then read twice. Immediately following the second 
presentation, subjects completed an 18 item questionnaire devised by 
the present author and included in Appendix 9. This was based on a 
self-statement questionnaire devised for social anxiety by Glass et al 
(1982). 
Subjects were asked to rate how strong their belief was in the following 
thoughts by placing a cross at the appropriate point on an 11 cm line 
which ranged from - 
"Don't believe at all to "Believe strongly". 
There then follows eight negative self-statements: 
e. g. "I can't cope with this", "I am making a fool of myself". 
and eight positive self-statements: 
e. g. "I am doing alright", "I can see this through to the end". 
There are two additional questions: 
1. How anxious were you when listening to the tape? 
Subjects placed a cross on an 11 cm line ranging from 
"Not at all anxious" to "Extremely anxious". 
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2. How well were you able to imagine yourself in the situation? 
Subjects placed a cross on an 11 cm line ranging from 
"Not at all well" to "Extremely well". 
The 16 self-statements and two questions were scored from 1- 12. 
Scores of 12 on the negative self-statements indicates more dysfunctional 
thinking while on the positive self-statements indicates more functional 
thinking. 
The sequence of presentation for each group was randomly 
determined 
(see Appendix 10). 
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OTHER MEASURES 
At pre- and post-therapy and follow-up, subjects completed the following 
questionnaires (all on 11 cm lines, scored 1- 12): 
i. ' STRESS CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE (SCQ) 
This questionnaire was devised by the present author. The pre-therapy 
version differed slightly from that used at post-therapy and follow-up. 
The alterations necessary for the latter two are placed here in 
parenthesis: 
1. flow anxious have you been over the last week? 
2. How appropriate is (was) the booklet in explaining stress? 
3. How well does (did) the booklet explain your own problem? 
4. How sensible does (did) the treatment seem to you? 
5. How well do you think this treatment will work for you? 
(How well did this treatment work for you? ) 
6. TO BE COMPLETED BY SPOUSE OR CLOSE RELATIVE. 
How would you rate your relative's/spouse's anxiety? 
7. Do you have any comments to make about the booklet? 
ii. COPING QUESTIONNAIRE (CO) 
This questionnaire was devised by the present author. 
1. flow well are you coping with your job (housework)? 
2. flow well are you coping with financial affairs? 
3. flow well are you coping with your social life? 
4. flow well are you coping with your marriage/relationship? 
5. flow well are you coping with your family? 
6. flow well are you generally coping with your life? 
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iii. CONSULTATION RATES. 
General Practitioners will be asked to calculate the number of 
consultations for each patient (for all problems) for the: 
1) Six months prior to therapy. 
2) Six months post therapy. 
iv. PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION PRESCRIPTIONS. 
As with the other objective measure noted above, G. P. s will be asked 
to calculate the number of psychotropic medication scripts issued to 
patients during the: 
1) Six months prior to therapy. 
2) Six months post therapy. 
v. COMPONENTS QUESTIONNAIRE. 
In a retrospective analysis, this questionnaire, devised by the present 
author, was sent to patients approximately nine months to one year 
following completion of therapy. Patients were asked: 
"Looking back on the course, can you rate each of the following items 
according to how useful (or useless) you found it. Rate each item on 
a scale of 1 to 100 with 1 being "no use at all" and 100 being 
"extremely useful". 
Patients were then presented with twelve components of Stress Control. 
Nine of the statements were applicable to all four treatment conditions, 
e. g. 
Hearing the psychologists talk about Stress Control; 
Being in a group and meeting others with similar problems. 
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The remaining four were specific to each therapy condition, e. g. 
"Learning about automatic thoughts"(Cognitive therapy). 
"Learning about avoidance" (Behaviour therapy). 
"Using your relaxation tape". (Cognitive-behaviour therapy). 
"Using the specialised anti-anxiety tapes". (Placebo). 
There were therfore four versions of the questionnaire - one for 
each treatment condition. All versions are reproduced in 
Appendix 11. 
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CHAPTER 9 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS. 
1. MAIN AND PROCESS DATA (pre- post-therapy) 
Due to the number of dependent variables in the present study, there was 
a large quantity of data for each patient. As repeated measures were 
available across the experimental period for each variable, statistical 
analysis using repeated measures analysis of variance with treatment type 
as the grouping factor was considered appropriate. 
This analysis generates main effects for time, treatment groups and 
treatment x time interaction effects. Further exploration of significant 
main effects concentrates on the sub-effects of treatment group within time 
(i. e. which between group differences were significant at which time points), 
and time within treatment group (i. e. at which point significant change 
occurs within each treatment). This design is termed "split-plot 
factorial" - SPF (see Kirk (1968) for detailed information on the design 
identified as SPF - 2.4. ) 
All analyses were conducted on main frame computing facilities using 
SPSSX programmes. In the results sections, SPSSX commands (and sub- 
commands) are printed in block capital script in order to identify the 
procedures selected. 
Manova 
O'Brien and Kaiser (1985) outlined detailed recommendations and computing 
instructions for analysing repeated measure designs using the MANOVA 
approach. This involves the computation of change scores as time contrast 
ý.. 
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variables for the within subjects part of the analysis and the use of 
these as dependent variables in a regular MANOVA with the grouping factor 
acting as the between subjects test. The present study derives change 
scores using the formula : pre-therapy - score at week n. 
This approach provides multivariate tests of significance with associated 
F ratios and probabilities for the time main effect and the treatment x 
time interaction. There are three alternative multivariate test statistics: 
Pillai, Hotelling and Wilks. All have the same distributional assumptions 
and similar roots. All have good methods for converting them to appropriate 
F statistics (see Srivastava and Khatri, 1979). Olson (1976) compared 
these statistics and recommended Pillai for general use. In the present 
study, only Pillai will be quoted. 
Finally O'Brien and Kaiser (1985) recommend that the treatment group main 
effect is obtained by conducting ONEWAY ANOVA upon the average score of 
all data points. 
Concerning the issue of how to follow-up significant multivariate effects 
in order to understand the data set and identify the source(s) of main 
effects, Borgen and Selling (1978) advocate the use of discriminant 
function analysis while others argue for further exploration via 
univariate ANOVAS especially when hypothesis testing is required 
(Spector, 1977; O'Brien and Kaiser, 1985). As the SPSSX MANOVA programme 
is very adaptable in this respect (see Table 6 in O'Brien and Kaiser), the 
latter approach was utilised in the present study. 
r 
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Following a significant F value, the specific significant group 
differences were then identified using NEWMAN-KEULS test. The principle 
advantages of the. Newman-Keuls test are that it preserves the overall 
significance level and it is possible, therefore, to determine which 
pairs of means differ significantly with more assurance, and more 
parsimoniously, than by the use of multiple paired comparisons. 
(Zivin and Bartko, 1976). 
MANOVA was selected for the following reason: 
1. Huck and McLean (1975) point out disadvantges in using the ANOVA 
approach - performing separate univariate analyses of multiple measures 
on the same subjects may inflate Type 1 errors, i. e. an unwarranted 
rejection of the null hypothesis (Bock, 1975; Turner, 1978). This could 
lead, in treatment outcome research, to concluding that true differences 
exist where, in fact, there are none. While one option is to 
conservatively adjust alpha levels, MANOVA can be regarded as more likely 
to produce reliable treatment effects (Hummel and Sligo, 1971). 
2. It is asumed that, in regular ANOVA, repeated observations are 
independent. However, as Jaccard and Ackerman (1985) point out, in 
clinical psychology this 'sphericity' demand is unlikely to be net as 
successive measurements are often more highly correlated than non- 
successive measurements. Regular ANOVA also assumes equality of group 
variances as a pre-condition for sphericity. O'Brien and Kaiser (1985) 
however, state "In general, sphericity is unnatural for most repeated 
measures data, and we believe that it is commonly violated in most 
designs with more than two repeated measures" (page 317). 
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Box (1954) established that non-sphericity artificially inflates F 
values for omnibus tests of main effects resulting in inflated Type 1 
error rate. While systematic reduction of the degrees of freedom for 
the sampling distribution of the F statistic may be one solution for the 
ANOVA approach (e. g. see Huynh and Feldt, 1976) the MANOVA approach 
presents no difficulties regarding proper error terms or modifications 
to the degrees of freedom. 
3. O'Brien and Kaiser (1985) suggest that the greatest virtue of MANOVA 
is that, in the strictest sense, it is the natural generalisation of the 
use of the specific type of error term for contrasts with one degree of 
freedom. MANOVA handles sets of contrasts in such a way that each contrast 
in the set remains linked with just its specific error term. As a result, 
all the problems associated with general (average) error terms are avoided. 
They conclude - 
"Because no clear-cut power differences exist, the best strategy is to 
choose a single method and seek to master it. We believe that method 
should be the MANOVA approach". (page 319). 
2. FOLLOW-UP DATA. 
In order to investigate the significance of change over time within 
each of the treatment groups, PAIRED T-TESTS were conducted on post-therapy 
and follow-up scores. In order to investigate between group differences 
change scores were computed : (pre-follow-up) - (pre-post) and 
subjected to ONEWAY ANOVA. This approach was preferred to ANCOVA with 
G 
pre-therapy scores as the covariate (Huck and McLean, 1975) as the 
SPSSX ONEWAY programme allows the use of supplementary range-testing 
procedures (in the study, NEWMAN-KEULS) to identify the loci of 
significant effects. 
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3. OTHER MEASURES. 
The objective measures employed - number of psychotropic prescriptions 
and number of G. P. consultations, the Stress Control Questionnaire and 
the Coping Questionnaire-were assessed by means of PAIRED T-TESTS for 
within group change and ONEWAY ANOVA for between group differences as 
outlined above. 
4. HANDLING OF MISSING DATA. 
There was a negligible amount of missing data over the course of treatment 
although at follow-up an average of 15% of data were missing across all 
outcome measures. These missing values were distributed across all 
treatment conditions and were not differentiately associated with high 
or low pre-treatment scores. A weighted score was substituted for 
missing values (Winer, 1972) to take account of trends over the data. 
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CHAPTER 10 
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS 
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PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS 
Prior to embarking on the treatment outcome analyses, seven important 
issues must be addressed: 
1). Similarity of baseline measures across conditions. 
2). Similarity of groups within each active treatment condition. 
3). Homogeneity of subjects across conditions. 
4). Comparison of repeated measures analysis of co-variance 
and change scores. 
5). Credibility of expectation factors associated with the 
treatment conditions. 
6). Distinctiveness of the treatment conditions. 
7). Comparability with other studies. 
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1). Similarity of baseline measures across conditions. 
Each subject in the treatment conditions completed the daily diaries for 
between one and three weeks prior to treatment. As most subjects 
completed diaries for between one and two weeks, it was decided to compute 
one mean score over this period for each subject. Subjects also completed 
all main and process measures prior to the commencement of therapy. 
In order to test whether the allocation method resulted in any significant 
differences across conditions on all clinical and demographic pre-treatment 
variables, a ONEWAY ANOVA was conducted across the five experimental 
conditions. The NEWMAN-KEU[S test was applied to identify the loci of 
any significant differences. 
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Forty-one variables were subjected to the test. Two variables 
showed significant differences: 
a) SCO - 2nd item. "How appropriate is the booklet in 
explaining stress? " 
The Behavioural condition scored significantly higher than the Cognitive 
behavioural condition (F (3,93) = 3.503, p< . 05). As the lower score 
was 9.4, on a 12 point scale, this difference was not considered clinically 
important. 
b) Diary - Daily Coping. "How well have 
; /coped today? " 
The Placebo condition scored significantly higher than the Behavioural 
condition (F (4,82) = 3.616, p< . 01). 
As was noted previously, the computation of change scores negates the 
influences of any baseline differences. In an analysis of 41 variables, 
2 significant differences would be expected by chance at the . 05 level). 
2). Groups within treatment conditions 
Each of the three active treatment conditions (Cognitive, Behavioural 
and Cognitive-behavioural) represents an amalgamation of two group 
therapies. In order to ensure that no differences existed between the 
two groups comprising each active condition, a ONEWAY ANOVA was conducted 
across the following groups :2 Cognitive therapy groups; 2 Behavioural 
therapy groups; 2 Cognitive-behavioural therapy groups; 1 Placebo group 
and the waiting list condition. 
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Forty-one variables (clinical and demographic) were subjected to the 
test. No differences emerged on any variable. It was thus concluded 
that combining the groups within each active therapy condition was 
justified. 
3). Homogeneity of subjects across conditions. 
As the assumption of homogeneity of variance is of importance in repeated 
measures designs, all pre-treatment variables were subjected to the 
COCHRAN homogeneity of variance test. All variables demonstrate homogeneity. 
4). Comparison of Repeated Measures ANCOVA and change scores. 
The case for the use of change scores as outlined by O'Brien and Kaiser 
(1985) has been made in a previous section. However, as the use of change 
scores has its critics, e. g. Cronbach and Furby (1970) who note that 
'raw change' or 'raw gain' scores are systematically related to any random 
error of measurement (see also Adams (1978), it was decided to compare the 
two approaches. All main and process measures were compared. The 
ANCOVA method (SPSSX) used the pre-treatment score as the covariate. 
Results indicated close agreement. In all cases significant F ratios found 
in one method were found in the other. It was thus felt that the use of 
change scores as previously outlined, was justified. 
5). Credibility and expectation factors. 
a) Credibility 
In order to investigate the credibility of treatment rationales, 3 
questions (on a 12 point scale) were assessed: 
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QUESTION 2: "How appropriate is the booklet in explaining stress? " 
QUESTION 3; "How well does the booklet explain your own problem? " 
QUESTION 4: "How sensible does the treatment seem to you? " 
Table 5 presents mean values for these questions across treatment 
conditions. 
TABLE 5. Comparison across treatment conditions of mean scores 
on credibility rating (SCQ 2- 4). 
Cognitive Behavioural Cogn-Beh. Placebo 
Question 2 10.84 11.06 9.38 10.90 
Question 3 9.52 10.10 8.58 9.40 
Question 4 9.58 10.3 9.44 10.30 
Although ONEWAY ANOVA produced a significant difference between the 
Behavioural and Cognitive-Behavioural condition on Question 2, it is 
clear that as the maximum score is 12, the results provide evidence for 
a high degree of treatment credibility across conditions. Of particular 
importance is the fact that subjects both in the active treatments and 
the placebo condition regard their treatments equally logical and credible. 
b). Expectation. 
In order to investigate subjects expectations of their therapy, Question 5 
from the SCO was assessed - "How well do you think . this therapy will work 
for you'? " Table 6 presents mean values for this question across 
treatment conditions. 
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TABLE 6. Comparison across treatment conditions of mean scores on 
the expectancy rating (SCQ5). 
Cognitive Behavioural Cogn-Beh. Placebo 
SCO-5 8.3 8.6 7.3 8.8 
ON WAY ANOVAS demonstrate that no significant differences existed between 
the four conditions. Of interest is the fact that active treatment and 
placebo conditions produce reasonably high levels of expectation of 
treatment success. 
6). Distinctiveness of the treatment conditions. 
It is of crucial importance to demonstrate that the treatments are distinct 
from one another. Although there are measures to assess treatment 
competence, e. g. the Cognitive Therapy Scale - CTS (Dobson et al, 1985) 
and treatment fidelity, e. g. the Minnesota Therapy Rating Scale - MTRS 
(DeRubeis et al, 1982), these measures are not suitable for use in large 
group studies. 
As all sessions in all conditions were audio-taped, two tapes were 
randomly selected from each of the Cognitive, Behavioural and Placebo 
conditions. (The Cognitive-behavioural condition was omitted as it, 
obviously, was composed of sections of the Cognitive and Behavioural 
conditions). The tapes were then given to two clinical psychologist 
raters outwith the study, both of whom were trained in cognitive and 
behavioural therapy. 
248 
The raters were simply asked to identify the type of therapy being 
carried out. Both raters independently demonstrated 100% accuracy 
in catching tapes to therapy condition. 
7). Comparability with other studies. 
In order, at a later stage, to compare treatment effectiveness of this 
study with other treatment outcome studies, we must first establish that 
patients in the present study are comparable in terms of pre-therapy 
ratings of anxiety. Table 7 presents a comparison of pre-treatment 
scores. The scores presented here represent the average scores across 
conditions in both the present and other studies. 
TADLE 7/ 
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TABLE 7. Comparison of mean pre-therapy scores - present study and 
other treatment outcome studies (* individual therapy, 
+ group therapy). 
COMPARISON STUDIES 
Variable Present Study 
" Mean Mean Author(s) and Presenting Problem. 
STAI: A-State 55.5 56.3 Butler et al (1987) - GAD * 
49.5 Eayres et al (1984) - 'generalised 
anxiety' + 
STAI: A Trait 57.9 55.5 Butler et al (1987) - GAD * 
54 Borkovec & Mathews (1988) - GAD * 
50.1 Jannoun et al (1982) - 'anxiety state' 
52 Eayres et al (1984) - 'generalised 
anxiety' + 
56.6 Powell et al (1987) - 'general anxiety' 
DAS 99.2 72.9 Durham & Turvey (1987) - 'general 
anxiety' 
BDI 19.1 16.5 Durham & Turvey (1987) - 'general 
anxiety' 
14 Borkovec & Mathews (1988) - GAD * 
E'SS 108.3 137.6 Woodward & Jones (1980) - 'general 
anxiety' + 
HSPO 31.3 28.2 Durham & Turvey (1987) - 'general 
anxiety' 
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Table 7 demonstrates clearly that the present study involves a 
representative sample. The present sample shows greater initial level 
of depression as measured by the BDI. The DAS scores are noticeably 
higher (i. e. more functional) than scores in the Durham and Turvey study. 
The discrepancy on FSS scores may be due to the Woodward and Jones study 
using a larger item FSS-III questionnaire thus inflating the score. The 
paper does not offer enough information to confirm this (see Tasto (1977) 
for a comprehensive review of FSS schedules). 
*** ************* 
Having addressed these important issues, we can now turn to the 
treatment outcome analyses. 
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